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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the institutional and functional aspects of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). The Taliban’s coercive approach and its entire reliance on “war-making” to “state-making” shows the difficulty of the transformation of an insurgent group into a state structure. The Taliban was primarily capable of establishing a two-track system of governance. However, the assessment of the IEA’s institutional and functional capabilities shows that the military–political organization formed by the Taliban lacked statehood in all three areas of legitimacy, authority and capacity.

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Introduction

The Taliban first emerged as an insurgent group in the midst of the Afghan civil war in 1994, it transformed into a state structure called the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) in 1996, and returned to insurgency in 2001. The existing literature mainly examines the Taliban as an insurgent and militant Islamist group and focuses on its changing strategies in Afghanistan. Yet, the IEA the Taliban formed in 1996 is rarely researched as a state structure. This paper focuses on the IEA and examines its institutional and functional aspects through the state studies lens.

Following the capturing of Kabul in September 1996, the Taliban formed a two-track governance system, a political-military leadership council called the Supreme Council in Kandahar and an executive bureau called the Council of...
Ministers in Kabul. The Supreme Council represented the Taliban as an insurgent group, while the Council of Ministers reflected the group’s efforts to transform into a state structure. This paper addresses two interconnected questions: what did the IEA look like and how did it function? Further, considering the IEA’s entire reliance on military means of the state formation, this paper asks why the Taliban decided to rely basically on ‘war making’ as a ‘state making’ strategy? Was it a choice or a default situation?

This paper argues that the IEA’s entire reliance on the violent means of state-making was a default situation produced by the civil war and linked to the nature of the Taliban as an insurgent group. Drawing on theories of the formation of the state, I investigate the institutional aspect of the IEA by focusing on its formation, structure, personality, and the territory, and measure its functional aspect by three variables, namely, legitimacy, authority, and capacity. While capable of capturing territory, the IEA entirely failed in producing regular governance and a state system. It fell short in all aspects of stateness. The IEA lacked both internal and external legitimacy, had poor authority, and was incapable of producing basic services.

The theoretical arguments of this paper are supported by original data belonging to the IEA and its internal rival, the Northern Alliance (NA), also known as the National United Front, which led the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA) in the 1990s. Data are collected from the IEA and NA’s official publications and legislations archived in Afghanistan Information Center based in Kabul University. The empirical finding of this paper shows that while suffering from a severe institutional fragility, the IEA was, functionally, a war-based entity – it was basically a ‘war-making’ structure. But despite its specialty at war, the IEA was incapable of eliminating its internal rival, militarily. Thus, while the IEA was successful in ‘war-making’ internally, it was incapable of ‘state making’ at its very minimum stage. Therefore, the IEA was incapable of successfully claiming its status as ‘the sole source of the right to use violence’ in Afghanistan, and lacked the capability to protect its clients and acquire the necessary means of governance. The IEA’s institutional fragility and its functional shortage were the results of its entire concentration and investment on war, the insurgent characteristic of its structure, and lack of resources.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the following part, I theorize the state. Next, I examine the formation of the IEA and its institutional characteristics. This part explains what the IEA looked like. The subsequent three parts investigate the functional aspects of the IEA by examining its legitimacy, authority, and capacity. In conclusion, I discuss the contribution of this paper.

**Theorizing the state**

By the state, this article refers to sovereign state which is ‘the assumption that the government of a state is internally supreme and externally independent’. The
state consists of two specific aspects, an institutional aspect, and a functional one.\(^5\) The institutional aspect of the state includes the state's institutions, personality, hierarchy, and the structure through which the state functions. Thus, the institutional aspect of the state is basically about what a state looks like.\(^6\) The functional aspect of the state includes the legitimate provision of the public goods of security, services, and justice in return for taxation.\(^7\) The state, then, can be defined as a territorially specific entity that functions through various hierarchies and institutions to fulfill its fundamental duties. Those duties include maintaining effective and legitimate institutions of government; preserving the monopoly over the use of violence within a given territory, providing security and basic services to the citizens in return of taxation.\(^8\) The state's institutional aspect, then, can be examined by than assessment of its structure, institutions, and hierarchies, and its functional capabilities can be measured by three variables, namely, legitimacy, authority, and capacity.\(^9\)

Weber (1919) defines the state as a form of human community that lay claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory.\(^10\) All other organizations, within a state, can use violence only insofar as the State permits them to do so.\(^11\) Therefore, the state is the sole source of the right to use violence in a given territory.\(^12\) However, in order to prevent social disorder and anti-state uprisings, the use of violence by the state has to be legitimate and people should obey it primarily by consent, rather than coercion. Therefore, a durable state requires what Weber calls it a ‘legitimate authority’. He identifies three major sources of a ‘legitimate authority’, namely, traditional, charismatic and rational-legal.\(^13\) The traditional rule is based on customs and traditions and is exercised by patriachs and patrimonial rulers.\(^14\) The charismatic rule is based on the charisma of a leader and is exercised by individuals such as prophets, the elected warlords, the ‘great demagogues’ and party leaders.\(^15\) And the rational-legal authority is based on impersonal rational rules, or ‘a person’s willingness to carry out statutory duties obediently.’\(^16\) This type of authority is practiced by the validity of legal status and practical competence. Weber describes this authority as the main characteristic of modern states.\(^17\)

Likewise, Tilly (1985) describes the state as a relatively centralized, differentiated organization the officials of which claim control over the chiefly concentrated means of violence within a population inhabiting a large, contiguous territory.\(^18\) Accordingly, Tilly’s conception of the state is similar to Weber’s political organization that lay claim to the monopoly of physical violence within a particular territory.\(^19\) However, Tilly goes further and elaborates different elements of the state more concretely. The state, according to Tilly, carries out four major duties: ‘war making’ or the elimination of the state’s external enemies; ‘state making’ or the elimination of the state’s internal rivals; protection or the elimination/neutralization of the enemies of its clients; and extraction or ‘acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities’.\(^20\) War-making yields armies, navies, and supporting services. State-making produces durable
instruments of surveillance and control within the territory. Protection relies on the organization of war-making and state-making and functions through specific state institutions such as courts and parliaments. Extraction brings fiscal and accounting structures into being. Yet, the state's all four duties depend on the state's tendency to monopolize the concentrated means of coercion. Therefore, the main purpose of those who monopolize the means of violence is primarily the elimination of their internal rivals which strengthens their ability to extract resources and protect their supporters. Accordingly, Tilly's theorization of the state includes two specific pillars: first, the concentration and the particular combination of capital and coercion within the state. Second, the interplay of war-making states on the international stage.

