



The Myth of Afghan Electoral Democracy
The Irregularities of the 2014 Presidential Election

Thomas H. Johnson



Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies



The Myth of Afghan Electoral Democracy

The Irregularities of the 2014 Presidential Election



Constitutional & Political System

Reform studies IV

© 2019 Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies

Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies (AISS) is an independent research institute, founded on October 2012 with a goal of providing scientific and academic ground for assessment of the strategic issues of Afghanistan in regional and international levels. Afghanistan Institute for Strategic Studies strives to help the society in improvement and development of democracy, security, peace, good governance and other matters through conducting independent researches, translating and publishing books and scientific papers, convention of national and international gatherings and conferences.

Disclaimer

The analysis provided in this study are solely those of the author and do not reflect viewpoint of AISS.



The Myth of Afghan Electoral Democracy

The Irregularities of the 2014 Presidential Election

Author: Thomas H. Johnson

Publishing No: AISS-P-021-2019

Circulation: 1000 Copies

Date Printing: 2019 Kabul

Address: Qala-e-9 Borja, Kart-e-Parwan, Kabul Afghanistan

Contact Number: (+93)799840161-(+93) (20)2232806

ISBN 978-9936-8070-8-2



Contents

Tables	II
Foreword	III
Acknowledgement.....	IV
Abstract	V
Introduction	1
Afghan Presidential Elections	6
2004 Afghanistan Presidential Election	7
2009 Afghanistan Presidential Election	8
2014 Afghanistan Presidential Election	11
Conclusion.....	43
Appendix A	52
Appendix B	105
Bibliography.....	108

Tables

Table 1: Uncertified and Certified Presidential Votes10

Table 2: 2014 April Presidential Election Results by Province15

Table 3: 2014 April Presidential Election Results by Province16

Table 4: Correlation Coefficients (Pearson r): 2014 April Presidential Election Results by Province 2009 and Ethno-Linguistic Provincial votes received (%)21

Table 5: 2014 June Runoff Presidential Election Results by Province.....22

Table 6: Percentage Differences (Changes) of Provincial Votes from the Preliminary Election to the Runoff Election25

Table 7: Correlation Coefficients (Pearson r): 2014 June (Runoff) Presidential Election Results by Province 2009 and Ethno-Linguistic Provincial votes received (%)28

Table 8: Kabul Province Unusual Polling Place Data32

Table 9: Ghani 1503 Polling Place Votes of Extremely High Percentages (At Least 100 votes Cast)52

Table 10: Abdullah Abdullah 35 Polling Place Votes of Extremely High Percentages (At Least 100 votes Cast)105

Foreword

The Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies (AISS) has the honor to present this research paper written by Professor Thomas Johnson, AISS Non-Resident Senior Fellow. This research is part of the Afghanistan Constitutional and Political System Reform Studies series of AISS. The previous works of AISS on the Afghanistan Constitutional and Political System Reform include *Afghanistan's Constitution and Society in Transition: Assessment of public opinion and proposals for a constitutional amendment* by Dr Mohammad Amin Ahmadi, A. Ahad Mohammadi and M. Irfani (2016), *The Challenging Path towards Democracy in Afghanistan: An Assessment and Critique of National Debates on Alternative Political Systems in Afghanistan* by Zalmi Nishat, M. Irfani, A. Ahad Mohammadi (2018) and *Electoral Reform and Experience of Parliamentary Elections in Afghanistan* by Nafay Choudhury and Mohammadi Irfani (2018).

Acknowledgement

This article was initially published in the journal *Small Wars and Insurgency*, Volume 29, Issue 5, December 2018. The views expressed in this paper are the author's own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Naval Postgraduate School or the Department of Defense or AISS or any other institution or person. While some will view this article as controversial, all efforts have made to present unbiased, objective analysis. I would like to thank Maj Thang Q. Tran for his research assistance on this article. I would like to thank Larry Goodson, Chris Mason and other anonymous Afghan scholars for comments and suggestions concerning an earlier version of this article. The views expressed in this paper are the author's own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Naval Postgraduate School or the Department of Defense or Afghan institute for Strategic Studies (AISS) or any other institution or person. While some will view this article as controversial, all efforts have made to present unbiased, objective analysis.

Some people may ask why I am writing this article four years after the actual election? The answer to this apt question is that new data have recently become available that allowed expanded analyses at the provincial level and explicit analyses at the Polling Center level. Moreover, the analyses have important implications for the upcoming April 2019 Afghan Presidential Election. It should be noted that the author has no preference or is associated with any Afghan Political Party or candidate.

Abstract

The 2014 Afghanistan Presidential Election marked a crucial milestone in Afghanistan's "democratic system," with its first projected transfer of power from President Hamid Karzai to an elected successor. This article systematically assesses the 2014 Afghanistan Presidential Election using provincial voting data as well as explicit data from polling centers. The analysis finds unusual voting results in the April election, where no candidate received 50%+1 votes required by the Afghan constitution, versus the voting results realized for the June "runoff election." As in other Afghan voting analyses, this article finds ethno-linguistic populations tending to vote for a candidate of their ethnicity, and interestingly found Dr. Ashraf Ghani receiving almost all the swing votes in the runoff election even though the other leading candidate from the April election all endorsed Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. More importantly, however, the research presented here clearly suggests that Ghani's campaign was at least partially, if not primarily, based on extremely unusual voting patterns. For example, the polling data center analysis finds 606 polling places where Ghani received all votes and Abdullah received none and another 900 polling centers that gave virtually all its votes to Ghani. These results in combination with other analyses raise the very real possibility that the election results of Ashraf Ghani in 2014 were illegitimate. Significant allegations of irregularities including ballot box stuffing, referred to as "stuffed sheep," must be taken very seriously. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the research to future Afghan elections and their processes as well as the long-standing conflict in the country.

Key Words: 2014 Afghan Presidential Election, ethno-linguistic voting patterns, illegitimate voting, illegitimate voting results, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, Afghan polling center data, Afghan 2014 June “runoff election.

Introduction

This article represents the third in a series of publications that assess the Afghanistan electoral process, actual elections, their fidelity and, indirectly, their implications for Afghanistan becoming a truly representative democratic state.¹ Specifically, this article examines the 2014 Afghan Presidential Election which is particularly important because for years there have been rumors concerning the legitimacy of the 2014 Afghan Presidential election results. Moreover, it was the first presidential election in Afghanistan without Hamid Karzai running for the position and it could be argued that it represented the first nonviolent regime transfer of power in Afghan history.

I am only aware of one scholarly publication that explicitly and critically examined this election and, in so doing, challenged the legitimacy of the 2014 Afghan Presidential Election results. This article, published in the influential magazine *Foreign Policy*, went as far as to suggest that the U.S. Government had conducted sophisticated statistical analyses and election modeling using Afghan presidential election data and had concluded that the election results were illegitimate:

The runoff round of the Afghan presidential election on June 14 was massively rigged, and the ensuing election audit was “unsatisfactory,” a result of Afghan government-orchestrated fraud on a scale exceeding two million fake votes, completely subverting the will of the Afghan people. That is the watered-down conclusion of the press

¹ Thomas H. Johnson, “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building after War,” *Central Asian Survey*, (March–June 2006) 25(1–2), pp. 1–26; Thomas H. Johnson, “The Illusion of Afghanistan’s Electoral Representative Democracy: The Cases of Afghan Presidential and National Parliamentary Elections,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 29, No. 1, January 2018, pp. 1–37. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2018.1404771>; for an additional discussion of Afghan Presidential elections and their irregularities see: Steve Coll, *Directorate S*, (New York: Penguin Press, 2018).

release of the European Union’s yet-to-be-released report detailing its thorough and non-partisan investigation of the entire Afghan election. The report was completed last week, according to sources in Kabul who have seen it, but political pressure has so far resulted in heavy redaction and kept it from public release...*Ashraf Ghani did not win the election.* [A U.S. agency] concluded in July [2014] that it was mathematically impossible for Ghani to win, given Afghan demographics and the initial 46 percent to 32 percent first-round vote spread, according to sources familiar with the analysis. According to sources who reviewed the private report, the top experts in statistical analysis in the United States used every known computer model of election balloting and concluded that a Ghani victory was scientifically impossible. In simple terms, there is no mathematical doubt that *Abdullah Abdullah won* (my emphasis).²

While this present article was approached without any explicit biases based on rumors of numerous journalistic accounts of the 2014 Afghan Presidential Election, it would be less than sincere, however, to suggest that we believed that the election was not plagued with significant irregularities. Nonetheless, we wanted to conduct systematic analyses, to the extent possible, to reveal how pertinent and significant the possible irregularities were to the final election results.

We believe this research is particularly apt at this time in Afghanistan’s history because the next Afghan Presidential Election is scheduled for April 2019 and after 17 years since the U.S. invasion to oust Al Qaeda and the Taliban Regime from Afghanistan and the establishment of the Bonn Accords that laid out the road map for Afghanistan’s political future. Moreover, the country is presently at a major “breakpoint.” The most recent Office of the Special Inspector

² Chris Mason, “Fraud and Folly In Afghanistan,” *Foreign Policy*, September 23, 2014.

General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Quarterly Report to Congress,³ for example, suggested among other things that:

- As of March [2018], DOJ views the situation in Afghanistan as “consistent with a largely lawless, weak, and dysfunctional government” with many corruption cases languishing due to the lack of political will - rather than the capacity - of the Afghan government.
- As of May 15, [2018] the ANDSF failed to improve its control over Afghanistan's districts, population, and territory since last quarter: instead, district and territorial control became slightly more contested between the government and the insurgency.
- According to DOJ, the Afghan attorney general has failed to respond to personal appeals made by several senior U.S. government officials to prosecute stalled high-profile corruption cases to show that no one was above the law. Despite these appeals, DOJ says the attorney general continues to have a poor record of prosecuting powerful and influential corrupt actors.
- USFOR-A classified ANDSF, MOD, and MOI performance assessments this quarter, a reversal from the preceding two quarters, when basic performance assessments were provided.
- According to a recent UN report, two-thirds of Afghanistan's provinces are experiencing a drought due to a precipitation deficit of 70 percent in recent months. USAID has told SIGAR that precipitation and snowpack levels have been so low that, in many areas, the current rain-fed winter wheat crop has been effectively lost. The UN estimates that, over the next six months, more than two million people will face severe food insecurity and will be in desperate need of humanitarian assistance.⁴

³ Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), *Quarterly Report to Congress*, (Washington, DC, July 30, 2018), <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2018-07-30qr.pdf>.

⁴ Ibid and email from Jennifer George-Nichol, Public Affairs, Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), July 31, 2018. For other assessments of the present situation in Afghanistan see: a series of excellent analyses of

Afghanistan's Unity Government formed after the controversial 2014 Presidential Election is anything but united. "President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, in their fourth year of partnership, have so far ostensibly gone their separate ways in dealing with the country's challenges."⁵ The initial "power-sharing relationships between Ghani and Abdullah, a direct result of the 2014 election (see below) has been revealed by most indicators to be a dismal failure. Legislative and local elections have been delayed, many prominent Afghans have called for a national Loyal Jirga (traditional Afghan grand assembly of tribal leaders) and referendum concerning Ghani's Government, corruption investigations against Ghani "critics" have been instituted, and promises for electoral reform have gone unanswered.⁶

And possibly more damning for the long-term success to Afghanistan's stability and progress, ethno-linguistic and regional identity schisms have become increasingly prominent in the country. "Identity politics remained in the margins during the many decades of political turmoil in the country, but it now vividly stirs up debates among a wider population. Opposition to the move on e-IDs [the electronic ID

Afghan elections by the Afghan Analysis Network for example, see: van Bijlert, 'Afghan Elections Dilemma'; van Bijlert, "Polling Day Fraud in the Afghan Elections"; Qaane and van Bijlert, "Elections in Hibernation"; Ruttig, "Elections (31)"; Ruttig, "Pluralistic within Limits, but Not Democratic."

⁵ Kambaiz Rafi, "Afghanistan's Institutional Credibility Crisis And Likelihood Of 'Sheepish Elections' – Analysis," Eurasia Review, (June 21, 2018), <https://www.eurasiareview.com/21062018-afghanistans-institutional-credibility-crisis-and-likelihood-of-sheepish-elections-analysis/>.

⁶ Generally see: Mujib Mashal, "Afghan President Under Fire as Critics Chafe at Overdue Vote," The New York Times, (December 12, 2017), <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/world/asia/afghanistan-ashraf-ghani-elections.html>.

card or *e-Tazkira* that was to serve as an official national identity card to be used for a wide variety of activities] has so far led to protests in Panjshir, Badakhshan and Parwan provinces, protestors carrying signs defiant of official symbols. Demands for political autonomy were raised by one MP from Badakhshan, Latif Pedram, should e-IDs be distributed in their current format.”⁷

This research is based and premised on the fact that the Afghanistan Constitution established free and fair elections for various levels of the Afghanistan state as a bedrock for the country’s move towards democracy. Specifically the Constitution of Afghanistan states:

*The President shall be elected by receiving more than fifty percent of votes cast by voters through free, general, secret and direct voting. The presidential term shall expire on 1st of Jawza of the fifth year after elections. Elections for the new President shall be held within thirty to sixty days prior to the end of the presidential term. If in the first round none of the candidates gets more than fifty percent of the votes, elections for the second round shall be held within two weeks from the date election results are proclaimed, and, in this round, only two candidates who have received the highest number of votes in the first round shall participate. In case one of the presidential candidates dies during the first or second round of voting or after elections, but prior to the declaration of results, re-election shall be held according to provisions of the law.*⁸

Each Afghan election since 2004 has been fraught with some fraud, but the Presidential Election of 2014 seems to be a special case. Here, as suggested above, irregularities were alleged to be so widespread that the Abudullah Abudullah campaign against Ashraf Ghani claimed that:

[L]arge-scale fraud using the code word “stuffed sheep” [was used] to discuss illegally filled ballot boxes. In 15 minutes of sometimes

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ The Constitution of Afghanistan (Ratified, January 26, 2004), Article 61, p. 16, <http://www.afghanembassy.com.pl/afg/images/pliki/TheConstitution.pdf>.

slightly surreal conversation, two men urge[d] an official to fire election staff with suspect loyalties and replace them with known supporters, ramp up plans for vote buying and ballot stuffing, and close down polling stations in areas thought to be unsympathetic. “Take the sheep into the mountain and bring them back stuffed,” one man says, before apparently lamenting the growing cost of buying votes. “The price of goats and sheep has gone up these days.”⁹

We will see explicit evidence of “stuffed sheep” ballots below and what can only be interpreted as widespread voting fraud. And the extent of this fraud defies any recent such similar episodes that I am aware of in any country claiming to have a Democratic national election.¹⁰

Afghan Presidential Elections

The explicit purpose of this article is to systematically examine the 2014 Afghan Presidential Election results and to purport their meanings and implications. I have attempted to conduct this analysis as objective as possible and I have not pursued any of this research to validate or invalidate claims of any Afghan electoral party or candidate.

Before systematically assessing the 2014 election, let me first briefly assess the first two previous Afghan Presidential Elections (i.e., 2004 and 2009) to establish context for this analysis.

⁹ Emma Graham Harrison, “Afghan Election Crisis: ‘Stuffed Sheep’ Recordings Suggest Large-Scale Election Fraud,” *The Guardian-US Edition*, June 22, 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/22/afghan-election-crisis-stuffed-sheep-fraud>.

¹⁰ It should also be noted that people that were apparently aware of me researching the 2014 election data and my plan to write an article concerning it, have unsolicitedly sent me a wide variety of videos that allegedly demonstrate illegitimate behavior in Eastern Afghanistan such as ballot stuffing, filling out multiple ballots, copying voter registration cards, and a variety of other things that would clearly suggest significant election fraud. I did not review these videos until I nearly completed my empirical research on the 2014 Presidential Election. I will be discussing these videos and their possible consequences in later sections of this article.

2004 Afghanistan Presidential Election

The first Afghan Presidential Election was held on October 9, 2004. Hamid Karzai won the election over 17 other candidates with 54.4% of the vote. Yunus Qanooni finished second receiving 16.3% of the vote while Mohammed Mohaqiq (11.7%) and Rashid Dostum (10.%) finished third and fourth respectfully. A number of interesting facts emerged from this first Afghan national election, especially considering that the leading four presidential candidates were all from the four leading ethno-linguistic groups of Afghanistan.

This election represented a massive logistics effort to supply all 4,800 polling stations using over 30,000 ballot boxes. The complexity of this election not only involved the logistics of voting during a time of conflict but also getting the ballots counted. “More than 2,000 trucks, four Mi8 helicopters, 135 donkeys, and even boats in Bamyan and Jalalabad carried the election material.”¹¹ This presidential election also represented and reflected “historical ethnic patterns that have long driven conflict dynamics in the county. No candidate received significant support outside of their particular ethno-linguistic group.”¹² This was a major finding of this initial election assessment. Statistical analysis, based on simple correlation analysis, leaves little doubt that Pashtuns

¹¹ Wahidullah Amani, “The Making of an Election,” October 7, 2004, https://web.archive.org/web/20041013205424/http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/arr/arr_200410_139_04_eng.txt.

¹²Thomas H. Johnson, “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building after War,” *Central Asian Survey*, (March–June 2006) 25(1–2), p. 13. And see Rubin, Barfield and DuPee for seminal studies concerning the role of ethnicity in Afghan history and politics: Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002); Thomas Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), and; Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973).

tended to vote for a Pashtun ($r = .88$ with $p < .0001$) – Hamid Karzai – and explicitly against Tajiks. ($r = -.44$ with $p < .01$). Similarly Tajiks voted for the Tajik candidate – Yunus Qanooni ($r = .84$ with $p < .0001$) and against Pashtun Karzai ($r = -.54$ with $p < .001$). Likewise Hazaras voted for the Hazara candidate – Haji Mohaqiq - ($r = .91$ with $p < .0001$) and Uzbeks voted for the Uzbek candidate - Rashid Dostum ($r = .88$ with $p < .0001$).¹³ These are results suggested that no candidate won as a national candidate and the voting in many respects merely reified ethnic dynamics that have helped drive Afghan politics for decades.¹⁴ Hence, one could argue persuasively that the initial 2004 Presidential Election was more procedural than substantive.

More than three-quarters of Afghanistan's nearly 12 million registered voters (70%) were estimated to cast ballots during this election. This is an incredibly high voter turnout considering that this was Afghanistan's first national election and held during an active insurgency. Only 1.3% of the votes were judged invalid. This is an extremely low figure considering what will be realized in later elections, especially the 2009 and 2014 presidential elections. Moreover it is not improbable that the actual voter turn out was exaggerated but I know of no analyses that have explored this dynamic for the 2004 election.

2009 Afghanistan Presidential Election

On August 20, 2009, Afghanistan held its second Presidential Election. Unlike the first election, this election was fraught with enormous

¹³ Pearson r correlation coefficients of Afghan presidential candidates by candidate ethno-linguistic standing and at the provincial level voting. See Table Two in Thomas H. Johnson, "Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Transition".

¹⁴ See Footnote 12.

controversy. Karzai won reelection with 49.67% of the vote (below the constitutionally required 50%+1 of the vote), while his opponent Abdullah Abdullah finished second with 30.59% of the vote. The election was characterized by poor security, poor voter turn out estimated to be between 30-33% by the United Nations.¹⁵

As we witnessed in the 2004 presidential election, the 2009 election also witnessed voting almost exclusively along ethno-linguistic lines. “The results clearly indicate that ethnicity continues to play an overriding role in Afghan political affairs. This is particularly evident among Pashtuns and Tajiks. Pashtuns voted primarily for the two leading Pashtun candidates – Karzai ($r = .79$) or Ahmadzai ($r = .66$) – and against the Tajik candidate Abdullah ($r = -0.71$) – while Tajiks voted overwhelmingly for Abdullah ($r = 0.80$) and against Karzai ($r = -0.64$). While ethnic Hazaras tended to vote for Bashardost ($r = 0.53$), they did not explicitly vote against other candidates, although there was a significant but not overly strong anti-Karzai Hazara vote ($r = -0.37$).”¹⁶

Apparent fraud was also very evident during this election:

Though Karzai emerged as the eventual winner, revelations of countrywide electoral fraud by all presidential candidates stripped him of the majority 50% plus votes attributed to him (see: Table 1 for the

¹⁵ Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, UNAMA, “Afghanistan: AIHRC-UNAMA Joint Monitoring of Political Rights, Presidential and Provincial Council Elections, Third Report, 1 Aug - 21 Oct 2009,” October 21, 2009, <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-aihrc-unama-joint-monitoring-political-rights-presidential-and-1>.

¹⁶ Thomas H. Johnson, “The Illusion of Afghanistan’s Electoral Representative Democracy: The Cases of Afghan Presidential and National Parliamentary Elections,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 29, No. 1, January, 2018, p. 8-9, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2018.1404771>.

uncertified and certified final results released by Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission (IEC) on September 16, 2009 and October 21, 2009). The Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) served as the key electoral watchdog, composed primarily of non-Afghan officials. It was the ECC which exposed the extent of the fraud in electoral registrations and ballots, and which subsequently invalidated about one million or *approximately one-third of Karzai votes in the presidential election*, forcing a second round of voting. The ECC investigated 600 of the most serious complaints and ‘sample audited’ suspect votes at 3377 polling stations. It dismissed all the votes cast at 210 of these stations. In the aftermath of the election analysis, the ECC determined that Karzai only received 48.29% of the vote. On 19 October 2009 the ECC announced the completion of the audit process based on a review of the ballot boxes that had been quarantined by the IEC. The investigation showed that no candidate received over 50% of the vote, and that a runoff vote was required to determine a winner. Karzai’s campaign team attributed the decision to foreign interference and hinted at not accepting the results. This triggered a series of high-diplomatic negotiations, encouraging the candidates to accept the findings. On October 21, the IEC announced that Karzai had received 49.67% of the vote and Abdullah received 30.59% of the vote (see Table 1). A subsequent runoff election was scheduled for 7 November 2009 but on 1 November 2009 Abdullah withdrew from the race, making the presidential runoff a one-man race. On 2 November 2009 the IEC declared Karzai as president-elect (my emphasis).¹⁷

*Table 1: Uncertified and Certified Presidential Votes*¹⁸

CANDIDATE	Sept 16 Uncertified Votes (%)	Oct 21 Certified Votes
Hamid Karzai	3,093,256 (54.6)	2,283,907 (49.67)
Abdullah Abdullah	1,571,581 (27.8)	1,406,242 (30.59)
Ramazan Bashardost	520,627 (9.2)	481,072 (10.46)
Ashraf Ghani	149,720 (2.7)	135,106 (2.9)
TOTAL	5,662,758	4,823,090

Analysts including Anand Gopal reported on fraudulent voter registration policies.¹⁹ “As early as February 2009, Martine van Bijlert of

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 6-7.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 7.

the nongovernmental Afghanistan Analysts Network published an extensive white paper reporting that an updated voter registration drive might have produced up to three million duplicate voting cards ripe for abuse. In addition, she described how the strange system of ‘proxy’ registration of female voters in Pashtun districts, designed to protect the modesty of local women, was vulnerable to large-scale fraud.”²⁰ It is hard to believe that these types of violations could occur without planning and without an explicit purpose. On the personal level, when I was in Kandahar in 2009 I was offered hundreds of voting cards for \$10.

2014 Afghanistan Presidential Election

“Elections in Afghanistan over the past decade have rarely gone smoothly, and those in 2014 were no exception.”²¹ It must also be considered that countries in conflict as well as countries going through fundamental changes in their political and economic systems often experience political decay. As suggested by Samuel Huntington, “what is the reason of political instability and violence in these countries? ... rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics

¹⁹ Anand Gopal, “Afghan Voter Registration Marred,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, (December 24, 2008).

²⁰ Steve Coll, *Directorate S*, (New York: Penguin Press, 2018), p.318.

²¹ Noah Coburn, “Afghanistan: The 2014 Vote and the Troubled Future of Elections,” The Chatham House: Asia Programme, March 2015, Afghanistan: Opportunity in Crisis Series No. 8. Also see: Scott Smith, *Afghanistan’s Troubled Transition: Politics, Peacekeeping and the 2004 Presidential Election* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2011); and Noah Coburn and Anna Larson, *Derailing Democracy in Afghanistan: Elections in an Unstable Political Landscape* (Columbia, 2014). For an ongoing series of papers on the subject of elections in Afghanistan, see Martine van Bijlert and Kate Clark at the Afghanistan Analysts Network website: www.afghanistan-analysts.org.

coupled with the slow development of political institutions.’²² Likewise, Donald Horowitz has pointed out that young democracies often fall victim to the problems of their past as they appropriate colonial institutions or western constitutional provisions.²³ Most certainly, one of the causes of violence and instability in Afghanistan has been because of the lag of the development of political institutions.

The 2014 Afghanistan Presidential Election was hyped as the first peaceful transfer of regime power in the history of the country. In actuality the election became highly contested with fraud being accused by the leading candidates and bringing Afghanistan to the brink of a very serious political crisis.²⁴

The United States and the international community have invested a significant amount of time, energy, resources, and, most importantly,

²² Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pg. 4.

²³ Donald L. Horowitz, “Democracy in Divided Societies.” *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 4, 1993, 18–38, p. 35. Many others have assessed this dynamic. To name just a few see: Sid Noel, *From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies*, (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005) and Fernando Pacheco, “The Role of External Development Actors in the Post-conflict Scenarios – The Case of Angola,” in *The Role of External Actors in Post-Conflict Scenarios*, edited by Fernando Pacheco, Mamadu Jao, Teresa de Almeida Cravo, and Ulrich Schiefer. Coimbra: Oficina do CES, No. 258, September 2006.

²⁴ As suggested in footnote 8 of Thomas H. Johnson, “The Illusion of Afghanistan’s Electoral Representative Democracy: The Cases of Afghan Presidential and National Parliamentary Elections,”: “Fifteen thousand Abdullah supporters marched on the Arg to protest the election. Ghani’s circle was equally adamant. His campaign coordinator at the time, Hamdullah Mohib, recalls a meeting in which Ghani advisers discussed bringing a hundred thousand people into the streets. Ghani told them, in his didactic way, “A civil war lasts on average ten or fifteen years, and even then they’re very hard to end – ours is still going on. I can guarantee that tomorrow, if you March on Kabul, the first bullet will be fired. If anyone can guarantee when the last bullet will be fired, then I’ll allow the March.” George Packer, “Afghanistan’s Theorist-in-chief: President Ghani is an expert on failed states. Can He Save His Country from Collapse.” *The New Yorker*, July 4, 2016, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/07/04/ashraf-ghani-afghanistans-theorist-inchief>.

manpower in Afghanistan since 2001. The 2014 Afghanistan Presidential Election marked a crucial milestone in Afghanistan's democratic system, with its first projected transfer of power from President Hamid Karzai to an elected successor. Andrew Wilder, the director of the United States Institute of Peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan, highlighted the importance of the 2014 Afghan Presidential election in testimony to the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, stating "[the] stakes in 2014 are not simply the election of a new Afghan leadership, but the endurance of Afghanistan's constitutional political order."²⁵ With substantial investments in Afghanistan's democratic apparatus, a successful election was suspected to be a victory in "nation building" for the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the rest of the coalition. A failed election could possibly tarnish the United States, NATO, and the entire coalition's reputation and legitimacy.

27 candidates ran for Afghanistan's Presidency, however Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission disqualified 16 candidates for a variety of reasons and by April of 2014 only 8 candidates stayed in the race.²⁶

On April 4, 2014 and June 14, 2014, Afghanistan held its Presidential Elections to elect President Hamid Karzai's successor. With Afghans in the "lead" and the coalition in a "supporting" role for security and administration of the 2014 Presidential Election, widespread

²⁵ Prospects for Afghanistan's 2014 Election: Hearing before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S. Senate, 113th Cong., (2013) (statement of Andrew Wilder, Director of U.S. Institute of Peace for Afghanistan and Pakistan).

²⁶ Ali M. Latifi, "Sixteen Afghan Election Hopefuls Disqualified," *Al Jazeera*, (October 22, 2013), <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2013/10/sixteen-afghan-election-hopefuls-disqualified-2013102213563537306.html>.

corruption and irregularities were evident when analyzing election results from the first election to the subsequent runoff election. This article's section utilizes election data published by the National Democratic Institute,²⁷ a nonprofit, nonpartisan, nongovernmental organization that has supported democratic institutions and practices in every region of the world for more than three decades, to analyze the fraudulent results of the 2014 Afghanistan Presidential Elections.

On 4 April 2014, the first round of the Afghan Presidential Election recorded 6,645,384 total votes, producing the following results:

- 1) Abdullah Abdullah (44.72%),
- 2) Ashraf Ghani (31.37%),
- 3) Zalmay Rassoul (11.3%),
- 4) Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (7.00%), and
- 5) Others (5.61%).

Voter turnout was considerably high – 58% – considering the threats made by the Taliban concerning the election.²⁸ Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present presidential election results by province. Note Abdullah received the majority of votes in 14 of the provinces and a near majority in 2 others. Ghani, on the other hand, received the majority of votes in only 8 provinces while the remaining 12 provinces saw no candidate receiving a majority of the votes. Abdullah defeated Ghani by a rousing 13.35%.

Figure 1 presents a map of Ghani and Abdullah's vote by province. As suggested this figure and Tables 2.1 and 2.2 Ghani's support came primarily from Pashtun eastern provinces (Khost, Kunar,

²⁷ See: <https://www.ndi.org/>.

²⁸ Al Jazeera, "High Turnout in Afghanistan Elections," *Al Jazeera America*, April 5, 2014, <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/4/5/afghan-election.html>.

Logar, Nangarhar, Paktika, and Paktya) and provinces where his first Vice Presidential candidate Abdul Rashid Dostum has significant control and popularity (Faryab and Jawzjan). Its interesting to note that Ghani did not receive a majority of the vote in the traditional Pashtun homelands of the of Southern Afghanistan – Kandahar, Helmand, Nimroz, Farah, and Zabul. Zalmay Rassoul carried Kandahar.