Finally, Mann (1984) organizes the main features of the state into two categories, an institutional category which includes a number of elements that define what a state looks like, and a functional category that describes what a state does. The institutional aspect of the state includes the state's institutions, personality, and a defined territory, while its functional aspect includes activities that a state is assigned to fulfill. Mann (1984) characterizes three ideological, military and economic bases for the state that determine its function. The ideology deals, basically, with the legitimacy, the military is about authority, and economy relates to the capacity of the state. These three measures determine whether a political entity enjoys statehood or not.

Considering Weber and Tilly's conceptualization of the state and Mann's categorization of the institutional and functional aspects of this political organization, I examine, first the institutional characteristics of the IEA and next focus on its functional aspect by measuring its legitimacy, authority and capacity. In this conception, legitimacy refers to the extent to which a state enjoys popular support domestically and acceptance internationally. Legitimacy, in this sense, refers to both internal and external legitimacy. Authority refers to a state's capability in exercising a monopoly over the use of legitimate violence within its territory. Authority, in this sense, refers to the state's security/military institutions and its capability of providing security within its sovereign borders, enacting legislation over a population, and providing a secure environment to its citizens. Finally, capacity includes the human and financial resources that a state has at its disposal. Capacity, in this sense, refers to the availability of vital resources, the state's economic size and the state capability of acquiring necessary means of governance and provision of basic services.

**IEA's formation and its institutional feature**

The Taliban emerged, primarily, as an insurgent group in the midst of Afghanistan's civil war, in 1994 in the southern province of Kandahar. The emergence of the Taliban, like all other warring groups in Afghanistan, had both internal and external causes. Internally, the group was the product of a civil
war in which ex-mujahidin and rebel groups fought one. Following the defeat of Najibullah’s government in April 1992, the central authority in Afghanistan was extremely disintegrated, the society was turned into the anarchical state of ‘war of all against all’ and no authority was capable of carrying out its end of ‘the social contract’. The anarchic environment had produced a political vacuum within the country and a lack of central governance which a group such as the Taliban was emerged to fill.

Externally, the Taliban’s formation was the product of the regional politics, particularly Pakistan’s regional ambitions. Evidence shows Pakistan’s ISI field officers, Pakistani Frontier Corps, and regular Pakistani armed forces personnel were directly involved in supporting the Taliban. Pakistan’s main purpose of sponsoring the Taliban was to create a regime in Kabul which would be favorable to Islamabad and to open an economic bloc extending as far as Central Asia. Having a favorable regime in Kabul would give Pakistan strategic depth and the opening of a trade route would bolster Pakistan’s hard-pressed economy and give the country greater strategic weight in its confrontation with India. However, the IEA’s officials never admitted, publicly, the direct military support of Pakistan. Rather, in the IEA’s official statements, Pakistan was stated as a ‘good’ ally and important supporter with an ‘an unbreakable and deep historical, cultural, religious and economic, unbreakable.’

A Sharia issue in March 1998, responding to the NA’s leaders’ accusation of Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan stated:

Pakistan was considered as an important supporter of the mujahidin during jihad [the anti-Soviet war of the 1980s] and sheltered millions of [Afghan] refugees in its territory and still welcome them. The Muslim nation of Afghanistan certainly values Pakistan’s brotherly approach and is highly satisfied of it.

Despite the Taliban’s official denial of Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan during the IEA’s rule, almost all publicly accessible international documents and reliable scholarly work confirm creation, funding, and mobilization of the Taliban by Pakistan. Pakistan was not the only country whose nationals joined and supported militarily the Taliban. Thousands of Arab, African, East Asian and Central Asian jihadis fought for the Taliban. Most of those fighters were organized, equipped and trained by al-Qaeda. Integration of the 055 Brigade of al-Qaeda which included around 2000 trained soldiers, into the Taliban force is a concrete example of the Taliban’s reliance on foreign fighters, particularly al-Qaeda.

Historically, the Taliban first emerged as a group of 30 madrassa students in a reaction to a local warlord who had abducted and repeatedly raped two teenage girls. In March 1994, the 30 Talibs/Taliban attacked the warlord’s camp, freed the girls and hanged the commander from the barrel of a tank. Following the ‘heroic’ event, the Taliban crossed the border into Pakistan where the number of the group increased to 200 in few months. Mobilized under Mullah Mohammad Omar’s command, these Talibs crossed the border into Afghanistan and took the control of Spinbuldak district of Kandahar province from Hekmatyar’s men.
in October 1994. Only, in next three months, the group took control of 12 of Afghanistan’s 31 provinces.

Following this victory, the Taliban organized a gathering of some 1200 Islamic clerics in Kandahar from 20 March to 4 April 1996. The Taliban’s leader, Mullah Mohammad Omer, was entitled in this gathering as the Amir al-Momenin, the Commander of the Faithful. According to Islamic tradition, Amir-al-Momenin is a political leader who has a religiously legitimate authority over people living in a territory controlled by his followers. Obeying Amir-al-Momenin is fardh (God’s demand and must be practiced). Therefore, anyone who refused bayat (oath of allegiance) to Amir-al-Momenin ‘would be called a rebel according to sharia. It would be a fardh to execute him/her’. In addition to entitling Mullah Omer as Amir-al-Momenin, some sources claim that the gathering renamed Afghanistan ‘the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ (IEA). However, a review of the Taliban’s official publications shows the term IEA was first used on 29 October 1997, a year after the Taliban captured Kabul. According to the Sharia, the renaming of Afghanistan was ordered by Mullah Omer on 13 October 1997. However, it is not explained why the IEA’s public announcement took more than two weeks:

In accordance with His Excellency Amir al-Momenin’s guidance of October 13, 1997, from this time on the Islamic State of Afghanistan will be named as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. All organizations and governmental institutions and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s citizens should do all their efforts to spread this message.