Table 2: 2014 April Presidential Election Results by Province

Province	Dr. Abdullah Votes	Dr. Abdullah Percentage	Dr. Ghani Votes	Dr. Ghani Percentage
Total	2,972,141	44.72%	2,084,547	31.37%
Badakhshan	191,260	64.65%	42,548	14.38%
Badghis	86,620	67.19%	12,577	9.76%
Baghlan	152,560	59.95%	51,953	20.42%
Balkh	238,582	60.54%	109,694	27.83%
Bamyan	113,324	67.54%	18,427	10.98%
Daykundi	128,713	74.70%	19,113	11.09%
Farah	18,029	31.45%	22,708	39.61%
Faryab	77,633	29.12%	173,225	64.99%
Ghazni	194,264	53.85%	68,328	18.94%
Ghor	180,446	59.44%	39,698	13.08%
Helmand	17,905	16.98%	34,110	32.35%
Herat	301,364	60.86%	54,618	11.03%
Jawzjan	29,375	19.57%	101,985	67.93%
Kabul	389,584	49.49%	248,220	31.53%
Kandahar	26,500	10.43%	34,698	13.66%
Kapisa	52,544	78.70%	2,745	4.11%
Khost	4,040	3.56%	83,691	73.69%
Kunar	13,257	12.26%	69,545	64.29%
Kunduz	100,413	46.60%	80,893	37.54%
Laghman	8,495	10.33%	40,673	49.48%
Logar	6,169	18.55%	20,953	62.99%

Nangarhar	63,689	18.93%	200,409	59.55%
Nimroz	9,674	20.39%	15,562	32.80%
Nooristan	23,234	37.60%	9,001	14.57%
Paktika	19,097	10.46%	118,089	64.66%
Paktya	13,610	5.36%	157,826	62.16%
Panjshir	37,925	87.20%	166	0.38%
Parwan	107,478	71.65%	8,395	5.60%
Samangan	86,845	60.69%	37,632	26.30%
Sar-e-pul	74,711	50.00%	57,097	38.21%
Takhar	159,375	49.85%	121,100	37.88%
Urozgan	5,317	23.10%	6,022	26.16%
Wardak	36,253	36.02%	15,064	14.97%
Zabul	3,856	18.74%	7,782	37.81%


Table 3: 2014 April Presidential Election Results by Province

Province	Prof Sayyaf		Other Candidates	
	Votes	Percentage	Votes	Percentage
Total	465,207	7.00%	372,492	5.61%
Badakhshan	25,537	8.63%	8,460	2.86%
Badghis	16,657	12.92%	6,075	4.71%
Baghlan	10,033	3.94%	11,534	4.53%
Balkh	4,512	1.14%	9,241	2.34%
Bamyan	7,695	4.59%	7,628	4.55%
Daykundi	794	0.46%	3,781	2.19%
Farah	6,016	10.49%	3,102	5.41%
Faryab	4,277	1.60%	4,918	1.84%
Ghazni	22,540	6.25%	14,839	4.11%
Ghor	48,565	16.00%	7,753	2.55%
Helmand	3,980	3.77%	21,017	19.93%
Herat	67,892	13.71%	15,051	3.04%
Jawzjan	3,020	2.01%	5,723	3.81%
Kabul	59,107	7.51%	25,437	3.23%
Kandahar	4,175	1.64%	54,011	21.26%


Kapisa	3,825	5.73%	3,907	5.85%
Khost	2,648	2.33%	14,576	12.83%
Kunar	7,416	6.86%	6,046	5.59%
Kunduz	12,272	5.70%	10,683	4.96%
Laghman	8,096	9.85%	17,303	21.05%
Logar	3,721	11.19%	1,621	4.87%
Nangarhar	24,041	7.14%	23,142	6.88%
Nimroz	4,550	9.59%	3,557	7.50%
Nooristan	17,858	28.90%	4,115	6.66%
Paktika	5,630	3.08%	13,152	7.20%
Paktya	34,847	13.72%	28,709	11.31%
Panjshir	946	2.18%	336	0.77%
Parwan	9,191	6.13%	9,123	6.08%
Samangan	3,612	2.52%	4,176	2.92%
Sar-e-pul	3,472	2.32%	5,035	3.37%
Takhar	12,063	3.77%	11,106	3.47%
Urozgan	637	2.77%	5,713	24.82%
Wardak	24,559	24.40%	8,082	8.03%
Zabul	1,023	4.9%	3,540	17.20%

Figure 1: Election Results by Province²⁹

Abdullah Abdullah



Aschraf Ghani



29

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_presidential_election,_2014#/media/File:Afghanist an_Praesidentschaftswahl_erste_Runde_Details.svg.

As we witnessed in the 2004 and 2009 Presidential elections, ethno-linguistic populations tended to vote for candidates of their ethnicity.³⁰

Figure 2 and Tables 2.1 and 2.2 suggest that Abdullah Abdullah did extremely well in the northern and central Afghan provinces where Pashtuns do not hold the majority for most of the provincial populations. Table 3 clearly suggests that Afghan voting continues to be almost exclusively influenced by ethno-linguistic lines.³¹ Provincial election results for each of the four leading candidates during the first election were compiled and correlated against the ethnic breakdown of the 34 Afghan provinces. The results indicate a significant correlation between Abdullah Abdullah, being supported by Tajiks ($r = 0.69$) and Hazaras ($r = 0.40$) while experiencing a significant negative correlation ($r = -0.74$) in support from ethnic Pashtuns. Although ethnic Pashtuns split their support between several candidates during the April election, Ashraf Ghani, an ethnic Pashtun, had a positive correlation of support from Pashtuns ($r = 0.50$) and Uzbeks ($r = 0.24$). Not only did Afghans vote along ethnic lines, but they also tended to vote against opposition ethnic groups. During the first election, Ashraf Ghani had significant negative correlation relative to the probability of support from Tajiks ($r = -0.52$) and Hazaras ($r = -0.30$).

A significant difference between the 2014 election and the 2004 and 2009 elections was that in 2014 three of the four leading candidates

³⁰ See footnote 12.

³¹ Timor Sharan and Srinjoy Bose, "Political Networks and the 2014 Afghan Presidential Election: Power Restructuring, Ethnicity and State Stability," *Conflict, Security & Development* 16, no. 6 (November 1, 2016): 613–33, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2016.1248431>; and footnote 12.

were all Pashtun. Pashtuns, as we saw in earlier presidential elections, also significantly voted against Abdullah Abdullah. Pashtuns, as expected, voted primarily for two of the Pashtun candidates Ghani ($r = .53$) and Zalmay Rassoul ($r = .35$). Rassoul had considerable support in Kandahar where he was the leading vote getter with 53% of the vote. He also had considerable election support in other southern Pashtun provinces of Helmand, Nimroz and Urozgan.

Abdul Rasul Sayyaf received only 7% of the total vote and only garnered considerable votes in his home province of Wardak (24.4%), Nooristan (28.9%), Ghor (16%) and Herat, the home of his Vice Presidential candidate Ismail Khan, (13.7%).

Table 3 also suggests that Hazaras supported Abdullah and Uzbeks supported Ghani but spread their votes amongst other candidates.

Table 4: Correlation Coefficients (Pearson r): 2014 April Presidential Election Results by Province 2009 and Ethno-Linguistic Provincial votes received (%)³²

	Tajik	Pashtun	Pashtun	Pashtun
	Abdullah³³	Ghani	Rassoul	Sayyaf
Pashtun	-0.7400	0.5043	0.3521	-0.0278
Tajik	0.6891	-0.5239	-0.3116	0.0139
Hazara	0.3984	-0.2971	-0.0469	-0.1406
Uzbek	0.0998	0.2400	-0.3339	-0.3665

Since no candidate received the required 50%+1 of the popular vote required by the constitution, a runoff election was required to elect President Karzai's successor. Table 4 presents the results of the runoff election held on 14 June 2014. This election saw an increase in voter participation across the country, with an additional 1,302,143 votes cast for a total of 7,947,527 votes. With a total voting population of approximately 25,354,494, Afghanistan witnessed a 31.35% voter turnout for the runoff election, versus 26.2% during the first election. Surprisingly, Ashraf Ghani claimed widespread support during the runoff to earn the victory with 56.44% of the popular votes, against Abdullah Abdullah's 43.56%. After beating Ashraf Ghani by 887,594 votes during

³² For an explanation of data sources see: Thomas H. Johnson, "The Illusion of Afghanistan's Electoral Representative Democracy: The Cases of Afghan Presidential and National Parliamentary Elections." The provincial data were updated for this analysis using a variety of Afghan Government sources noted above.

³³ While Abdullah Abdullah is the son of a Pashtun father from the Kandahar area, and a Tajik mother from the north, politically he is most closely identified with the main Tajik political party in the north. During the anti-Soviet jihad, Abdullah was a major player in the main Tajik mujahideen party, Jamiat-e Islami and later became the main spokesman for the Northern Alliance.

the first election, Abdullah Abdullah ended up losing to Ashraf Ghani by 1,024,249 votes during the runoff election – a swing of 1,911,843 votes, well over twice the number of all the votes that were received by candidates other than Ghani and Abdullah in the April election, even though Rassoul, Sayyaf, and Sherzai threw their support to Abdullah.

Afghans voting along ethno-linguist lines might explain the massive swing from the first election to the runoff in favor of Ashraf Ghani.

Table 5: 2014 June Runoff Presidential Election Results by Province

Province	Dr. Abdullah		Dr. Ashraf Ghani		Margin (#)	Margin (%)
	Votes	Percentage	Votes	Percentage		
Totals	3,461,639	43.56%	4,485,888	56.44%	-1,024,249	-12.89%
Badakhshan	247,637	79.32%	64,578	20.68%	183,059	58.63%
Badghis	88,650	65.50%	46,702	34.50%	41,948	30.99%
Baghlan	212,223	55.19%	172,317	44.81%	39,906	10.38%
Balkh	224,506	63.11%	131,259	36.89%	93,247	26.21%
Bamyan	126,570	75.64%	40,758	24.36%	85,812	51.28%
Daykundi	136,779	77.49%	39,743	22.51%	97,036	54.97%
Farah	40,133	53.24%	35,252	46.76%	4,881	6.47%
Faryab	113,228	34.20%	217,895	65.80%	-104,667	-31.61%
Ghazni	181,791	58.47%	129,146	41.53%	52,645	16.93%
Ghor	238,303	72.48%	90,491	27.52%	147,812	44.96%
Helmand	18,083	30.64%	40,943	69.36%	-22,860	-38.73%
Herat	325,843	63.65%	186,118	36.35%	139,725	27.29%
Jawzjan	25,179	19.35%	104,957	80.65%	-79,778	-61.30%
Kabul	422,269	48.17%	454,296	51.83%	-32,027	-3.65%
Kandahar	51,186	15.99%	268,946	84.01%	-217,760	-68.02%

Kapisa	74,364	87.36%	10,756	12.64%	63,608	74.73%
Khost	11,628	2.91%	388,532	97.09%	-376,904	-94.19%
Kunar	25,521	12.03%	186,697	87.97%	-161,176	-75.95%
Kunduz	81,375	42.36%	110,742	57.64%	-29,367	-15.29%
Laghman	16,986	14.21%	102,556	85.79%	-85,570	-71.58%
Logar	8,722	9.15%	86,567	90.85%	-77,845	-81.69%
Nangarhar	91,738	22.37%	318,348	77.63%	-226,610	-55.26%
Nimroz	10,970	34.67%	20,668	65.33%	-9,698	-30.65%
Nooristan	57,193	70.68%	23,722	29.32%	33,471	41.37%
Paktika	47,389	11.71%	357,173	88.29%	-309,784	-76.57%
Paktya	26,960	8.06%	307,445	91.94%	-280,485	-83.88%
Panjshir	60,214	93.65%	4,085	6.35%	56,129	87.29%
Parwan	124,287	86.11%	20,044	13.89%	104,243	72.22%
Samangan	89,141	63.17%	51,962	36.83%	37,179	26.35%
Sar-e-pul	62,117	46.72%	70,830	53.28%	-8,713	-6.55%
Takhar	160,218	52.21%	146,648	47.79%	13,570	4.42%
Urozgan	6,709	32.52%	13,922	67.48%	-7,213	-34.96%
Wardak	49,281	20.91%	186,382	79.09%	-137,101	-58.18%
Zabul	4,446	7.43%	55,408	92.57%	-50,962	-85.14%

With Rassoul and Sayyaf not participating in the runoff election, ethnic Pashtuns it could be argued rallied behind their Pashtun candidate to defeat the Tajik candidate, Abdullah Abdullah.

Although this proposed proposition is probable without circumstantial evidence, additional context into Afghan politics refutes the proposition, as suggested above, as both Zalmay Rassoul and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf's camps pledged support for Abdullah Abdullah before the 14 June 2014 runoff election. Zalmay Rassoul, the third-place finisher in

the first round presidential election with 11.5% of the votes, announced his endorsement for Presidential Candidate Abdullah Abdullah on May 11, 2014.³⁴ Zalmay Rassoul, as suggested above, is an ethnic Pashtun, whose endorsement of Abdullah was predicted by some to cause Ashraf Ghani to withdraw from the runoff election. On June 3, 2014, former-Presidential Candidate Abdul Rasul Sayyaf's two vice-presidential running mates, Mohammad Ismail Khan and Abdul Wahah Erfan, along with Abdul Rasul Sayyaf's other supporters proclaimed their endorsement for Abdullah Abdullah in the runoff election.³⁵ With all these endorsements for Abdullah one would expect that with his already wide margin lead from the initial election that he was in a good position to win the runoff election.

Table 5 represents the differences in voting percentages from the April (initial) to June (runoff) elections. Ghani won six provinces that he lost in the April election. The provinces of Farah, Kabul, Kandahar, Kunduz, Sar-e-pul and Wardak all represent significant swing provinces. In Farah, Ghani had more votes during the initial election, but Abdullah apparently gained swing votes. In Kabul, Abdullah had a majority win during the primary (49.5% - 31.5%), but lost by 3.66% in the runoff (possibly all due to swing votes). This is a significant change and as we will see below, this province experienced extremely "unusual" voting

³⁴ Tim Craig and Mohammad Sharif, "Abdullah Abdullah, the Front-Runner in the Afghan Presidential Race, Solidifies Support," *Washington Post*, May 11, 2014, sec. World, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/abdullah-the-front-runner-in-afghan-election-picks-up-new-support-from-one-time-rival/2014/05/11/db84abd8-d939-11e3-8009-71de85b9c527_story.html.

³⁵ "Abdullah Receives another Endorsement for Afghan President," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, accessed October 27, 2017, <https://www.rferl.org/a/abdullah-receives-another-endorsement-for-afghan-president/25408733.html>.

patterns during the runoff election (see Table 7). Whereas Ghani only received 34,698 votes (13.66%) during the initial election, he received 268,946 votes (84%) in the runoff election. This would suggest that even though the leading Pashtun candidate in Kandahar, Zalmay Rassoul, threw his support to Abdullah, Ghani still received almost all of the votes from this province; Ghani gained 217,763 votes! On the surface this seems highly improbable. In Kunduz, Abdullah had a majority win during the April election (46.6% - 37.5%), but lost by 15.3% in the runoff. While Ghani receiving all the swing votes in the runoff election might explain this, this appears highly unlikely. In Sar-e-pul, Abdullah had a majority win during the primary (46.6% - 37.5%), but lost by 15.3% in the runoff – a tremendous change in the province’s voting pattern. Again, it seems highly unlikely that this was just a result of Ghani receiving all the swing votes. In Wardak, Abdullah had twice as many votes during the primary, but due to Sayyaf dropping out, Ghani apparently gained Pashtun votes.

Table 6: Percentage Differences (Changes) of Provincial Votes from the Preliminary Election to the Runoff Election

	Abdullah	Ghani
Total	-1.17%	25.08%
Badakhshan	14.67%	6.30%
Badghis	-1.70%	24.75%
Baghlan	-4.77%	24.39%
Balkh	2.57%	9.06%
Bamyan	8.10%	13.38%
Daykundi	2.79%	11.42%
Farah	21.79%	7.15%
Faryab	5.07%	0.82%

Ghazni	4.62%	22.59%
Ghor	13.04%	14.45%
Helmand	13.66%	37.02%
Herat	2.79%	25.32%
Jawzjan	-0.22%	12.72%
Kabul	-1.32%	20.29%
Kandahar	5.56%	70.36%
Kapisa	8.66%	8.52%
Khost	-0.65%	23.40%
Kunar	-0.23%	23.68%
Kunduz	-4.24%	20.10%
Laghman	3.87%	36.31%
Logar	-9.39%	27.85%
Nangarhar	3.45%	18.08%
Nimroz	14.29%	32.53%
Nooristan	33.08%	14.75%
Paktika	1.26%	23.63%
Paktya	2.70%	29.78%
Panjshir	6.44%	5.97%
Parwan	14.46%	8.29%
Samangan	2.48%	10.53%
Sar-e-pul	-3.27%	15.07%
Takhar	2.36%	9.91%
Urozgan	9.42%	41.32%
Wardak	-15.11%	64.12%
Zabul	-11.31%	54.76%

Hypothetically, if *all* voters who did not vote for Abdullah Abdullah in the first election voted for Ashraf Ghani during the first election, Ashraf Ghani would have edged out Abdullah Abdullah by a margin of 55.28% to 44.72%. The proposed voting population would include supporters for all other candidates during the first election. Although this idea may seem nearly impossible and unimaginable, the results of the runoff election almost mirrored the hypothetical margin of victory by Ashraf Ghani if he received ALL of votes not cast for Abdullah Abdullah in the April election (56.44% to 43.56%).

During the runoff election, voter turnout in several provinces also raises red flags that signal election fraud that was alleged by many. With the overall voter turnout of 31.35% across the country, Ghor, Khost, Kunar, Paktika, Paktya, and Panjshir all reported over 45% voter turnout. Of note, Paktika – a conflict-ridden province – *reported a 97.77% voter turnout*, where 404,562 of the 413,799 eligible voters traveled to election polls on 14 June 2014 to cast their ballots for the next president. Ashraf Ghani received 357,173 of those 404,562 votes, equaling 88.29%. After further examination of the vote counts in Paktika during the first election and runoff election, several other concerning details emerged. There was a 54.86% increase in voter turnout, as 221,927 additional votes emerged during the runoff election as compared to the first election. Additionally, Ashraf Ghani gained 239,084 more votes during the runoff election in Paktika Province, also a conflict-ridden province. In Khost Province, records indicate that 73.18% of eligible voters (400,160 of 546,800) showed up to polling stations on June 14, 2014 to cast their ballots. Of the reported ballots, 388,532 or 97.09% of the votes were in favor of Ashraf

Ghani. Even more alarming is the increase of 286,590 ballots from the first election and the runoff election, representing a 252.35% increase in voter turnout. These are just two extreme cases of provinces that reported election results that indicated a significant probability of election irregularities in favor of the declared victor, Ashraf Ghani.

Table 7: Correlation Coefficients (Pearson r): 2014 June (Runoff) Presidential Election Results by Province 2009 and Ethno-Linguistic Provincial votes received (%)

	Tajik	Pashtun
	Abdullah	Ghani
Pashtun	-0.7552	0.7552
Tajik	0.6562	-0.6562
Hazara	0.3324	-0.3324
Uzbek	0.0258	-0.0258

As suggested throughout this article, it has been argued that historically, ethnic divides in Afghanistan remain a significant force in Afghan politics.³⁶ As posited by Table 6, The 2014 Afghan Presidential Runoff Election witnessed alliances of Tajik-Hazara ethnic groups supporting Abdullah Abdullah and Pashtun-Uzbeks ethnic groups supporting Ashraf Ghani.

During the runoff election following the absence of Zalmay Rassoul and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, both ethnic Pashtuns, Ashraf Ghani experienced a significant correlation increase in support from ethnic Pashtuns ($r = 0.76$ from $r = 0.50$). This correlation further confirms that

³⁶ Thomas H. Johnson, “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building after War,” 2006, <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/38800>, 13.

Afghans voted along ethno-linguistic lines. Or at least votes being counted from these provinces represented this dynamic. Contrary to this theory, Abdullah Abdullah experienced a slight decrease in support from ethnic Tajiks ($r = 0.66$ from $r = 0.69$) and Hazaras ($r = 0.33$ from $r = 0.40$) between the first and runoff elections. The latter correlational analysis of the runoff election further possibly promotes the idea of potential fraud regarding the additional votes that elected Ashraf Ghani. These correlations, even when falling, indicate the difficulties involved in overcoming ethnic lines in a tribal society to promote nationalism and unity in support of a legitimate centralized government.

During the April election, Abdullah Abdullah won the popular vote in 19 of the 34 provinces (Ashraf Ghani won 14, and Zalmay Rassoul won Kandahar). Going head-to-head during the runoff election two months later, Ashraf Ghani unexpectedly gained the popular vote in 18 of the 34 provinces, giving him the overall victory in the presidential election (see Tables 4 and 5). In Kabul, Abdullah Abdullah had a firm lead during the first election (49.5% to 31.5%) but ended up losing the province's popular vote in the runoff by 3.7%. This is an incredible voter change in preferences in a city that has a large mixed ethno-linguistic population. Since Zalmay Rassoul won the popular vote in Kandahar during the first election with 53% of the votes, ethnic Pashtuns in Kandahar apparently voted along ethnic-linguistic lines to give Ashraf Ghani a decisive victory in the province during the runoff election. In Kunduz, Abdullah Abdullah again had a firm lead during the first election (46.6% to 37.5%) but ended up losing the province's popular vote in the runoff by 15.3%. Again, a massive voter swing in votes that raise many

questions. In Sar-e-pul, Abdullah Abdullah had a large margin of victory during the first election (50% to 38.2%), but ended up losing the province's popular vote in the runoff by 7%. Similar to Kunduz, removal of other candidates alone seemingly cannot explain the swing votes, the ethnic-linguistic composition of the province indicate that Pashtuns and Uzbeks compose of 75% of the province. In Wardak, Abdullah Abdullah had over twice the number of votes during the first election (36% to 15%) but ended up losing the province's popular vote in the runoff by 60% since Abdul Rasul Sayyaf's voters apparently reverted to ethnic-linguistic lines and supported Ashraf Ghani.

After the runoff election Afghanistan descended into chaos as both Ghani and his rival, Abdullah Abdullah, accused each other of fraud. As suggested below, the possibilities of violence concerning the election results³⁷ reached such a state that US Secretary of State John Kerry intervened to work out a compromise solution with Ghani and Abdullah forming a "unity government" with the two candidates sharing power; Ghani was made President and Abdullah was made the country's newly created position of Chief Executive Officer (CEO).

A year and one-half after the election, Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission finally publically confirmed the election results. The "official" election results changed from those presented in Table 4 as a significant number of votes were invalidated. "More than 850,000 ballots were invalidated after months of recounting under the supervision

³⁷ See footnote 24.

of the United Nations. Of those invalidated votes, more than 567,000 were cast for Ghani, while more than 284,000 were cast for Abdullah.”³⁸

The official election results gave Ghani the June runoff victory with 55.27% of the vote compared to Abdullah’s 44.73%.³⁹ Table 7 and data presented in Appendices A and B, that contain the most important data presented in this article and require attention. And the large amount of data is purposely presented because, as will be argued below, the election results appear extremely irregular if not illegitimate.

Table 7 presents what is referred to as “unusual” results from a variety of polling places in Afghanistan’s largest province and home of the capital city, Kabul. During the April election Abdullah clearly won the province with 49.49% of the vote compared to 31.53% to Ghani. In the runoff election, Ghani won the province with 51.8% of the vote compared to 48.2% for Abdullah.

As suggested by the Table 7 numerous polling places in most of Kabul’s districts experienced voting results that virtually all went to Ashraf Ghani. And it should be remembered that we are not talking about votes that had to travel hundreds of miles on mules to reach their final destination. These votes were conducted at Kabul Polling Centers that were easy to gather. Yet these results included polling places that went for Ghani 600-0, 599-1, 598-1, etc. These kinds of results are virtually unknown in fair and free democratic elections. Abdullah did carry two

³⁸ Reuters Staff, “Commission releases disputed 2014 Afghan election results,” Reuters, February, 24, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-election/commission-releases-disputed-2014-afghan-election-results-idUSKCN0VX1O8>.

³⁹ Ibid.

Kabul polling places both in Kabul’s Kalakan District by 97-1 and 346-4 but this was the clear exception rather than the rule.

Even more disturbing are data presented in Appendices A and B. Appendix A presents election results for 1503 polling places where Ghani received virtually all votes. In 606 polling places Ghani received all of the votes. In an additional 903 polling places Ghani received all the votes except for a few. These polling places were found in numerous provinces, especially in Kabul, Ghazni, Paktika, Paktya, Khost, Kunar, Ghor, Zabul, Wardak, Logar, Nangarhar, Laghman, Ghazni and Faryab. Even a cursory review of the Appendices will clearly suggest that the 2014 runoff election was marred by incredibly unusual voting patterns that can only be view as highly suspicious, if not fraudulent. Moreover and more importantly, the voting results could lead an objective observer to conclude that the election and, hence Ghani’s presidency is illegitimate, at least, by democratic voting standards.

Table 8: Kabul Province Unusual Polling Place Data⁴⁰

<i>Province</i>	<i>District</i>	<i>Polling Center (Station)</i>	<i>Abdullah Total Votes</i>	<i>Ghani Total Votes</i>
Kabul	Kabul	101514 (4)	1	595
Kabul	Kabul	101514 (5)	15	584
Kabul	Kabul	101514 (6)	2	429
Kabul	Kabul	101448 (5)	2	595
Kabul	Kabul	101448 (6)	2	597
Kabul	Kabul	101448 (7)	3	597
Kabul	Kabul	101448 (8)	2	598
Kabul	Kabul	101511 (7)	6	586
Kabul	Kabul	101511 (8)	0	596
Kabul	Kabul	101499 (6)	1	592
Kabul	Kabul	101514 (1)	10	582
Kabul	Kabul	101514 (2)	9	582

⁴⁰ Afghan Election Data, http://2014.afghanistanelectiondata.org/#runoff/results_runoff.

Kabul	Kabul	101514 (3)	2	597
Kabul	Kabul	101532 (3)	5	590
Kabul	Kabul	101488 (1)	15	579
Kabul	Kabul	101488 (2)	3	596
Kabul	Kabul	101488 (3)	2	596
Kabul	Kabul	101488 (4)	1	597
Kabul	Kabul	101511 (6)	0	600
Kabul	Kabul	101313 (1)	6	343
Kabul	Kabul	101313 (2)	10	424
Kabul	Kabul	101511 (1)	0	600
Kabul	Kabul	101499 (2)	9	587
Kabul	Kabul	101499 (3)	1	588
Kabul	Kabul	101499 (4)	1	595
Kabul	Kabul	101499 (5)	3	594
Kabul	Kabul	101313 (3)	19	505
Kabul	Kabul	101313 (5)	7	423
Kabul	Kabul	101313 (6)	5	276
Kabul	Kabul	101313 (7)	5	241
Kabul	Kabul	101511 (2)	4	571
Kabul	Kabul	101511 (3)	2	597
Kabul	Kabul	101511 (4)	2	596
Kabul	Kabul	101511 (5)	1	597
Kabul	Kabul	101473 (1)	5	591
Kabul	Kabul	101498 (8)	14	579
Kabul	Kabul	101473 (8)	2	589
Kabul	Kabul	101473 (9)	5	592
Kabul	Kabul	101473 (10)	0	591
Kabul	Kabul	101473 (11)	13	584
Kabul	Kabul	101332 (1)	15	585
Kabul	Kabul	101322 (2)	6	586
Kabul	Kabul	101322 (3)	3	596
Kabul	Kabul	101322 (4)	2	598
Kabul	Kabul	101322 (5)	1	298
Kabul	Kabul	101322 (6)	11	585
Kabul	Kabul	101322 (7)	8	589
Kabul	Kabul	101322 (8)	18	580
Kabul	Kabul	101322 (9)	1	597
Kabul	Kabul	101510 (3)	3	589
Kabul	Kabul	101510 (4)	5	594
Kabul	Kabul	101510 (5)	0	597
Kabul	Kabul	101499 (1)	5	585
Kabul	Kabul	101176 (13)	1	317
Kabul	Kabul	101176 (14)	1	207
Kabul	Kabul	101499 (7)	1	596
Kabul	Kabul	101509 (1)	0	428

Kabul	Kabul	101509 (2)	5	488
Kabul	Kabul	101509 (3)	0	584
Kabul	Kabul	101509 (4)	0	599
Kabul	Kabul	101509 (5)	0	600
Kabul	Kabul	101509 (6)	3	593
Kabul	Kabul	101509 (7)	7	593
Kabul	Kabul	101535 (1)	7	593
Kabul	Kabul	101535 (3)	10	571
Kabul	Kabul	101532 (1)	11	579
Kabul	Kabul	101473 (2)	12	578
Kabul	Kabul	101473 (3)	0	598
Kabul	Kabul	101473 (4)	0	591
Kabul	Kabul	101473 (5)	0	598
Kabul	Kabul	101473 (6)	0	595
Kabul	Kabul	101473 (7)	0	593
Kabul	Kabul	101176 (4)	9	580
Kabul	Kabul	101176 (5)	18	567
Kabul	Kabul	101176 (6)	3	115
Kabul	Kabul	101176 (7)	1	88
Kabul	Kabul	101176 (8)	4	143
Kabul	Kabul	101176 (9)	7	403
Kabul	Kabul	101176 (10)	3	332
Kabul	Kabul	101176 (11)	10	471
Kabul	Kabul	101176 (12)	10	294
Kabul	Kabul	101331 (4)	0	596
Kabul	Kabul	101331 (5)	0	596
Kabul	Kabul	101331 (6)	0	598
Kabul	Kabul	101331 (7)	0	591
Kabul	Kabul	101331 (8)	0	589
Kabul	Kabul	101331 (9)	0	598
Kabul	Kabul	101331 (10)	0	592
Kabul	Kabul	101331 (11)	0	596
Kabul	Kabul	101513 (6)	9	412
Kabul	Kabul	101249 (9)	2	154
Kabul	Kabul	101249 (10)	1	323
Kabul	Kabul	101249 (2)	14	578
Kabul	Paghman	102408 (5)	1	78
Kabul	Paghman	102408 (4)	0	83
Kabul	Chahar Asyab	103429 (5)	5	465
Kabul	Chahar Asyab	103419 (4)	6	203
Kabul	Chahar Asyab	103536 (2)	6	361
Kabul	Chahar Asyab	103419 (3)	1	125
Kabul	Chahar Asyab	103536 (1)	3	214
Kabul	Chahar Asyab	103419 (2)	2	274
Kabul	Chahar Asyab	103419 (5)	0	399

Kabul	Chahar Asyab	103422 (2)	5	435
Kabul	Chahar Asyab	103536 (3)	0	279
Kabul	Chahar Asyab	103420 (4)	7	581
Kabul	Chahar Asyab	103420 (2)	9	472
Kabul	Bagrami	104461 (4)	5	583
Kabul	Bagrami	104461 (5)	9	582
Kabul	Bagrami	104460 (2)	3	330
Kabul	Bagrami	104460 (1)	3	240
Kabul	Bagrami	104460 (1)	3	240
Kabul	Bagrami	104460 (3)	1	326
Kabul	Khak-e-Jabar	109440 (1)	8	579
Kabul	Khak-e-Jabar	109443 (2)	6	497
Kabul	Khak-e-Jabar	109445 (3)	5	496
Kabul	Khak-e-Jabar	109440 (3)	11	589
Kabul	Kalakan	110354 (3)	97	1
Kabul	Kalakan	110352 (5)	346	4

The probability that these results actually represented valid votes seems to be extremely remote if not impossible. A careful examination of Table 7 and Appendix A clearly suggests that Ghani’s campaign was at least partially, if not primarily, based on fraud. There is virtually no chance that 606 polling places would find Ghani receiving all votes and another 900 giving virtually all its votes to Ghani. These results in combination with other analyses presented earlier raise the very real possibility that the election results of Ashraf Ghani in 2014 were illegitimate. Significant allegations of irregularities, including ballot box stuffing, referred to, as “stuffed sheep” as suggested in the introduction of this paper, must be taken very seriously.

Appendix B suggests that Abdullah Abdullah received virtually all votes in 35 polling places primarily in Ghor and Badakhshan both of which voted heavily for Abdullah province-wide. Hence, fraud might

have also existed in the Abdullah campaign but apparently at levels much less significant than in the Ghani's campaign.