Before the announcement, the Sharia constantly called the regime of the Taliban ‘the Islamic State of Afghanistan’. The new title, Emirate, was justified by statements attributed to Islamic clerics:

The famous Alim and the principle of Rahat Abad Madrasa, Mawlana Rahat Gul, welcomed His Excellency Amir al-Momenin’s substitution of the Islamic State of Afghanistan with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. He characterized the Islamic Emirate as the continuation of Islamic Caliphate. He said that the term ‘state’ can be used both for Islamic and non-Islamic governments. But the term Emirate is specifically assigned to Islamic governments. According to him, the current government of Afghanistan is not a state, but an Emirate …

After capturing Kabul, the Taliban produced a two-track government, a leadership council (the Supreme Council) based in Kandahar and a Council of Ministers (the Kabul Council) based in Kabul. Mullah Omer himself acted as the head of the state. The Supreme Council had six members and directly led by Mullah Omer, and the Council of Ministers worked under the direct supervision of the Supreme Council. The Supreme Council had two subsidiary branches, an Ulema Shura or the Council of Clerics and a Military Council that consulted, respectively, the country’s religious and military affairs and worked directly under Mullah Omer’s command.

Besides the Supreme Council’s political and moral supremacy, all ‘administrative’ and ‘executive’ affairs were legally assigned to the Council of Ministers led by an individual called Rayees al-Wazara, the Chairman of the Council of Minister.
The rights and duties of the council were specified in a law entitled the Council of Ministers’ Act which was published in the Official Gazette on 2 May 2001. According to this act, the Council of the Ministers of the IEA was described as ‘the highest executive and administrative bureau of the government’. According to this act, the Council of Ministers was responsible for enforcing Sharia, lead the IEA’s internal and foreign policies, and manage and lead the country’s defensive affairs and its army. It was also considered responsible for organizing the country’s social, economic, cultural, and administrative affairs in Kabul and the provinces. If the Council of Ministers was given all authorities and responsibilities described in the Council of Ministers Act, then the Supreme Council would turn into a ceremonial body. Nonetheless, empirical evidence shows that the Supreme Council never stopped intervening in all major and minor affairs of the country from war-making to decision-making to issuing orders on all internal and external affairs. Therefore, although assigning the executive and administrative affairs of the IEA to a Council of Ministers, legally, the Supreme Council with an Amir al-Momenin at its head remained as the most influential and decisive body of the IEA, in practice.

The functional aspects of the IEA

While the previous section examined the IEA’s institutional formation, this section evaluates how those institutions functioned. As discussed in previous parts, the state is a territorially specific entity that functions through various institutions, hierarchy, and procedures. These functions include preserving the monopoly over the legitimate use of violence within a given territory, providing protection to its clients, maintaining effective and legitimate institutions of governance that meet basic welfare needs of the citizens and acquiring the necessary means to fulfill these fundamental duties. The degree of the state’s capability for meeting those functional requirements depends on nature of the governance and the state’s capability to rule the country, control its borders, and provide its citizens with security, justice, and services. Therefore, the state’s functional capability is measured by legitimacy, authority, and capacity.

Legitimacy

Poor internal and lack of external legitimacy was the main characteristic of the IEA. Internally, the IEA lacked a broad-based popular support and externally it was an unrecognized political organization in the international community. Internally, considering Weber’s articulation of the three basic sources of legitimacy, i.e. traditional, charismatic and rational-legal, the IEA relied on traditional sources of legitimacy and enforced them by coercion. The IEA legitimated its authority, in particular, on the basis of Islam. Although the IEA’s behavior was also based on the tradition of authority in Afghanistan according to which
Pashtuns dominantly ruled the country, Islam was the main source of legitimacy. The religious source of the Taliban’s rule was emphasized in official statements and documents. For example, Sharia’s first issue begins with:

‘The Islamic Movement of the Taliban is a revolutionary and religious movement … One can only expect from the Islamic Movement of the Taliban which is sprouted of the Islamic madrasas … the creation of a Sharia-based Islamic regime.’

Following the capturing of Kabul in September 1996, a Sharia editorial emphasizes:

Our platform is an Islamic one. We will follow this platform step by step. Every member of our Islamic movement is obliged to follow this platform … From its outset, our Islamic movement has promised to the Mujahid nation of Afghanistan of establishing an Islamic regime, enforcing Sharia …

Another issue of Sharia describes the IEA as a legitimate state on the basis of a number of religious reasons:

The Taliban’s uprising is supported by a large number of Islamic scholars, the IEA enforces Sharia completely … and the majority of the IEA’s leadership and officials are Sunni individuals and clerics.

The Taliban leadership emphasized that the IEA would enforce Sharia in Afghanistan by any means possible. As Mawlawi Wakil Ahmad Motawakkel, then the spokesman of the IEA, stated once that ‘for enforcing Islamic principles, the IEA will not have any tolerance’.

The IEA used Islam as a restrictive political source of legitimation to forbid any political activity opposed to the Taliban. The regime propagated that, with a pure Islamic regime in place, there is no need for any alternative political mechanisms such as a modern party or traditional tribal system. In an official statement published on the Sharia, for instance, Mullah Omer emphasized that ‘with the Taliban being in power there is no need for any kind of “elders’ grand council,” Loya Jirga, or any other “third party.” The IEA also emphasized that, with Islam being the legitimizing source of governance, it does not need to use ethnic, tribal, or sectarian politics. For example, through two separate statements, Mullah Omer, and the IEA’s Minister of Information and Culture, Mawlawi Qudratullah Jamal, emphasized on the IEA’s sole Islamic identity in which ethnic and sectarian lines are not important:

‘The Islamic Movement of the Taliban is inclusive of all ethnic groups, and therefore it represents the country’s faithful nation … the Taliban movement is an Islamic movement, and the leadership and members of this movement never think about ethnic and sectarian basis. In accordance with the Islamic Sharia, it respects all ethnic groups.’ It is a recognized reality that the IEA’s policies and platform are in accordance with Islam in which there is no majority and minority.

Almost all publicly accessible data and direct evidence and eyewitnesses of the time Taliban ruled Afghanistan confirm that the IEA was a religious regime which enforced Sharia in its most severe sense and by coercion. However, despite the Taliban’s claim of being ethnically tolerant, there is numerous empirical
data and evidence that indicate the IEA’s ethnic-based behavior. The IEA was entirely dominated by Pashtuns with other ethnic groups being excluded from the IEA’s political and leadership arenas. For example, non-Pashtuns were largely excluded from the IEA’s both governing councils, the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers. Of the six original members of the Supreme Council, five were Pashtuns and only one, Maulvi Sayed Ghausuddin, was a Tajik from Badakhshan. Likewise, out of 17 members of the Council of Ministers in 1998, only two were non-Pashtuns. Furthermore, the IEA appointed provincial governors and administrators of districts, cities, and towns from the center, Kandahar or Kabul, depending on the importance of the position. These administrators, particularly the governors of provinces and districts, were dominantly Pashtuns. In Kabul, Herat, and Mazar-e-Sharif – none of which have a Pashtun majority – the Taliban’s representatives such as governors, mayors, police chiefs and other senior administrators were invariably Pashtuns who either did not speak Farsi, the lingua franca of these cities or spoke it poorly. Overall, one can claim that Sharia was the major legitimizing basis of the IEA which was led exclusively by Pashtun mullahs who in most parts of Afghanistan followed a parallel Islamic and ethnic politics.