Paul Miller, a political scientist in the National Security Research Division at the RAND Corporation, explained the importance of the 2014 Presidential Election by stating, "If Afghans can hold elections on time and elect someone relatively honest and competent under a process open and transparent enough to persuade all parties to accept the result— and if they can do so in the face of insecurity, international skepticism, and huge logistical challenges—the election could become a catalyst for Afghans to rally around their government, trigger negotiations with the Taliban, and ensure continued donor support for development. If they cannot, the worst prognostications of Afghanistan's future — political breakdown, fragmentation of the security forces, or even civil war — become far more likely."⁴¹ Although the elections were executed in a semi-secured environment, widespread fraud and ethnic divisions point to a weak centralized national government that sponsored a questionable election. The bitter stalemate following the runoff election by the Ghani and Abdullah required the international community led by US Secretary of State John Kerry, as suggested above, to arbitrate a power-sharing compromise by creating the National Unity Government that named Ashraf Ghani as the elected president and Abdullah Abdullah as the Chief Executive Officer. Ashraf Ghani was inaugurated as president on September 29, 2014. It is not unreasonable at all to assume that Kerry

⁴¹ Paul D. Miller, "Democracy in Afghanistan: The 2014 Election and Beyond," *RAND Corporation*, 2014, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE120/RAND_PE120.pdf.

promoted this compromise because he knew that the election results were probably blatantly illegitimate.

The unity government has proved anything but “united” as political in fighting continues to disrupt day-to-day political decision making in the country. “The eventual compromise over the candidates’ competing claims to the presidency must be considered preferable to the alternative of continued uncertainty and a lack of functioning government. However, the failure of the election process and the ad hoc nature of the agreement between the candidates underlined the continuing deep flaws in Afghanistan’s political system and political culture.”⁴²

A Report by the European Union based on observations of EU election observers found “stark” election fraud in the runoff election and that auditing only invalidated a small number of votes:

The report provides the fullest picture yet of the allegations of fraud that plagued the election, suggesting that more than two million votes — or about a quarter of total votes cast — came from polling stations with voting irregularities.

Reports of widespread fraud led to a political crisis pitting the two campaigns, of Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, against each other after the preliminary results tilted sharply in favor of Mr. Ghani... The report from Mr. Berman’s election assessment team does not provide a figure for how many votes it believes to be invalid, but it does point to a number of irregular voting patterns that raise doubts about more than two million votes. *It notes that millions of votes came from stations with unexpectedly high turnouts or where the votes were cast almost uniformly in favor of one candidate — both of which are “extremely unlikely and an indication of possible fraud,”* Mr. Berman said. *In the runoff, 2.06 million of the votes cast, or some 26 percent of the total, came from polling stations in which turnout was reported to have reached or exceeded 99 percent of the predicted turnout of 600 voters per polling station.* The report cites another voting irregularity: *More than 2.3 million votes during the runoff came from polling sites in which more than 95 percent of the votes went to one candidate.* Of those, 378,281 votes, or 5 percent of the

⁴² See: Noah Coburn, *Afghanistan: The 2014 Vote and the Troubled Future of Elections*, Chatham House: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, March 19, 2015, p. 2.

total, came from polling stations that reported that 100 percent of the votes went just one way (my emphasis.)⁴³

It took over a year and one-half for Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission to finally confirm the official results of the disputed election.

Videos. The author also received a large number of unsolicited videos that purported to show explicit voting fraud.⁴⁴ Most of the videos suggested that fraud was committed in the eastern provinces that Ghani eventually won in the runoff election. Some of these videos (by province) suggest:

Logar Province: Logar is a province where Ghani gained 27.85% of votes in the runoff election compared to the April election (see Table 5). A video shows a bundle of ballots that had been marked for Ashraf Ghani, without them being ripped and folded. This clearly seems to suggest that one individual was marking these bundles of ballots and prepared them to be stuffed in ballot boxes.

Paktia Province: Ghani received 29.78% more votes in the runoff election as compared to the April election (see Table 5). Video 20131112_055118 shows ANA soldiers closing down a polling center in Paktia province with over 20,000 fraudulent ballots that were all

⁴³ Joseph Goldstein, "E.U. Confirms Wide Fraud in Afghan Presidential Runoff Election," *The New York Times*, December 16, 2014, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/world/asia/afghan-voting-fraud-detailed-in-new-report.html>. Also, see: Carlotta Gall, "In Afghan Election, Signs of Systemic Fraud Cast Doubt on Many Votes," *The New York Times*, August 23, 2014, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/24/world/asia/in-afghan-election-signs-of-systemic-fraud-cast-doubt-on-many-votes.html>.

⁴⁴ The author will make these videos available to responsible requesters. Many of these videos can be found at: <https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/19YIMiNyDT6B8yu6Xd6xOpuoFQ0xqCbOp?usp=sharing>.

marked for Ashraf Ghani; Video 0018 shows the ANA soldiers counting the fraudulent ballots; Video 10454541_720470141348700_1501703985 shows another polling center in Paktia, where poll workers are seen marking ballots for Ashraf Ghani; The ballots were not folded and stamped like they should have been; Video 3gp (1) shows a group of men in Paktia stamping and marking the ballots in favor of Ghani at another polling station; The ballots were still in bundles without them being ripped and folded; Video 3gp (2) shows the same group of men filling the ballot boxes with those ballots that they stamped and marked for Ghani.

Paktika Province: In Paktika Province Ghani received 23.63% more votes in the runoff election versus the April election (see Table 5). Video 0000 shows ballots marked by only one individual in favor of Ghani. Another video shows an individual with ballot boxes in the trunk of his station wagon taking it to an unspecified location to be stuffed; Photo 20140615_070214, shows ballots that were marked for Abdullah being ripped by poll workers at a polling station in Paktika Province; Video 20140615_070222.mp4, shows more ballots marked for Abdullah torn apart that the same polling station, the person speaking in this video claims he was a poll worker at the station and that most of the ballots marked for Abdullah were burned inside the polling station and he was unable to film it. He also claims that one poll worker stuffed over 500 ballots in favor of Ghani in the same polling station.

Khost Province: In Khost Province Ghani received 23.40% more votes in the runoff election as compared to the April election (see Table 5). Video 03082011015, shows an individual possessing 14 voter cards without any photos and was able to use them in multiple locations to vote;

Video 2012-03-24-946, shows a polling station where poll workers are marking ballots then stamping and marking them; Video 20140323, shows polling workers forcing voters to vote for Ghani; Video 2012-03-24-947, shows a ballot box being stuffed by fraudulent ballots; Video 03082011013, shows dozens of voter cards that were in the possession of a poll worker.

These are only a few examples of the apparent fraud that was committed in the eastern provinces. An additional abnormality in the results published by the IEC showed a high turn out for women in these conservative provinces.

Additionally, on November 2017, Rahmatullah Nabil, the former head of the NDS, who is a Pashtun and indirectly supported Ghani in 2014, stated on Tolo TV that the NDS, the Afghan Security Council, and the Interior Ministry headed by Daudzai knew that massive fraud did happen in favor of Ghani but was unable to charge anyone or to prevent it from happening because Karzai would not allow them. He gives a detailed account of how government funds and resources were given to Ghani's campaign.⁴⁵

On Afghan Tolo TV, November 20, 2017, “BLACK AND WHITE: Government’s Electoral Reform Policy Discussed” partly stated:

There is confidential information that I would like to share with all of Afghanistan’s people so such acts will not be repeated again. We have

⁴⁵ See: <https://ariananews.co/video/%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%88-%D9%86%D8%A7%DA%AF%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%86%D8%A8%DB%8C%D9%84.html/>.

experienced crisis after crisis, the whip of the Taliban, and we do not want to return to that era again. Unfortunately the elections that we have had so far, we had problems with the electoral law and the people who controlled and oversaw it had bad intentions. In 2004, we had a good election, during 2009 we had many problems and in 2014 the election became too problematic. Let me say this candidly, we do not have a good power-sharing deal. We are facing a power crisis, identity crisis, and an ethnic conflict, and we are seeing each one of these crises exacerbated on a daily basis. The results of the 2014 elections have caused legal, legitimacy, and economic crises. When the 2009 election came to an end, the information that I have right now is that an agreement was reached between the former president and one of the candidates of the 2009 election (he means Ghani) that the president will endorse and support him in the next election. Because of this, many national processes such as the Afghan Transition Coordination Commission was formed for him to prepare him for the 2014 presidential elections. About the 2014 elections, many of the problems have been told by the mass media however besides all that has been said and published there are many other evidence and information that hasn't been said. Intelligence agencies of other countries spent money on the presidential campaigns, contracts and government resources and lands were promised for many donors in exchange for donations before election day, and machines to print election cards was put in place in the Wazir Akbar Khan district in the house of a very powerful individual in the National Unity Government (he means Hanif Atmar). I reported all of this to the former president, the former national security adviser, to Mr. Daudzai who is present here and was the Interior Minister in 2014, to the other members of the National Security Council, and to the former head of the IEC. I did not intervene more than this since I didn't have authority to do so. We did arrest many but the intentions of those who controlled the process were wrong and I was unable to

do anything to change their intentions. It wasn't my responsibility to have stopped them since the president and all of the members of the National Security Council was aware of what was unfolding in 2014. In the future we have to be aware and we shouldn't allow such elections to be repeated again. The only reason why we accepted the National Unity Government was to save Afghanistan from destruction.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dGDAXwInduk&feature=youtu.be>.

Conclusion

“The world and the United States stand with [the people of Afghanistan] as partners in their quest for peace and prosperity and stability and democracy.”

-- *President Bush's remarks in a press conference with President Karzai of Afghanistan, The Rose Garden, Washington, D.C., June 15, 2004*⁴⁷

“The United States supports a set of universal rights. And these rights include free speech, the freedom of peaceful assembly, the freedom of religion, equality for men and women under the rule of law, and the right to choose your own leaders.”

-- *President Obama, Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa, May 19, 2011*⁴⁸

We believe that this analysis has important implications for U.S. and NATO involvement in Afghanistan. As suggested above, the Bonn Accords and process have helped drive U.S. and NATO strategies in Afghanistan. And among other important aspects of the Afghan “political road map” that the Bonn Accords spelled out includes:

- *Acknowledging* the right of the people of Afghanistan to freely determine their own political future in accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice;
- [E]stablishment of a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government; and

⁴⁷ <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/afghanistan/20040708.html>

⁴⁸ <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/photos-and-video/video/2011/05/19/moment-opportunity-american-diplomacy-middle-east-north-africa#transcript>

- Request the United Nations to conduct as soon as possible (i) a registration of voters in advance of the general elections that will be held upon the adoption of the new constitution by the constitutional Loya Jirga and (ii) a census of the population of Afghanistan.

The U.S. Afghan strategy that has clearly sought to develop a democratic system of governance in Afghanistan has resulted in a trillion dollars spent and as of August 5, 2018, 3,458 coalition deaths and of thousands more wounded since the invasion of Operational Enduring Freedom (OEF) started in 2001.⁴⁹ Have we fought for naught relative to the goal of a democratic Afghanistan? Recognizing that the 2014 Presidential Election was fraught with considerable irregularities raises difficult questions as to what the U.S., ISAF and NATO have fought so hard for over the last 17 years.

No one can, and have, surely argued that keeping Afghanistan safe from becoming a terrorist haven for actors such as Al Qaeda and defeating the Taliban regime were the true measures of success in Afghanistan. But this ultimately begs the question as to consistent pronouncements coming out of Washington (less during Obama's tenure than Bush's Administration) and other western capitals that this conflict was going to result not only in a stable regime in Kabul but also one based on democratic principles. There is no doubt that the 2014 Afghan Presidential Election was fraught with fraud to such an extent that one can make a very credible argument based on hard evidence that the

⁴⁹ "Operation Enduring Freedom". ICasualties.org. 28 May 2010, <http://icasualties.org/oef/>.

election results were illegitimate. The sheer number of polling places that gave their entire vote to Ghani defies any kind of democratic practice and clearly points to explicit, systematic fraud. Indeed, a cursory review of Appendix A unequivocally demonstrates a degree of voter fraud that is historically hard to match and explicitly suggests that the large-scale fraud using the code word “stuffed sheep” that was presented in the Introduction of this article most certainly occurred.

The Taliban presently control more districts than any time since 2001 and increasing attacks on urban environment such as Kunduz (2015, 2018), Farah City (May 2018) and the very recent attacks in Ghazni City (August 2018) and Sar-e-pul (September 2018). The heightened seriousness of the Taliban insurgency was vividly demonstrated in late October 2017 when the United States military as well as Kabul classified the casualties of Afghan troops, the exact size of the force, and the number of Afghan districts controlled and/or challenged by the Taliban.⁵⁰ The classification of these data clearly suggests that the ANDSF is not as large as has traditionally been promoted by Kabul and the U.S. and that the Taliban have significant momentum. Another important indicator is that for years the numerical strength of the Taliban in Afghanistan has usually been suggested to be between 20-25 thousand. “In 2014, U.S. officials told NBC News that the number of Taliban fighters in Afghanistan was about 20,000. Four years later, one U.S. defense official said the current Taliban strength is at least 60,000. Another senior U.S.

⁵⁰ See: Merrit Kennedy, “U.S. Military Withholds Key Measures of Afghan War,” The Two-Way: Breaking News from NPR, October 31, 2017, <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/10/31/561140868/u-s-military-withholds-key-measures-of-afghan-war>.

official said 60,000 ‘passes the sniff test,’ while a third official said 60,000 is ‘a place to start’.”⁵¹ Recently this estimate has been increased to 60-70k and history has suggested that the Taliban will put as many insurgents into Afghanistan as they need to accomplish short and long term goals. One must ask what these objectives are?

Will a shrinking ANDSF continue to fight for a regime elected under a shadow is also a very legitimate question that needs to be raised.

This presents Afghanistan with a serious dilemma. The Unity Government that was mustered by Secretary Kerry shortly after the runoff election was certainly based partly on the realization by the United States that the election results were illegitimate or at least highly irregular. Thus, to avoid bloodshed that was threatened by Abdullah supporters was forestalled. In the perfect world, a more adequate, immediate resolution would have been to disregard the results, impose an interim government and conduct a new election at a later date with much greater objective, international oversight.

Such a resolution would have obviously been difficult to implement but considering the facts surrounding the election it was probably the best course of actions that could have been taken.

In addition to the blatant fraud and illegitimacy of the election results, another extremely important consequence of this election suggests that little has really changed in Afghanistan over the last few decades:

Even in the most limited understanding of democracy, what has been seen in 2004, 2009, and now 2014 would not be described as anything remotely resembling a functioning democratic system. The Afghan

⁵¹ Courtney Kube, “The Taliban is Gaining Strength and Territory in Afghanistan,” NBC News, January 30, 2018, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/numbers-afghanistan-are-not-good-n842651>.

Presidential Elections of 2014 were not designed to improve the lives of Afghans; they were merely a bureaucratic process through which the Afghan people have been “allowed” to select which member of the two interlinked and fluid competing elites they would best like to run the country, regardless of the fact that their ideologies and policies differ very little. Leaving the future of Afghanistan to the will of existing elites should be challenged and questioned by anyone who believes that Afghans should be supported to fight for something significantly more inclusive, just, and democratic.⁵²

An explicit implication of this analysis is that Bonn tried to establish a form of government that had a very low probability of success considering the state of conflict in the country as well as historical, societal and cultural dynamics. Moreover, as suggested above, the continuing fact that ethno-linguistic groups in a large margin vote for a candidate from their clan or in-group, for all practical purposes, make Afghan elections basically a procedural exercise rather than a meaning political substantive event. Each Presidential Election since 2004 clearly suggest that no national candidate has been able to emerge that significantly disregarded his ethnicity.

By 2014, the United States had approximately 2375 military killed in Afghanistan, spent well over \$700 billion; the road map to “democracy” laid out by the Bonn Accords has not been realized. When you combine the travesty of the 2014 Afghan Presidential Election with the latest Wolsi Jirga (Legislative) Elections based on a Single Nontransferable Voting (SNTV) system in 2009, one should clearly recognize that Afghanistan has a totally dysfunctional electoral system:

⁵² Darren Atkinson, “Democracy as Theatre: The 2014 Presidential Elections in Afghanistan, E-International Relations, <https://www.e-ir.info/2014/08/12/democracy-as-theatre-the-2014-presidential-elections-in-afghanistan/>.