The IEA relied on a specific interpretation of Islamic Sharia, Deobandism, which is the subcontinental branch of the Islamist ideology. Deobandism follows a Salafist egalitarian model and like all Islamist schools seeks to emulate the life and times of the Prophet Mohammed. It rejects all forms of ijtihad – the use of reason to create innovations in sharia in response to new conditions. The Deobandi philosophy was founded in 1867 at the Dar ul-Ulum (Abode of Islamic Learning) madrassa in Deoband, India. Deobandi madrassas flourished across South Asia, and they were officially supported in Pakistan when President Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq assumed control of the Pakistani government in 1977. The Taliban members were students at these madrassas that were broadly controlled by Pakistani Islamist parties, particularly, the Jamaat Islami Pakistan (JIP), led by Qazi Hussein Ahmad, and Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islami Pakistan (JUIP) led by Maulana Fazl ul-Rahman. All characteristics of Deobandism were found in exaggerated form among the Afghan Taliban which was fundamentally alien in Afghanistan. The IEA’s Deobandi interpretation of sharia was reflected in the IEA’s legislations, policies and procedures. The IEA enforced numerous law decrees in accordance with the group’s interpretation of sharia. To make sure that these decrees were implemented in Afghanistan, the IEA established a religious police called Amr-e-Bil Marouf Wa Nahi Anil Munker or The General Department for the Preservation of Virtues and the Elimination of Vice. The organization had ‘thousands of informers in the army, government ministries, and hospitals who monitored foreigners and Western aid agencies’. Most of these informers were teenagers and recent graduates of the Pakistani madrassas. They patrolled the streets, making sure
that the people go to the mosque at the time of daily prayers, women are covered from head to toe with the burka, and men have not shaved their beard.\textsuperscript{72}

Although Afghanistan is an Islamic country and Islam has functioned as a source of legitimacy and jurisprudence for centuries, the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam and its coercive approach to enforcing it was not broadly welcomed in the country. Except for individuals who joined the Taliban, the rest of the Afghan population, even the rural religious communities, did not tend to freely follow the Taliban’s Islamism. Further, the IEA was not considered a legitimate authority by all rival parties that also considered themselves as Islamic organizations. The Payam-e-Mujahid, the official publication of Jamyat-e-Islami, the Taliban’s internal rival, for example, questioned the main legitimizing source of the IEA.\textsuperscript{73}

An Islamic fatwa published on this paper described the Taliban as a rebellion group that disobeys a religiously legitimate government, the Islamic State of Afghanistan, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani:

\begin{quote}
On the basis of Sharia, Rabbani’s government has not lost its legitimacy. Therefore disobedience of it is a subject to execution.\textsuperscript{74}
\end{quote}

While Islam has been a generally accepted source of political legitimation in Afghanistan, such statements indicate a high degree of disagreement and contradiction on interstation of Islamic Sharia in this country.

In addition to its poor internal legitimacy, the IEA lacked external legitimacy in the sense that it was not officially recognized by the international community as the sole source of authority in Afghanistan. In many international organizations, including the United Nations, Rabbani’s ISA represented Afghanistan. In some countries, such as the United States, the Afghanistan diplomatic mission was suspended, however, consulate duties, despite the IEA’s constant complaints, were delivered by the ISA.\textsuperscript{75} The international community’s rejection of performing any intention for the recognition of the IEA was based on three issues: the violation of the women and human rights by the IEA, the Taliban’s association with al-Qaeda, and the IEA’s constant emphasis on resolving Afghanistan problem by military means. However, the IEA refused all those accusations.\textsuperscript{76}

Only three countries, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, extended the IEA official recognition and the latter two soon downgraded it.\textsuperscript{77} Therefore, from its outset in September 1996 until its collapse in December 2001, the IEA largely invested in diplomatic activities and propaganda to convince the international community to recognize it as the legitimate and sovereign authority in Afghanistan. Those activities are broadly covered in the Sharia. For example, after the Taliban captured Mazar-e-Sharif, the capital of the ISA, the Sharia wrote:

\begin{quote}
Will still the UN seek excuse [in recognizing IEA as the legitimate authority in Afghanistan]? Will it still propagate against the IEA? Will it create a Capital for Rabbani overseas?\textsuperscript{78}
\end{quote}
Subsequent editorials of the Sharia blamed the United Nations for continuously ignoring the IEA’s achievements in stabilizing the country and creating ‘a central authority’:

It has been years since Rabbani’s regime is toppled. Nevertheless, Afghanistan’s seat in the UN is still assigned to the toppled regime … as long as Afghanistan’s seat is dominated by Rabbani, his regime will claim legitimacy and receive weapons and military support from abroad … Despite its claim of supporting the peace process in Afghanistan, the UN officially recognizes an illegitimate regime and assigns Afghanistan’s seat in the United Nations to it.\(^\text{79}\)

Moreover, in diplomatic meetings between the IEA officials and any Western official, the main issue the former brought on the table was the official recognition of the IEA.\(^\text{80}\) For example, following his visit to the United States in September 2000, in an interview with the Voice of America, the IEA’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Mawlawi Abdurrahman Zahid, described the purpose of his visit as conveying a ‘realistic picture of developments’ in Afghanistan to convince the international community to officially recognize the IEA:

The international community should not ignore the official recognition of the IEA. The IEA has provided all conditions necessary for the formal recognition. The international community should not ignore this reality …\(^\text{81}\)

However, after a subsequent visit to the US, another IEA diplomat, Mullah Abdul Hakim Mujahid, pessimistically expressed that the case of the recognition was massively influenced by the case of bin Laden’s presence in Afghanistan:

During the meeting, their [the Americans’] concentration was on Osama bin Laden. We said … we are working on the fourth statement on bin Laden … But the point is that the American government has launched a massive propaganda, and exaggerates on bin Laden.\(^\text{82}\)