664 candidates competed for the 33 Wolesi Jirga seats available for the province of Kabul and a total of 486,111 valid ballots were cast. Muhammad Mohaqiq, Chairman of the People's Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan and former Vice-President and the Minister of Planning in the interim government of Afghanistan was the leading vote getter just as he was during the 2005 election. He received a total of 3.6% of the vote! That a mere 3.6% of the vote could represent the most popular candidate as indicated by total votes received is disturbing, and have serious implications for Afghan 'representative democracy'. Overall, 21 of the 33 candidates elected to the Wolesi Jirga from Kabul (64%) were elected with less than 1% of the total vote in their district.⁵³

The entire Afghan electoral system must be recalibrated, but it is also worth asking the uncomfortable question if representative democracy is a proper political system for Afghanistan? In the Chatham House's excellent analysis of the 2014 Presidential Election Assessment they suggest that: "Not only has the electoral system therefore failed to meet expectations of a timely and transparent transfer of power, it has also raised wider concerns. An immediate problem is uncertainty about new government structures, personnel and influence in the context of an ill-defined dual leadership system that divides power between the presidency and the chief executive's office. In the longer term, there is a question mark over the future of democracy in Afghanistan."⁵⁴

Probably the best result of the 2014 Afghan Presidential Election is to draw lessons from it and these lessons should serve as an immediate mandate for changing a badly flawed system. Below we offer a few lessons that need to be considered.

⁵³ Thomas H. Johnson, "The Illusion of Afghanistan's Electoral Representative Democracy," p. 14.

⁵⁴ Noah Coburn, "Afghanistan: The 2014 Vote and the Troubled Future of Elections," p.2.

First, the Afghan voter registration process has to be completely revamped. Theoretically, this was suppose to be a major focus of the Ghani-Abdullah “unity government,’ but nothing significantly has happened. As suggested in a recent and excellent article by Scott Warden:

Voter registration has long been a weak point undermining the integrity of Afghan elections. The results of the 2009 and 2014 presidential elections and 2010 parliamentary elections were all highly contested because of mass ballot stuffing – with between 10 and 25 per cent of the ballots thrown out because of fraud by the Afghan electoral authorities. That ballot stuffing was enabled in part by the availability of excess ballot papers which had been sent to areas with no independent election observers – because they were insecure, or sometimes also because they had been politically captured by local strongmen. In the 2014 election, there were an estimated total number of voters of around 12 million and 23 million voter cards in circulation.⁵⁵

Second and related to the voter registration, it’s been decades since the country has had a proper census performed. The United States gave Kabul millions of dollars in both 2008 and 2013 to conduct a proper countrywide survey, but it was never completed. While Kabul blamed security concerns for the lack of conducting a proper census, others believe that Kabul’s failure to conduct a census probably related to ethnic issues. Just as the Sunnis never wanted to see a valid census in Iraq because it would clearly demonstrate that the Sunnis were a minority to the Shia, many believe that Karzai was concerned that a census would reveal that the Pashtuns were not a real majority in Afghanistan.

Having an accurate census could help begin a needed change not only for presidential elections but also legislative elections. There is no

⁵⁵ Scott Worden, “Afghanistan Election Conundrum (12): New voter registry too good to be true,” August 28, 2018, <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/afghanistan-election-conundrum-12-new-voter-registry-too-good-to-be-true/>.

question that the SNTV has been a disaster for the construction of a true Afghan legislative body with a true constituency. The census could be the mainstay of creating legislative districts that could result in legislative candidates having a true constituency and would eliminate an electoral process where the vast majority of Afghan electorate votes for losing candidates. In addition, a census would allow at least a first-order defense against inflated voter registration and fraudulent votes coming from certain districts.

Third, if Afghanistan is to become a true representative democracy, the political party system in the country needs to be strengthened. This is especially crucial for the Wolsi Jirga elections but also presidential elections. Political parties, especially if they are not tied exclusive to ethnicity, afford the public an idea of what candidates' main positions on issues converge upon. This is presently sorely absent in Afghanistan.

While candidates within a party will surely have differing views on many important issues, political parties are usually developed around a range of political beliefs that can help guide a voters' perspective concerning different candidates.

The Chatham House argues that “[t]he 2014 process largely broke down because of political pressure before the IEC and ECC had completed the ballot counting and auditing. The ensuing crisis demonstrated the absence of credible and impartial mechanisms for dealing with electoral fraud or political tensions.”⁵⁶ Artificial time

⁵⁶ Noah Coburn, “Afghanistan: The 2014 Vote and the Troubled Future of Elections,” p. 7.

deadlines should be eliminated in favor of processes that are truly transparent and comprehensive.

Fourth, the government should institute an extensive program of training for election workers and their work needs to be monitored by both internal and international election observers. To the extent possible and feasible, each polling place should have an objective election observer. While this is an onerous process, for sure, it needs to be implemented especially for the next presidential election that is scheduled for April 2019.

While it is also very difficult to institute major political changes during time of conflict, especially with the Taliban insurgency getting stronger in Afghanistan with the Taliban controlling more land than at anytime since 2001, it is critical that mechanisms be put in place that allow for fair voting in restrictive areas. This will require a larger ANDSF presence at polling centers.

In conclusion it would be difficult to find election results in any democratic country that could compare to the results of the 2014 Afghan Presidential Election. The only similar results can be found in certain dictatorial regimes where the winning candidates regularly “receive” at least 90% of the vote. Afghanistan with the assistance of the international community must take a very serious look at its election procedures at all levels and seriously reform them. In the absence of such reform, the door is wide open for more fraud and illegitimate results in Afghan elections.

Appendix A

Table 9: Ghani 1503 Polling Place Votes of Extremely High Percentages (At Least 100 votes Cast)⁵⁷

<i>Province</i>	<i>District</i>	<i>Polling Center</i>	<i>Polling Station</i>	<i>Abdullah</i>	<i>Ghani</i>	<i>Total</i>
Kabul	Kabul	101511	8	0	596	596
Kabul	Kabul	101511	6	0	600	600
Kabul	Kabul	101511	1	0	600	600
Kabul	Kabul	101473	10	0	591	591
Kabul	Kabul	101510	5	0	597	597
Kabul	Kabul	101509	1	0	428	428
Kabul	Kabul	101509	3	0	584	584
Kabul	Kabul	101509	4	0	599	599
Kabul	Kabul	101509	5	0	600	600
Kabul	Kabul	101473	3	0	598	598
Kabul	Kabul	101473	4	0	591	591
Kabul	Kabul	101473	5	0	598	598
Kabul	Kabul	101473	6	0	595	595
Kabul	Kabul	101473	7	0	593	593
Kabul	Kabul	101331	4	0	596	596
Kabul	Kabul	101331	5	0	596	596
Kabul	Kabul	101331	6	0	598	598
Kabul	Kabul	101331	7	0	591	591
Kabul	Kabul	101331	8	0	589	589
Kabul	Kabul	101331	9	0	598	598
Kabul	Kabul	101331	10	0	592	592
Kabul	Kabul	101331	11	0	596	596
Kabul	Chahar asyab	103419	5	0	399	399
Kabul	Chahar asyab	103536	3	0	279	279
Ghazni	Waghaz	1104131	1	0	185	185
Ghazni	Deh yak	1105066	2	0	300	300

⁵⁷ Afghan Election Data, http://2014.afghanistanelectiondata.org/#runoff/results_runoff.

Ghazni	Deh yak	1105066	1	0	600	600
Ghazni	Andar	1107232	2	0	600	600
Ghazni	Andar	1107231	1	0	600	600
Ghazni	Andar	1107231	3	0	600	600
Ghazni	Andar	1107237	1	0	113	113
Ghazni	Andar	1107253	4	0	600	600
Ghazni	Andar	1107242	1	0	600	600
Ghazni	Andar	1107242	3	0	600	600
Ghazni	Andar	1107252	3	0	600	600
Ghazni	Qara bagh	1111135	2	0	593	593
Ghazni	Qara bagh	1111161	1	0	591	591
Ghazni	Gelan	1117394	1	0	549	549
Kabul	Surubi	115483	5	0	598	598
Kabul	Surubi	115486	4	0	600	600
Paktika	Sharan	1201013	4	0	500	500
Paktika	Sharan	1201003	1	0	538	538
Paktika	Sharan	1201013	3	0	500	500
Paktika	Sharan	1201012	4	0	537	537
Paktika	Sharan	1201009	5	0	600	600
Paktika	Sharan	1201003	3	0	534	534
Paktika	Sharan	1201014	3	0	570	570
Paktika	Sharan	1201012	1	0	541	541
Paktika	Mata khan	1202035	3	0	447	447
Paktika	Mata khan	1202038	1	0	599	599
Paktika	Mata khan	1202038	2	0	599	599
Paktika	Mata khan	1202038	3	0	497	497
Paktika	Mata khan	1202034	3	0	298	298
Paktika	Yosuf khel	1203042	3	0	595	595
Paktika	Yosuf khel	1203042	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Yahya khel	1204064	1	0	590	590

Paktika	Yahya khel	1204052	2	0	599	599
Paktika	Yahya khel	1204048	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Yahya khel	1204064	3	0	593	593
Paktika	Yahya khel	1204064	4	0	593	593
Paktika	Yahya khel	1204064	5	0	598	598
Paktika	Yahya khel	1204062	3	0	596	596
Paktika	Yahya khel	1204047	1	0	595	595
Paktika	Yahya khel	1204051	4	0	600	600
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205073	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205073	4	0	600	600
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205073	5	0	598	598
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205074	1	0	594	594
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205074	2	0	581	581
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205074	3	0	565	565
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205074	4	0	600	600
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205074	5	0	574	574
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205080	2	0	530	530
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205084	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205285	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205285	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205073	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205073	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205079	1	0	593	593
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205083	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205083	2	0	240	240
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205077	3	0	592	592
Paktika	Omna	1206070	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Omna	1206070	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Omna	1206070	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Omna	1206071	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Omna	1206068	1	0	600	600

Paktika	Omna	1206068	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Omna	1206071	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Omna	1206284	2	0	599	599
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207093	3	0	595	595
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207104	1	0	595	595
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207104	2	0	598	598
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207098	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207098	4	0	600	600
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207096	2	0	595	595
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207096	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207092	1	0	591	591
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207092	2	0	595	595
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207092	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207092	4	0	597	597
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207106	2	0	599	599
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207100	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207100	4	0	600	600
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207102	1	0	597	597
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207102	2	0	595	595
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207289	2	0	596	596
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207289	3	0	589	589
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207289	4	0	600	600
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207090	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207090	3	0	600	600

Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207107	1	0	582	582
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207287	2	0	592	592
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207089	1	0	589	589
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207103	1	0	597	597
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207103	2	0	597	597
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207103	3	0	594	594
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207095	1	0	592	592
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207101	1	0	595	595
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207101	2	0	597	597
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207101	3	0	593	593
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207288	1	0	595	595
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207089	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207102	3	0	599	599
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207108	1	0	593	593
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207108	2	0	592	592
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207085	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Gomal	1208136	1	0	598	598
Paktika	Gomal	1208136	2	0	599	599
Paktika	Gomal	1208126	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Gomal	1208146	3	0	258	258
Paktika	Gomal	1208146	4	0	300	300
Paktika	Gomal	1208144	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Gomal	1208134	3	0	181	181
Paktika	Gomal	1208138	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Gomal	1208138	4	0	599	599
Paktika	Gomal	1208126	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Gomal	1208140	1	0	525	525

Paktika	Gomal	1208140	2	0	518	518
Paktika	Jani khel	1209116	3	0	595	595
Paktika	Jani khel	1209114	1	0	592	592
Paktika	Jani khel	1209112	1	0	596	596
Paktika	Surubi	1210155	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Surubi	1210150	2	0	542	542
Paktika	Surubi	1210150	3	0	580	580
Paktika	Surubi	1210157	1	0	597	597
Paktika	Surubi	1210149	2	0	598	598
Paktika	Surubi	1210153	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Surubi	1210157	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Urgoon	1211179	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Urgoon	1211178	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Urgoon	1211186	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Urgoon	1211186	4	0	600	600
Paktika	Urgoon	1211162	1	0	597	597
Paktika	Urgoon	1211180	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Urgoon	1211182	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Urgoon	1211182	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Urgoon	1211184	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Urgoon	1211181	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Urgoon	1211177	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Urgoon	1211177	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Urgoon	1211183	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Urgoon	1211183	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Urgoon	1211175	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Urgoon	1211183	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Ziruk	1212190	2	0	593	593
Paktika	Nika	1213198	5	0	600	600
Paktika	Nika	1213198	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Nika	1213203	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Nika	1213203	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Nika	1213200	2	0	598	598
Paktika	Nika	1213203	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Nika	1213197	1	0	600	600

Paktika	Nika	1213197	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Nika	1213197	3	0	592	592
Paktika	Nika	1213197	4	0	600	600
Paktika	Nika	1213197	5	0	600	600
Paktika	Nika	1213197	6	0	600	600
Paktika	Nika	1213204	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Nika	1213204	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Nika	1213199	2	0	597	597
Paktika	Nika	1213198	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Barmal	1214258	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Barmal	1214258	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Barmal	1214266	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Barmal	1214258	5	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyani	1215272	4	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyani	1215272	5	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyani	1215268	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyani	1215272	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyani	1215268	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyani	1215274	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyani	1215274	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyani	1215268	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyani	1215270	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyani	1215270	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyani	1215278	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyani	1215278	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyani	1215278	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyani	1215278	4	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyani	1215280	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyani	1215280	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyani	1215280	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyani	1215267	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyani	1215267	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyani	1215267	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyani	1215267	4	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyani	1215273	1	0	600	600

Paktika	Giyan	1215273	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyan	1215272	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyan	1215272	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyan	1215275	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyan	1215275	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyan	1215269	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyan	1215269	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyan	1215269	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyan	1215279	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyan	1215279	2	0	599	599
Paktika	Giyan	1215274	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyan	1215270	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyan	1215273	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Giyan	1215279	3	0	500	500
Paktika	Dila wa khush	1216206	5	0	595	595
Paktika	Dila wa khush	1216215	2	0	593	593
Paktika	Wazakhwah	1217228	1	0	595	595
Paktika	Wazakhwah	1217221	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Wazakhwah	1217221	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Wazakhwah	1217230	1	0	600	600
Paktika	Wazakhwah	1217230	2	0	600	600
Paktika	Wazakhwah	1217222	1	0	597	597
Paktika	Wazakhwah	1217222	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Wazakhwah	1217229	3	0	600	600
Paktika	Wor mamy	1218237	4	0	600	600
Paktika	Wor mamy	1218237	5	0	600	600
Paktya	Gardez	1301006	2	0	301	301
Paktya	Gardez	1301006	7	0	215	215
Paktya	Gardez	1301006	8	0	547	547