Thus, despite the IEA’s extended attempts, neither the US nor other Western countries showed any serious intention to recognize the IEA as the sole sovereign reality of Afghanistan. By contrast, Rabbani’s ISA continuously represented Afghanistan in the UN and other international organizations. For example, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the ISA, Dr. Abdullah, attended the UN General Assembly in 1997 as the official representative of Afghanistan, and Rabbani represented Afghanistan at the annual conference of the Non-Allied countries in South Africa in September 1998.\(^\text{83}\)

In addition to its failed attempt for international recognition, the IEA remained isolated in the region too. During its five-year-rule on Afghanistan, the IEA entirely failed to win possible allies while creating, even more, new enemies. The movement had no friend in the region, except Pakistan. Iran cut its relationship with the IEA due to the Taliban’s anti-Shiite campaign. Central Asian states were frightened of the spread of the Taliban’s Islamism into their societies. Likewise, Russia was fearful of the IEA’s fundamentalist version of Islam and reinforced its hostility to the Taliban when the IEA granted separatist Chechens full diplomatic recognition in 2000.\(^\text{84}\) The Saudis recalled their diplomatic staff...
from Kabul in 1998 after the Taliban refused their request to expel a Saudi citizen, bin Laden, from Afghanistan. Moreover, India was deeply against the Taliban because of the group's pro-Pakistani strategy. Beyond the region, the United States' post-Cold War disengagement policy toward Afghanistan turned to hostility and direct engagement in the wake of the al-Qaeda attacks in 1998 on two US embassies in East Africa that began with a cruise missile strike against an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan and continued with political and economic sanctions on Taliban. Further, the Buddhist states, including Japan which was providing Afghanistan with hundreds of millions of dollars in humanitarian aid, condemned the IEA’s policy after the Taliban blew up the Bamiyan Buddhas in March 2001.

**Authority**

The IEA, unlike traditional authoritarian regimes that lack in legitimacy but enjoy authority, neither had the capability of exercising a monopoly over the use of force in Afghanistan nor was it capable of providing a secure environment to its clients. The IEA was involved in an unending armed combat with its internal rival but lacked a sufficient force to eliminate it entirely. In other words, the IEA invested and concentrated massively on ‘war making’ with the purpose of ‘state making’. However, it never enjoyed the sufficient war machine to eliminate its rival and acquire the means of building a state that could provide protection and welfare to its clients. Empirical data and evidence show that the IEA’s security force was organized as a traditional tribal militia force, a *Lashkar*, rather than a regular army. It was basically formed as an insurgent force during the civil war in Afghanistan rather than an army structure that is able to regularly respond to internal threats, control borders and provide a governed and secure space to the population living in the country.

As conceptualized, a state in order to meet its basic requirements of eliminating/neutralizing its internal and external enemies and secure its territory, borders and citizens needs a ‘physical force’. The ‘physical force’ in the modern world, as Tilly articulates, is a modern military force, or an army. In other words, ‘state making’ in the contemporary world needs a ‘war making’ apparatus, which in the modern era is a regular army.

Although the IEA benefited from young and quickly moving combatants who captured territory surprisingly fast, its military structure was far from being a regular army. The IEA's war-making affairs were basically conducted by a traditionally organized militia force similar to an insurgent militia. Therefore, it was not successful in producing durable instruments of surveillance and control to provide security and protection on the one hand and control the state’s territory and borders on the other. The IEA itself admitted publicly the lack of a regular army in Afghanistan and repeatedly emphasized on the need to organize its military force as an ‘Islamic army.’
Following the defeat of the Communist regime and the establishment of an Islamic administration and due to the jihadi parties’ lack of a united administration and program, Afghanistan’s powerful army was looted by militiamen … its logistical infrastructure was looted and its modern and sophisticated machinery was destroyed … Considering the IEA’s armed forces victories, and with regard to our time’s need [for states having a central army] the IEA has started the rebuilding of the ‘national Islamic army’ … The Army is the soul of a nation … [In order to build an army that could defend Afghanistan], first, we have to create a sound [military] base made of righteous and faithful officers and individuals.\textsuperscript{92}

In order to show the IEA’s concentration on reviving and reinforcing the army, the Sharia opened a new page on 4 March 1998, entitled \textit{Urdu}, the Army, which covered the Taliban’s activities in rebuilding Afghanistan’s army, and its technical, logistical, combatant and infrastructural development.\textsuperscript{93} Nevertheless, neither the \textit{Urdu} page in the Sharia nor ‘the \textit{Urdu},’ a special magazine published by the IEA’s Ministry of National Defense, characterized what the ‘Islamic Army’ would look like and how would it function. The \textit{Urdu} only highlighted the Islamic army’s ultimate goal: the stabilization of Afghanistan through the enforcement of Sharia.\textsuperscript{94}

The IEA’s armed forces’ tactical decisions, including the provision of money; fuel; food; transport; weapons and ammunition for combatant units, were mainly implemented by the Supreme Council’s Military branch, the Military Council, based in Kandahar. Although a few months before its complete collapse, the IEA published the Council of the Ministers’ Act in May 2001, according to which the miniseries based in Kabul were considered as leading executive and administrative organizations of the IEA, including its army and security force, the IEA was basically managed traditionally and by the Supreme Council.\textsuperscript{95} Thus, apart from general strategies, key appointments and the allocation of funds for offensives that were decided directly by Mullah Omar, the Military Council consulted and determined the armed forces’ tactical and daily activities.\textsuperscript{96} This had created numerous overlaps on decision-making which in turn had made the development of a uniform security system almost impossible.

The overlap and its outcome were largely evident in the armed forces’ structure and their operations. Under the Military Council consultancy and supervision, individual commanders, mainly from Pashtun areas, were responsible for recruiting men, paying them and looking after their needs in the field. These commanders acquired the resources to do so directly from the Military Council.\textsuperscript{97} The individual commanders directed their affiliated combatant units into the battlefields and took care of them as tribally loyal military units. There was no regular military structure with a hierarchy of officers and commanders, while unit commanders were being shifted around.\textsuperscript{98} The Taliban’s 25,000 to 30,000 armed forces, in this sense, resembled a local insurgency or a traditional tribal militia force, a \textit{Lashkar}, rather than a regular army.\textsuperscript{99} Therefore, the IEA’s poorly equipped and trained armed force; its tribal organization and its lack of a meaningful hierarchical structure, did not allow for a disciplined army to be created.
However, the IEA claimed that its armed forces captured more than 90–95% of Afghanistan’s territory and emphasized on its capability of providing a secure environment and defending the country.

The IEA has a complete control over the 95 percent of Afghanistan’s territory. It also controls the countries gateways, borders, and public establishments. The IEA, under a united Islamic regime, serves the people and provides them with job opportunities in a secure and peaceful environment …

Nevertheless, empirical data shows that the IEA’s control over the claimed territory was not stable as the war never stopped in those areas. The continuation of the war in Afghanistan in this period (1996–2001) is broadly reported by the Sharia itself. Data show that there was no absolute victory to anyone with the either side of the war having the capability of quickly preparing itself for new attacks following every defeat. The Taliban captured territory surprisingly quick, however, considering the complex aspects of war in Afghanistan, the IEA’s reliance on Arab and Pakistani military and financial support and the Taliban’s overlapping structure and command system, there was no guarantee how long the IEA could maintain control over the areas it captured.

The IEA’s security and military weakness made it heavily dependent on foreign fighters and the military support it received from Pakistan and the Arab jihadis. Evidence shows that between 1994 and 1999 over 80,000 Pakistanis fought with the Taliban which included ISI field officers, Pakistani Frontier Corps, regular Pakistani armed forces personnel and madrasa students. The presence of Pakistani combatants in Taliban’s structure is also supported by empirical data. Payam-e-Mujahid, for instance, reports the capturing of hundreds of Pakistanis by the Northern Alliance in northern Afghanistan. The paper reports that a UN Security Council special envoy traveled to Afghanistan in July 1997 to investigate Pakistan’s intervention in Afghanistan affairs. The Envoy observed more than 400 Pakistani citizens captured in Faryab, Balkh and Panjshir provinces by the NA. Other sources, including the US. government data, also confirm the involvement of Pakistani government in supporting and supplying the IEA for political and strategic purposes. Two US. intelligence reports/cables documented in ‘national security archive’ at George Washington University, for instance, highlights the Pakistani government’s direct support of the Taliban in the second half of the 1900s:

The Pakistan Inter-Service Intelligence is supplying the Taliban forces with munitions, fuel, and food. The Pakistani ISI is currently using a private sector transportation company to funnel supplies to Taliban forces in Kabul, Afghanistan. ‘Pakistan provides both military and financial assistance to the Taliban financial and military assistance, but speculates that because ‘Pakistan fears a complete Taliban victory may incite irredentist aspirations within its own Pashtun population [Pakistan] will likely attempt to pressure the Taliban into moderating some of its policies.

Another US. ‘intelligence information report’ indicates that Pakistan uses sizable numbers of its Frontier Corps in Taliban’s operations in Afghanistan:
These Frontier Corps elements are utilized in command and control; training; and when necessary—combat. Elements of Pakistan’s regular army force are not used because the army is predominantly Punjabi, who have different features as compared to the Pashtun and other Afghan tribes.  

Pakistan was not the only country whose nationals joined and supported the Taliban, militarily. Thousands of Arab, African, and East Asian and Central Asian Muslim jihadis fought for the Taliban. Most of those fighters were organized, equipped and trained by al-Qaeda. Integration of the 055 Brigade of al-Qaeda which included around 2000 trained soldiers, into the Taliban force is a concrete example of the Taliban’s reliance on foreign fighters, particularly al-Qaeda. Services in this unit, based in Khairkhana in northern Kabul, constituted part of the training of militants who came to Afghanistan, and the unit also supplied the most committed and effective part of the Taliban military. Findings show that between 2000 and 3000 Arabs under the command of Osama bin Laden fought for the Taliban, as did the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Pakistani Sipahi-i-Sahaba, Lashkar-i-Jangavi, Harakat-ul-Mujahidin, and some Chechen and Uyghur jihadi networks. The Taliban received financial and military support from these organizations in return for providing them with sanctuaries in Afghanistan.

The IEA used all support it received from foreigners in the war against the NA. It also attempted to provide security by coercion in areas it controlled. Comparing with the chaotic situation of the country in the early 1990s, Taliban was not doing so badly in bringing order in areas it controlled. However, they enforced Sharia, to create order, so severely that was not broadly supported in Afghanistan. Therefore, although the IEA was quick in capturing territory and severe in law enforcement, one can hardly predict how the situation would develop if the IEA was not toppled by external force. However, considering the Taliban’s shortage of resources to cover the cost of war, its poorly developed armed and law enforcement forces, the IEA’s unfamiliarity with modern ways of warfare and control, and the quickly changing nature of war in Afghanistan the IEA’s poor and limited authority in Afghanistan, the IEA’s poor and limited authority could not change for years.

**Capacity**

As discussed, the state capacity primarily depends on its size of the economy and its capability for acquiring the means of governance or the extraction of resources. Smaller the pool of resources and fiscal instruments, the more difficult is the work of extracting resources to sustain the war and other governmental activities. The IEA’s capacity, in this sense, was massively affected by its very small economy and the low administrative capability for acquiring resources and providing basic services.
When the Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996, it inherited a totally collapsed state with its infrastructure destroyed, its wealth looted and its professionals fled the country as a result of the civil war. Therefore, two major problems challenged the IEA’s capacity: a small economy and a weak administration. The IEA’s source of the legal economy was too small to manage a state and its administrative institutions were filled with Mullahs roughly with a madrasa education.\(^{114}\)

The IEA’s regular source of revenue produced some 40% of the state’s costs and, therefore, its economy was largely dependent on illegal revenues such as its drug economy and foreign aid.\(^{115}\) According to new findings, the per capita income of the 25 million population, in this period, was under $200, and the country was close to a total economic collapse.\(^{116}\) The IEA had no annual budget but it appeared to spend $300 million a year, nearly all of it on war.\(^{117}\) The IEA’s largest official source of revenue was the transit trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan which had an estimated turnover of $4.5 billion, with the Taliban receiving between $100 and $130 million per year which covered roughly between 33 and 43% of its costs.\(^{118}\)