Paktya	Gardez	1301011	2	0	107	107
Paktya	Gardez	1301006	4	0	531	531
Paktya	Ahmadab a	1302192	2	0	558	558
Paktya	Ahmadab a	1302192	3	0	600	600
Paktya	Ahmadab a	1302194	2	0	599	599
Paktya	Ahmadab a	1302195	3	0	599	599
Paktya	Ahmadab a	1302197	4	0	599	599
Paktya	Ahmadab a	1302197	5	0	599	599
Paktya	Ahmadab a	1302190	5	0	587	587
Paktya	Ahmadab a	1302218	3	0	600	600
Paktya	Ahmadab a	1302218	4	0	506	506
Paktya	Zurmat	1303090	2	0	227	227
Paktya	Zurmat	1303100	2	0	120	120
Paktya	Zurmat	1303103	1	0	100	100
Paktya	Zurmat	1303103	2	0	141	141
Paktya	Zurmat	1303099	2	0	503	503
Paktya	Zurmat	1303078	7	0	592	592
Paktya	Shwak	1304112	6	0	599	599
Paktya	Wuza zadran	1305130	1	0	599	599
Paktya	Wuza zadran	1305131	4	0	600	600
Paktya	Wuza zadran	1305127	3	0	600	600
Paktya	Wuza zadran	1305118	2	0	560	560
Paktya	Wuza zadran	1305130	2	0	598	598
Paktya	Wuza zadran	1305119	1	0	592	592
Paktya	Wuza zadran	1305120	1	0	584	584
Paktya	Wuza zadran	1305117	2	0	400	400

Paktya	Wuza zadran	1305129	2	0	600	600
Paktya	Wuza zadran	1305119	2	0	595	595
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306032	1	0	600	600
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306020	5	0	600	600
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306026	1	0	588	588
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306026	2	0	599	599
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306032	2	0	600	600
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306021	5	0	600	600
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306029	1	0	590	590
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306039	1	0	501	501
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306023	1	0	600	600
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306034	2	0	598	598
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306020	2	0	513	513
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306020	3	0	599	599
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306031	3	0	595	595
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306039	2	0	501	501
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306019	6	0	592	592
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306031	2	0	598	598
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307070	1	0	600	600
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307070	2	0	600	600
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307070	3	0	600	600
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307070	4	0	600	600
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307073	2	0	600	600
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307212	1	0	550	550
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307216	1	0	600	600
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307216	2	0	600	600

Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307214	2	0	598	598
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307214	3	0	582	582
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307070	5	0	600	600
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307056	1	0	599	599
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307056	2	0	600	600
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307056	4	0	600	600
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307076	4	0	598	598
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307067	2	0	600	600
Paktya	Laja ahmad k	1308142	3	0	600	600
Paktya	Laja ahmad k	1308143	1	0	600	600
Paktya	Laja ahmad k	1308134	3	0	600	600
Paktya	Laja ahmad k	1308135	2	0	600	600
Paktya	Laja ahmad k	1308135	1	0	600	600
Paktya	Laja ahmad k	1308139	1	0	600	600
Paktya	Laja ahmad k	1308139	2	0	600	600
Paktya	Laja ahmad k	1308219	1	0	600	600
Paktya	Laja ahmad k	1308219	2	0	600	600
Paktya	Jani khel	1309173	5	0	596	596
Paktya	Jani khel	1309171	2	0	600	600
Paktya	Jani khel	1309209	2	0	600	600
Paktya	Jani khel	1309173	1	0	592	592
Paktya	Jani khel	1309173	2	0	600	600
Paktya	Jani khel	1309173	3	0	598	598
Paktya	Jani khel	1309173	4	0	600	600
Paktya	Jani khel	1309172	6	0	600	600
Paktya	Jani khel	1309170	1	0	600	600
Paktya	Jani khel	1309170	2	0	600	600
Paktya	Samkani	1310166	1	0	600	600
Paktya	Samkani	1310163	1	0	594	594
Paktya	Samkani	1310157	2	0	600	600

Paktya	Samkani	1310157	3	0	600	600
Paktya	Samkani	1310157	4	0	599	599
Paktya	Samkani	1310167	3	0	599	599
Paktya	Samkani	1310167	4	0	594	594
Paktya	Samkani	1310157	1	0	600	600
Paktya	Dand patan	1311187	1	0	599	599
Paktya	Dand patan	1311187	3	0	600	600
Paktya	Dand patan	1311210	2	0	600	600
Paktya	Dand patan	1311188	1	0	597	597
Paktya	Dand patan	1311188	2	0	599	599
Paktya	Dand patan	1311181	1	0	600	600
Paktya	Dand patan	1311186	1	0	597	597
Na	Na	1312155	1	0	600	600
Na	Na	1312155	2	0	600	600
Na	Na	1312223	1	0	600	600
Na	Na	1312223	3	0	600	600
Na	Na	1312222	1	0	600	600
Na	Na	1312153	4	0	600	600
Na	Na	1312147	1	0	600	600
Na	Na	1312149	2	0	600	600
Na	Na	1312148	1	0	600	600
Na	Na	1312148	2	0	600	600
Na	Na	1312148	3	0	600	600
Na	Na	1312154	1	0	600	600
Na	Na	1312154	2	0	600	600
Na	Na	1312150	2	0	600	600
Na	Na	1312147	2	0	600	600
Na	Na	1312149	1	0	600	600
Na	Na	1312150	1	0	600	600
Na	Na	1312146	2	0	600	600
Na	Na	1312146	1	0	600	600

Na	Na	1312222	2	0	600	600
Na	Na	1313205	3	0	600	600
Na	Na	1313205	4	0	600	600
Na	Na	1313047	1	0	599	599
Na	Na	1313047	4	0	600	600
Na	Na	1313051	4	0	600	600
Na	Na	1313044	4	0	600	600
Na	Na	1313044	6	0	600	600
Na	Na	1313044	7	0	600	600
Na	Na	1313046	5	0	600	600
Na	Na	1313046	6	0	600	600
Na	Na	1313050	1	0	599	599
Na	Na	1313050	2	0	600	600
Na	Na	1313052	2	0	600	600
Na	Na	1313049	1	0	598	598
Na	Na	1313049	2	0	599	599
Na	Na	1313049	3	0	600	600
Khost	Khost	1401015	4	0	594	594
Khost	Khost	1401015	5	0	595	595
Khost	Khost	1401015	7	0	590	590
Khost	Khost	1401014	5	0	600	600
Khost	Khost	1401001	2	0	590	590
Khost	Khost	1401011	2	0	585	585
Khost	Khost	1401016	6	0	600	600
Khost	Khost	1401036	4	0	595	595
Khost	Khost	1401031	3	0	598	598
Khost	Khost	1401028	5	0	600	600
Khost	Khost	1401035	2	0	583	583
Khost	Khost	1401162	9	0	576	576
Khost	Khost	1401039	1	0	600	600
Khost	Khost	1401039	3	0	586	586
Khost	Khost	1401041	1	0	599	599
Khost	Khost	1401161	5	0	596	596
Khost	Khost	1401012	1	0	581	581
Khost	Khost	1401029	3	0	599	599

Khost	Khost	1401023	1	0	599	599
Khost	Khost	1401016	2	0	576	576
Khost	Manduza y	1402083	2	0	548	548
Khost	Manduza y	1402084	1	0	594	594
Khost	Manduza y	1402084	2	0	597	597
Khost	Manduza y	1402082	4	0	580	580
Khost	Manduza y	1402179	3	0	598	598
Khost	Gurbuz	1403175	2	0	599	599
Khost	Gurbuz	1403174	3	0	600	600
Khost	Gurbuz	1403174	2	0	599	599
Khost	Gurbuz	1403154	3	0	597	597
Khost	Gurbuz	1403154	4	0	598	598
Khost	Gurbuz	1403174	4	0	600	600
Khost	Gurbuz	1403174	5	0	600	600
Khost	Gurbuz	1403174	6	0	600	600
Khost	Gurbuz	1403174	7	0	600	600
Khost	Gurbuz	1403148	5	0	589	589
Khost	Tanay	1404144	4	0	587	587
Khost	Tanay	1404142	5	0	600	600
Khost	Tanay	1404143	4	0	599	599
Khost	Tanay	1404143	6	0	600	600
Khost	Tanay	1404135	1	0	597	597
Khost	Musa khel	1405078	2	0	592	592
Khost	Musa khel	1405074	2	0	595	595
Khost	Musa khel	1405078	3	0	596	596
Khost	Musa khel	1405078	1	0	596	596
Khost	Musa khel	1405075	1	0	600	600
Khost	Musa khel	1405078	4	0	587	587
Khost	Musa khel	1405078	5	0	300	300

Khost	Musa khel	1405072	1	0	596	596
Khost	Musa khel	1405074	4	0	582	582
Khost	Musa khel	1405074	5	0	597	597
Khost	Musa khel	1405077	2	0	597	597
Khost	Musa khel	1405075	2	0	600	600
Khost	Musa khel	1405072	2	0	579	579
Khost	Musa khel	1405076	1	0	592	592
Khost	Musa khel	1405076	2	0	600	600
Khost	Musa khel	1405076	3	0	600	600
Khost	Musa khel	1405070	1	0	599	599
Khost	Musa khel	1405069	1	0	580	580
Khost	Musa khel	1405069	2	0	590	590
Khost	Musa khel	1405069	3	0	594	594
Khost	Musa khel	1405070	2	0	599	599
Khost	Musa khel	1405070	3	0	590	590
Khost	Nadirsha h ko	1406113	3	0	574	574
Khost	Sabari	1407065	3	0	421	421
Khost	Sabari	1407065	4	0	519	519
Khost	Sabari	1407065	7	0	571	571
Khost	Sabari	1407065	6	0	597	597
Khost	Sabari	1407064	2	0	597	597
Khost	Ali sher	1408049	4	0	597	597
Khost	Ali sher	1408054	6	0	583	583
Khost	Ali sher	1408054	2	0	600	600
Khost	Ali sher	1408054	3	0	600	600
Khost	Ali sher	1408051	6	0	587	587
Khost	Ali sher	1408050	3	0	100	100

Khost	Ali sher	1408163	1	0	173	173
Khost	Ali sher	1408165	1	0	598	598
Khost	Ali sher	1408053	4	0	584	584
Khost	Ali sher	1408053	5	0	585	585
Khost	Ali sher	1408051	4	0	585	585
Khost	Ali sher	1408053	2	0	580	580
Khost	Ali sher	1408165	2	0	589	589
Khost	Ali sher	1408165	3	0	597	597
Khost	Ali sher	1408163	6	0	600	600
Khost	Ali sher	1408163	4	0	280	280
Khost	Qalandar	1410109	4	0	594	594
Khost	Qalandar	1410105	4	0	598	598
Khost	Qalandar	1410107	1	0	585	585
Khost	Qalandar	1410105	1	0	599	599
Khost	Spera	1411170	2	0	580	580
Khost	Spera	1411171	1	0	375	375
Khost	Spera	1411132	1	0	581	581
Khost	Spera	1411169	1	0	563	563
Khost	Spera	1411128	3	0	398	398
Khost	Shamul	1412155	1	0	566	566
Kunar	Sawkai	1509092	7	0	440	440
Kunar	Dangam	1512054	4	0	352	352
Kunar	Dangam	1512052	4	0	590	590
Kunar	Dangam	1512050	5	0	587	587
Kunar	Dangam	1512050	4	0	440	440
Kunar	Dangam	1512050	6	0	597	597
Kunduz	Kunduz	1901199	3	0	400	400
Kunduz	Khan abad	1904147	1	0	268	268
Sar-e-pul	Sozma qala	2204047	2	0	168	168
Ghor	Char sada	2304060	4	0	600	600
Ghor	Char sada	2304060	2	0	600	600
Ghor	Char sada	2304060	3	0	600	600
Ghor	Shahrak	2306087	1	0	600	600
Ghor	Shahrak	2306074	1	0	597	597

Ghor	Shahrak	2306074	3	0	600	600
Ghor	Shahrak	2306076	1	0	600	600
Ghor	Shahrak	2306091	1	0	400	400
Ghor	Shahrak	2306091	2	0	221	221
Ghor	Shahrak	2306076	3	0	600	600
Zabul	Arghanda b	2605018	7	0	589	589
Zabul	Daichopa n	2607024	2	0	353	353
Zabul	Daichopa n	2607024	3	0	550	550
Zabul	Daichopa n	2607022	5	0	330	330
Zabul	Daichopa n	2607022	2	0	600	600
Zabul	Daichopa n	2607023	2	0	600	600
Zabul	Daichopa n	2607024	4	0	600	600
Zabul	Atghar	2608035	5	0	580	580
Zabul	Atghar	2608073	3	0	500	500
Zabul	Atghar	2608035	6	0	550	550
Zabul	Atghar	2608035	4	0	560	560
Kandahar	Panjwaye e	2704193	6	0	312	312
Kandahar	Shah wali kot	2706090	1	0	589	589
Kandahar	Ghorak	2709130	2	0	598	598
Kandahar	Spin boldak	2711219	5	0	526	526
Kandahar	Spin boldak	2711219	6	0	430	430
Na	Na	2718238	7	0	350	350
Jawzjan	Shebergh an	2801023	3	0	120	120
Jawzjan	Mardyan	2809060	5	0	357	357
Faryab	Pashtun kot	2902048	1	0	600	600
Faryab	Pashtun kot	2902046	3	0	597	597
Faryab	Pashtun kot	2902035	4	0	162	162

Faryab	Khwaja sabz posh	2903054	4	0	596	596
Helmand	Lashkarg ah	3001018	3	0	106	106
Badghis	Ghormac h	3107124	4	0	600	600
Badghis	Ghormac h	3107124	2	0	598	598
Badghis	Ghormac h	3107124	5	0	590	590
Badghis	Ghormac h	3107124	1	0	598	598
Herat	Shindand	3214330	2	0	599	599
Herat	Shindand	3214328	2	0	600	600
Herat	Shindand	3214323	3	0	354	354
Herat	Shindand	3214328	3	0	600	600
Herat	Shindand	3214328	1	0	596	596
Herat	Shindand	3214308	3	0	269	269
Farah	Khak-e- safed	3303051	2	0	549	549
Farah	Khak-e- safed	3303051	3	0	583	583
Farah	Bala buluk	3306127	3	0	105	105
Wardak	Maydan shah	401010	3	0	598	598
Wardak	Maydan shah	401005	2	0	161	161
Wardak	Maydan shah	401001	10	0	598	598
Wardak	Nerkh	402144	4	0	600	600
Wardak	Nerkh	402155	1	0	600	600
Wardak	Nerkh	402148	2	0	500	500
Wardak	Chaki wardak	404090	1	0	600	600
Wardak	Chaki wardak	404086	2	0	600	600
Wardak	Chaki wardak	404103	3	0	600	600
Wardak	Chaki wardak	404106	1	0	600	600
Wardak	Chaki wardak	404106	2	0	600	600

Wardak	Chaki wardak	404104	2	0	600	600
Wardak	Chaki wardak	404105	1	0	600	600
Wardak	Chaki wardak	404105	2	0	600	600
Wardak	Chaki wardak	404105	3	0	600	600
Wardak	Chaki wardak	404096	1	0	600	600
Wardak	Chaki wardak	404095	1	0	600	600
Wardak	Chaki wardak	404097	2	0	599	599
Wardak	Chaki wardak	404097	4	0	600	600
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405117	2	0	600	600
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405116	1	0	590	590
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405108	4	0	596	596
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405124	3	0	600	600
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405122	4	0	600	600
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405117	1	0	594	594
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405110	4	0	595	595
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405108	2	0	600	600
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405108	3	0	600	600
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405108	5	0	596	596
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405111	1	0	600	600
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405122	3	0	600	600
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405114	7	0	595	595
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405142	2	0	588	588
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405142	3	0	591	591

Wardak	Daymirda d	406066	2	0	597	597
Wardak	Daymirda d	406070	5	0	600	600
Wardak	Daymirda d	406066	1	0	596	596
Wardak	Daymirda d	406065	2	0	597	597
Wardak	Daymirda d	406065	3	0	600	600
Wardak	Daymirda d	406070	1	0	598	598
Wardak	Daymirda d	406070	2	0	598	598
Wardak	Daymirda d	406070	3	0	598	598
Wardak	Daymirda d	406067	1	0	599	599
Wardak	Daymirda d	406066	3	0	594	594
Wardak	Daymirda d	406071	1	0	598	598
Wardak	Daymirda d	406071	2	0	597	597
Wardak	Daymirda d	406071	3	0	597	597
Wardak	Daymirda d	406064	5	0	598	598
Wardak	Daymirda d	406065	1	0	600	600
Wardak	Daymirda d	406064	3	0	599	599
Wardak	Daymirda d	406067	2	0	595	595
Wardak	Daymirda d	406064	1	0	597	597
Wardak	Daymirda d	406064	2	0	599	599
Wardak	Daymirda d	406064	4	0	597	597
Wardak	Daymirda d	406070	4	0	600	600
Logar	Puli alam	501014	5	0	600	600
Logar	Puli alam	501013	3	0	305	305
Logar	Puli alam	501019	1	0	594	594