Due to the shortage of official revenue, the IEA relied mainly on three unofficial sources: drug, the Pakistanis, and bin Laden.\(^{119}\) The IEA controlled 96% of Afghanistan’s poppy fields making opium its largest source of taxation.\(^{120}\) Taxes on opium exports became one of the mainstays of Taliban’s income and its war economy.\(^{121}\) By 2000, Afghanistan accounted for an estimated 75% of the world’s supply, and in 2000 it grew an estimated 3276 tons of opium from poppy cultivation on 82,171 hectares.\(^{122}\) The IEA, due to international pressures, banned the poppy cultivation in mid-2000 by issuing a ‘counternarcotic act’.\(^{123}\) However, in previous years, it extracted a large amount of money by imposing taxation on the poppy trade by leveling the ushr, a 25% tax on all agricultural production.\(^{124}\) This brought in some $15 million a year from the $60 million Afghan growers and traders earned from opium exports out of a business worth $40 billion in Europe alone.\(^{125}\)

The second unofficial source of the IEA’s revenue was the financial support it received from the Pakistanis, particularly from the Pakistani Army and the ISI. Pakistan, in addition to its official trade relations with IEA, largely contributed to the Taliban costs of war. ISI, for instance, had prepared a budget of some 2 billion rupees (US$5 million) for logistical supports for the Taliban.\(^{126}\) In addition to ISI’s direct financial injection to the IEA, it provided the group with massive military and logistical supplies. A majority of the Taliban combatants were trained by Pakistani elements, and Pakistan’s civil and military presence was apparent everywhere in Afghanistan. For instance, in its April and May 2001 report, the Human Rights Watch, highlighted that as many as thirty trucks a day were crossing the Pakistan border, and sources from inside Afghanistan reported that some of these convoys were carrying artillery shells, tank rounds, and rocket-propelled
grenades. Further, a 1997 report of the UN secretary-general confirmed such deliveries from Pakistan to Afghanistan.

The third major source of IEA's revenue was the financial supports it received from Arab jihadis, particularly bin Laden. According to a 9/11 Commission staff monograph, once bin Laden moved to Afghanistan he provided a considerable part of the IEA's costs, paying it an amount between $10 and $20 million per year. The monograph emphasized that IEA's reliance on bin Laden increased over time: 'As time passed, it appeared that the Taliban relied on al-Qaeda for an ever-greater share of their needs, such as arms, goods, and vehicles.' The IEA's lack of sufficient sources of revenue largely affected the state's capacity in providing basic services.

The IEA spent all its revenue on 'war making' and the elimination of its internal rival, the NA. According to the IEA's official data, the state's investment on development and services providing projects was extremely small. According to an IEA's official report, the government invested, in the 2000 fiscal year some $800,000 from internal resources to complete 766 reconstruction and economic development projects, including the reconstruction of agricultural stores, powers stations and systems, post offices and a number of government establishments in Kabul and beyond. This report claims a $100,000 increase in IEA's investment on development projects in the subsequent year. Other reports indicate the IEA's engagement in very small development and service providing projects such rebuilding a few public libraries and madrasas, responding to emergency needs and reconstruction of some urban streets and provincial governmental establishments.

The IEA's severe economic situation was intensified by international economic sanctions that were imposed because of the Taliban's violation of human rights and its association with bin Laden and his terrorist group. In a public statement, the IEA expressing the women's situation in Afghanistan, rejected the accusation of violation of women's rights and indicated its need for humanitarian assistance:

The accusation of the violation of women's rights by the IEA is just a lie … the educated Afghan women expressed their wishes in a glorious ceremony on the women international day on March 8 in Kabul … and called on the world that instead of economic sanctions which have increased the food prices and therefore the women problem, the international community should solve the existing problems in front of women in Afghanistan by launching humanitarian assistance projects …

In a subsequent statement, the IEA rejected the existence of any terrorist activities in Afghanistan highlighting that the sanctions had enormous impacts on the IEA as a state and its citizens. Moreover, in a press conference in Islamabad, the IEA's ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Abdul Salam Zayeef described the humanitarian costs of the sanctions on Afghanistan as 'massive' by highlighting a few examples:
The sanctions have stopped the Ariana Airline which transported medicine into Afghanistan. It also affected people’s life by stopping post and telecommunication services, and enhancing the food price.\textsuperscript{134}

Considering the economic problems and the low service providing capability of the IEA, almost all basic services depended on international organizations’ aid. For example, more than half of Kabul’s 1.2 million people benefited in some way from NGO handouts.\textsuperscript{135} Food distribution, health care, and the city’s fragile water distribution network, for instance, heavily depended on emergency aid.\textsuperscript{136} These services were largely affected when Taliban closed all NGO offices in July 1998, after those organizations refused to relocate to a disused former polytechnic college.\textsuperscript{137} Taliban’s purpose of moving the NGOs in a specified place was to keep their activities under control. As a response to Taliban’s decision, the NGOs decided to stop services and leave Afghanistan, which highly affected people’s already deteriorated living situation. However, the Taliban leadership reacted to the termination of NGOs services comfortably. For example, the IEA’s Planning Minister, Qari Din Mohammed, in a response to people’s concerns about the termination of NGO services in Kabul stated as ‘we Muslims believe that God the Almighty will feed everybody one way or another. If the foreign NGOs leave then it is their decision. We have not expelled them.’\textsuperscript{138}

Even if Afghanistan’s state institutions were not destroyed, the Taliban did not have the administrative capability to run them. Almost all IEA’s authorities were armed mullahs with nearly no administrative knowledge or expertise.\textsuperscript{139} Because most educated and professional Afghans had left the country during the course of the war, the shortage of trained and skilled professionals in the IEA was severe. Almost all cabinet ministers, deputies, and provincial governors were mullahs roughly with a madrasa education who simultaneously acted as military commanders. For example, the Health Minister, Mullah Mohammed Abbas, served as a Taliban commander in Mazar and Herat in 1997 until he returned to his job as Minister six months later.\textsuperscript{140} Likewise, the Governor of the State Bank, Mullah Ehsanullah Ehsan, commanded an elite force of some 1000 Kandahari Taliban, and the Governor of Herat, Mullah Abdul Razaq, led military offensives all over the country.\textsuperscript{141} Moreover, the IEA replaced all senior Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara bureaucrats with Pashtuns, whether qualified or not.\textsuperscript{142} The appointment of uneducated and inexperienced militant mullahs in the IEA’s administration created a situation in which ministries ceased to function and provincial and district administrations turned into military bases.

The absence of skilled professionals in the IEA was very obvious in all areas of governance. For example, the IEA’s negotiating team with the oil companies that were competing over a pipeline which was planned to connect Central Asia’s natural gas and oil to Pakistan was composed of nine mullahs and one engineer.\textsuperscript{143} The Taliban’s lack of administrative capacity is well reflected in a 1997 note by the Pakistani journalist, Ahmed Rashid, on the IEA’s Ministry of Finance,
The Ministry of Finance can barely put together a budget, and not just because funds are scarce. The Ministry has no qualified economists: the minister and his deputy are mullahs with a madrasa education. The ministry’s own budget for the fiscal year that began in February 1997 was $1000000.\textsuperscript{144}

\textbf{Conclusion}

The IEA emerged as a ‘war-making’ organization in the midst of the civil war in Afghanistan. It sought to develop a regular state through eliminating its internal rivals militarily. Therefore, it basically planned to make the state through a ‘war making’ campaign. However, the IEA never acquired the meaningful war-making institutions and instruments that are necessary for state-making. The IEA, in this sense, was a primitive war-making institution built of traditional tribal militia units with overlapping two-track governing institutions at its top.

Regardless of its progress at war and quickly capturing of territory, the IEA was unsuccessful in its ultimate goal of eliminating its internal rival, the NA, militarily. Further, the IEA was incapable of providing a secure environment to its citizens by ending the war and securing its borders to prevent the infiltration of regional jihadis into Afghanistan. In addition, the IEA’s economic size was too small to manage a state and it lacked the required administrative capability to manage resources it had at its disposal, to produce new sources of revenue and to provide basic services.

Overall, the IEA was, institutionally based on a two-track governing system that almost entirely concentrated and invested on war-making with a failed effort to state-making. Thus, it lacked the required institutions and personnel to form a state with, and functionally, the IEA fell short in all three measures of statehood including legitimacy, authority, and capacity.

The Taliban’s ‘state-making’ campaign indicates the difficulty of the transformation of an insurgent group into a state structure by relying on physical force alone. This indicates the importance of ‘political inclusion’ on state-building in war-torn societies. Finding shows that a dominant insurgent group, such as the Taliban, might capture a large part of a given territory through war-making for a short period, however, it cannot eliminate the other insurgent group(s) entirely and forever. Therefore, as Weber articulates, a dominant force in order to survive for a longer period of time does not impose its rule by coercion alone.\textsuperscript{145} The IEA’s failed attempt at state-making through war-making, alone, affected all aspects of its statehood. As a result, reliance on ‘war-making’ did not result into making a state in the case of the Taliban.

Nevertheless, examining the IEA within the framework of state studies will contribute to both the political development of Afghanistan and studies of the insurgency. Since its creation in 1893, the development of the sovereign state of Afghanistan is partly confused with the development of ruling parties. The Taliban’s rule over Afghanistan is one of the most confusing parts of this
history. Political scientists and journalists have mostly used the Taliban and the IEA interchangeably which has made the understanding of the development of the state in Afghanistan, in this period (1996–2001), confusing. Studying the IEA within the state studies framework can help to fill this gap. This examination also contributes to the insurgency studies indicating the difficulty, if not impossibility, of the transformation of an insurgent group into a state structure through violent means, alone.

Notes


11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., 34.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.


21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.


25. Ibid., 188.
26. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 88.
30. Ibid., 86.
31. Ibid.
34. Sharia, 3(11), March 4, 1998, pp. 1, 2; Sharia 5(51), July 22, 2000, p. 1; and Sharia, 5(11), February 7, 2001, pp. 1, 2.
35. Sharia, 3(11), March 4, 1998, pp. 1, 2.
36. Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim*, 162.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. See for example, Davi, “The Taliban Published Mullah Omer’s Biography.”
49. The Council of Ministers Act, article 3.
50. Ibid., articles 1, 2, and 6.
51. For example, Sharia, 3(5), August 16, 1998, pp. 1, 4; Sharia 6(18), March 11, 2001, pp. 1, 4; Sharia 3(57), 23 August, 1998: 1; Sharia 5(68), September 19, 2000, pp. 1, 4; and Sharia, 6(50), July 11, 2001, p. 1.
57. Sharia 5(58), August 15, 2000, pp. 1, 2.
63. Sharia 5(91), December 9, 2000, p. 4.
70. Ibid., 154.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
76. Sharia, 5(89) December 2, 2000, pp. 1, 4; (Sharia 5(26), April 9, 2000, p. 4. Sharia 5(54), August 1, 2000, pp. 1, 4; (Sharia 5(9), February 2, 2000, pp. 1, 2; Khelaphat, July–August 2000, pp. 54–56; and Khelaphat, May–June 2001, pp. 13, 33, 34.
79. Sharia 4(64), September 2, 1999, pp. 1, 2.
80. Sharia, 5(9), February 2, 200, pp. 1, 2; Sharia 5(31), April 30, 2000, pp. 1, 2; and Sharia 5(43), June 25, 2000, p. 1.
81. Sharia 5(68), September 19, 2000, pp. 1, 4.
86. Ibid.
90. Ibid., 181; and Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, 17–20.
92. Sharia, 3(6), February 15, 1998, pp. 1, 2.
93. Sharia, 3(11), March 5, 1998, p. 4 – subsequent issues.
95. The Council of Ministers Act.
98. Ibid., 99.
99. Ibid., 100.
103. Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan, 322; and Rashid, “Pakistan and the Taliban,” 72–89.
106. From [Excised] to DIA, “[Excised], Pakistan Interservice Intelligence….”
108. Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, 162.
109. Ould Mohamedou, Understanding Al-Qaeda, 49.
111. Ibid., xvi; and Rashid, “Afghanistan Resistance Leader Feared.”
113. Ibid., 182.
115. Del Castillo, Rebuilding War-Torn States, 167; and Skaine, Women of Afghanistan, 57.
116. Ibid.
117. Chouvy, Opium, 52.
119. Chouvy, Opium, 52.
120. Ibid., 52.
121. Ibid., 52.
123. The Counternarcotic Act, articles, 1–5.
125. Ibid.
126. Rashid, Taliban, 72.
127. Human Rights Watch, Pakistan's Support of the Taliban.
128. U.N. Secretary General, “The Situation in Afghanistan,” para. 18.
132. Sharia 5(26), April 9, 2000, p. 4.
133. Sharia 5(40), June 11, 2000, pp. 1, 4.
135. Rashid, Taliban, pp. 64, 65.
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid.
138. Rashid, Taliban, 72.
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid., 101.
144. Ibid., 176.

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