Logar	Puli alam	501019	2	0	600	600
Logar	Puli alam	501019	3	0	600	600
Logar	Puli alam	501004	3	0	593	593
Logar	Puli alam	501004	6	0	594	594
Logar	Puli alam	501004	7	0	585	585
Logar	Puli alam	501004	9	0	382	382
Logar	Puli alam	501007	5	0	600	600
Logar	Puli alam	501009	2	0	494	494
Logar	Mohamm ad a	505054	1	0	310	310
Logar	Mohamm ad a	505067	5	0	163	163
Logar	Mohamm ad a	505067	6	0	139	139
Logar	Mohamm ad a	505062	4	0	388	388
Logar	Azra	507081	4	0	599	599
Nangarhar	Surkh rud	603090	1	0	223	223
Nangarhar	Surkh rud	603090	2	0	240	240
Nangarhar	Surkh rud	603101	3	0	424	424
Nangarhar	Rodat	607129	4	0	100	100
Nangarhar	Rodat	607134	3	0	597	597
Nangarhar	Pachir waga	611307	2	0	228	228
Nangarhar	Sher zad	619244	2	0	598	598
Nangarhar	Nazyan	620409	3	0	358	358
Laghman	Mehtarla m	701001	6	0	514	514
Laghman	Qarghaye e	702045	5	0	157	157
Laghman	Qarghaye e	702048	4	0	153	153
Baghlan	Pul-e- khumri	901031	5	0	595	595
Baghlan	Pul-e- khumri	901026	3	0	595	595
Kabul	Kabul	101514	4	1	595	596
Kabul	Kabul	101449	6	1	592	593
Kabul	Kabul	101448	4	1	597	598
Kabul	Kabul	101449	3	1	588	589

Kabul	Kabul	101449	4	1	595	596
Kabul	Kabul	101511	5	1	597	598
Kabul	Kabul	101332	5	1	298	299
Kabul	Kabul	101332	9	1	597	598
Kabul	Kabul	101176	13	1	317	318
Kabul	Kabul	101176	14	1	207	208
Kabul	Kabul	101449	7	1	596	597
Kabul	Kabul	101249	10	1	323	324
Kabul	Paghman	102417	4	1	148	149
Kabul	Chahar asyab	103419	3	1	125	126
Kabul	Bagrami	104460	3	1	326	327
Ghazni	Andar	1107226	1	1	187	188
Ghazni	Andar	1107231	2	1	446	447
Ghazni	Andar	1107252	2	1	594	595
Ghazni	Gelan	1117394	2	1	461	462
Ghazni	Gelan	1117394	3	1	405	406
Paktika	Sharan	1201004	4	1	170	171
Paktika	Mata khan	1202030	1	1	302	303
Paktika	Mata khan	1202283	2	1	212	213
Paktika	Yosuf khel	1203040	3	1	578	579
Paktika	Yosuf khel	1203042	4	1	299	300
Paktika	Yosuf khel	1203042	1	1	599	600
Paktika	Yahya khel	1204051	3	1	599	600
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205286	1	1	599	600
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205286	2	1	599	600
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205285	3	1	599	600
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205075	2	1	590	591
Paktika	Omna	1206066	3	1	598	599
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207090	2	1	598	599
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207095	2	1	594	595

Paktika	Gomal	1208293	3	1	599	600
Paktika	Gomal	1208293	1	1	595	596
Paktika	Gomal	1208129	1	1	595	596
Paktika	Gomal	1208144	1	1	564	565
Paktika	Gomal	1208144	2	1	597	598
Paktika	Gomal	1208139	1	1	589	590
Paktika	Gomal	1208138	1	1	593	594
Paktika	Jani khel	1209114	3	1	594	595
Paktika	Jani khel	1209117	2	1	591	592
Paktika	Jani khel	1209118	1	1	593	594
Paktika	Urgoon	1211176	2	1	598	599
Paktika	Urgoon	1211178	1	1	599	600
Paktika	Urgoon	1211181	1	1	599	600
Paktika	Nika	1213200	1	1	597	598
Paktika	Barmal	1214304	1	1	599	600
Paktika	Barmal	1214259	3	1	599	600
Paktika	Wazakhwah	1217230	3	1	599	600
Paktika	Wazakhwah	1217219	5	1	599	600
Paktika	Wazakhwah	1217222	2	1	599	600
Paktika	Wormamy	1218302	1	1	595	596
Paktya	Gardez	1301009	6	1	141	142
Paktya	Gardez	1301202	4	1	467	468
Paktya	Ahmadaba	1302196	2	1	598	599
Paktya	Ahmadaba	1302194	1	1	598	599
Paktya	Ahmadaba	1302198	1	1	594	595
Paktya	Ahmadaba	1302197	3	1	597	598
Paktya	Ahmadaba	1302218	2	1	599	600
Paktya	Ahmadaba	1302190	6	1	596	597
Paktya	Ahmadaba	1302197	1	1	596	597

Paktya	Zurmat	1303090	3	1	191	192
Paktya	Zurmat	1303089	1	1	119	120
Paktya	Zurmat	1303098	2	1	575	576
Paktya	Zurmat	1303101	2	1	100	101
Paktya	Shwak	1304113	6	1	599	600
Paktya	Wuza zadran	1305131	2	1	597	598
Paktya	Wuza zadran	1305128	1	1	593	594
Paktya	Wuza zadran	1305129	4	1	596	597
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306024	3	1	594	595
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306024	4	1	599	600
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306021	4	1	599	600
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306034	3	1	595	596
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306029	2	1	599	600
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306029	3	1	598	599
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306025	2	1	599	600
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306031	1	1	599	600
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307061	3	1	599	600
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307071	1	1	599	600
Paktya	Jani khel	1309171	1	1	599	600
Paktya	Samkani	1310163	2	1	597	598
Paktya	Samkani	1310161	4	1	598	599
Paktya	Samkani	1310163	3	1	595	596
Paktya	Samkani	1310159	4	1	597	598
Paktya	Dand patan	1311183	1	1	599	600
Na	Na	1313205	2	1	599	600
Na	Na	1313051	1	1	599	600
Na	Na	1313044	2	1	597	598
Khost	Khost	1401015	6	1	567	568
Khost	Khost	1401005	3	1	597	598

Khost	Khost	1401016	3	1	599	600
Khost	Khost	1401019	3	1	586	587
Khost	Khost	1401027	1	1	593	594
Khost	Khost	1401028	4	1	599	600
Khost	Khost	1401033	4	1	599	600
Khost	Khost	1401035	4	1	593	594
Khost	Khost	1401162	5	1	582	583
Khost	Khost	1401162	10	1	580	581
Khost	Khost	1401162	11	1	595	596
Khost	Khost	1401045	4	1	596	597
Khost	Khost	1401161	6	1	596	597
Khost	Khost	1401037	4	1	581	582
Khost	Khost	1401023	6	1	596	597
Khost	Manduza y	1402085	1	1	579	580
Khost	Manduza y	1402084	3	1	594	595
Khost	Manduza y	1402092	2	1	597	598
Khost	Manduza y	1402093	3	1	542	543
Khost	Manduza y	1402082	1	1	589	590
Khost	Manduza y	1402082	5	1	599	600
Khost	Manduza y	1402177	2	1	598	599
Khost	Gurbuz	1403147	3	1	590	591
Khost	Tanay	1404137	1	1	598	599
Khost	Tanay	1404137	2	1	589	590
Khost	Nadirsha h ko	1406124	3	1	159	160
Khost	Nadirsha h ko	1406122	2	1	585	586
Khost	Nadirsha h ko	1406124	2	1	430	431
Khost	Nadirsha h ko	1406122	4	1	564	565
Khost	Nadirsha h ko	1406115	1	1	578	579
Khost	Nadirsha	1406114	2	1	584	585

	h ko					
Khost	Nadirsha h ko	1406119	1	1	589	590
Khost	Sabari	1407065	8	1	588	589
Khost	Ali sher	1408054	4	1	594	595
Khost	Ali sher	1408051	1	1	587	588
Khost	Baak	1409062	2	1	484	485
Khost	Qalandar	1410105	2	1	587	588
Khost	Qalandar	1410107	2	1	586	587
Khost	Qalandar	1410111	3	1	591	592
Khost	Spera	1411127	6	1	594	595
Khost	Spera	1411128	6	1	473	474
Khost	Jaji maidan	1413104	4	1	598	599
Kunar	Sawkai	1509092	5	1	591	592
Kunar	Khas kunar	1510096	6	1	593	594
Kunduz	Char dara	1902120	4	1	205	206
Ghor	Shahrak	2306088	2	1	599	600
Zabul	Qalat	2601002	7	1	450	451
Zabul	Shah joi	2606014	4	1	410	411
Zabul	Atghar	2608073	2	1	510	511
Kandahar	Panjwaye e	2704193	7	1	553	554
Kandahar	Shah wali kot	2706095	1	1	593	594
Kandahar	Spin boldak	2711225	2	1	598	599
Jawzjan	Khwaja duko	2802110	10	1	586	587
Faryab	Pashtun kot	2902021	1	1	506	507
Faryab	Pashtun kot	2902023	2	1	164	165
Faryab	Khwaja sabz posh	2903054	5	1	449	450
Faryab	Khwaja sabz posh	2903054	8	1	118	119
Faryab	Khwaja sabz posh	2903059	5	1	599	600
Faryab	Gurziwan	2908130	3	1	596	597

Herat	Shindand	3214306	1	1	550	551
Herat	Shindand	3214322	3	1	595	596
Wardak	Maydan shah	401010	2	1	597	598
Wardak	Maydan shah	401010	4	1	599	600
Wardak	Maydan shah	401001	6	1	307	308
Wardak	Maydan shah	401008	4	1	599	600
Wardak	Maydan shah	401004	4	1	116	117
Wardak	Maydan shah	401004	3	1	112	113
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405108	6	1	599	600
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405118	2	1	599	600
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405114	9	1	599	600
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405109	2	1	354	355
Logar	Puli alam	501014	3	1	388	389
Logar	Puli alam	501016	2	1	564	565
Logar	Khushi	504049	3	1	140	141
Logar	Mohamm ad a	505065	5	1	271	272
Logar	Mohamm ad a	505052	2	1	202	203
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601009	5	1	587	588
Nangarhar	Kama	605185	2	1	217	218
Nangarhar	Khugyani	608283	3	1	192	193
Nangarhar	Pachir waga	611308	2	1	412	413
Nangarhar	Pachir waga	611308	3	1	248	249
Nangarhar	Kot	613517	1	1	312	313
Laghman	Mehtarla m	701022	2	1	378	379
Laghman	Mehtarla m	701010	5	1	596	597
Laghman	Mehtarla m	701009	1	1	582	583

Laghman	Qarghaye e	702049	6	1	308	309
Laghman	Qarghaye e	702049	4	1	596	597
Laghman	Qarghaye e	702049	1	1	590	591
Baghlan	Pul-e- khumri	901015	5	1	596	597
Baghlan	Baglan-e- jade	905045	1	1	599	600
Kabul	Kabul	101514	6	2	429	431
Kabul	Kabul	101448	5	2	595	597
Kabul	Kabul	101448	6	2	597	599
Kabul	Kabul	101448	8	2	598	600
Kabul	Kabul	101514	3	2	597	599
Kabul	Kabul	101448	3	2	596	598
Kabul	Kabul	101511	3	2	597	599
Kabul	Kabul	101511	4	2	596	598
Kabul	Kabul	101473	8	2	589	591
Kabul	Kabul	101332	4	2	596	598
Kabul	Kabul	101249	9	2	154	156
Kabul	Chahar asyab	103419	2	2	274	276
Kabul	Chahar asyab	103422	3	2	146	148
Ghazni	Andar	1107234	1	2	190	192
Ghazni	Andar	1107234	3	2	140	142
Ghazni	Andar	1107250	2	2	593	595
Ghazni	Muqur	1115369	2	2	219	221
Paktika	Sharan	1201005	3	2	107	109
Paktika	Sharan	1201004	3	2	154	156
Paktika	Mata khan	1202032	3	2	217	219
Paktika	Yahya khel	1204064	2	2	598	600
Paktika	Yahya khel	1204051	2	2	598	600
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205078	2	2	125	127
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205076	1	2	587	589
Paktika	Gomal	1208146	1	2	408	410

Paktika	Gomal	1208146	6	2	595	597
Paktika	Gomal	1208137	1	2	594	596
Paktika	Gomal	1208139	2	2	596	598
Paktika	Gomal	1208138	2	2	598	600
Paktika	Jani khel	1209124	1	2	592	594
Paktika	Jani khel	1209123	1	2	594	596
Paktika	Jani khel	1209109	2	2	595	597
Paktika	Jani khel	1209112	2	2	598	600
Paktika	Surubi	1210154	3	2	598	600
Paktika	Surubi	1210151	2	2	591	593
Paktika	Urgoon	1211162	3	2	595	597
Paktika	Nika	1213199	1	2	598	600
Paktika	Giyān	1215276	2	2	598	600
Paktika	Wazakhwah	1217229	1	2	597	599
Paktika	Wormamy	1218242	4	2	598	600
Paktika	Turwo	1219236	2	2	594	596
Paktya	Ahmadaba	1302193	4	2	428	430
Paktya	Ahmadaba	1302192	4	2	506	508
Paktya	Ahmadaba	1302194	3	2	598	600
Paktya	Ahmadaba	1302195	1	2	596	598
Paktya	Ahmadaba	1302195	2	2	597	599
Paktya	Ahmadaba	1302190	1	2	588	590
Paktya	Ahmadaba	1302191	1	2	597	599
Paktya	Zurmat	1303098	1	2	559	561
Paktya	Wuzazadran	1305128	3	2	598	600
Paktya	Wuzazadran	1305127	1	2	598	600
Paktya	Wuzazadran	1305129	3	2	598	600
Paktya	Wuzazadran	1305126	3	2	561	563

Paktya	Wuza zadran	1305118	3	2	588	590
Paktya	Wuza zadran	1305130	3	2	598	600
Paktya	Wuza zadran	1305120	2	2	562	564
Paktya	Wuza zadran	1305118	1	2	588	590
Paktya	Wuza zadran	1305129	1	2	598	600
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306021	6	2	596	598
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307065	1	2	598	600
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307061	4	2	576	578
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307076	3	2	596	598
Paktya	Jani khel	1309173	6	2	597	599
Paktya	Jani khel	1309172	5	2	556	558
Paktya	Samkani	1310168	1	2	598	600
Paktya	Dand patan	1311180	3	2	588	590
Paktya	Dand patan	1311189	3	2	595	597
Paktya	Dand patan	1311186	2	2	594	596
Na	Na	1312223	2	2	590	592
Na	Na	1313044	5	2	598	600
Khost	Khost	1401044	5	2	596	598
Khost	Khost	1401018	7	2	598	600
Khost	Khost	1401013	6	2	597	599
Khost	Khost	1401005	2	2	598	600
Khost	Khost	1401008	1	2	548	550
Khost	Khost	1401025	1	2	531	533
Khost	Khost	1401019	6	2	579	581
Khost	Khost	1401027	4	2	598	600
Khost	Khost	1401026	3	2	598	600
Khost	Khost	1401043	2	2	587	589
Khost	Khost	1401032	1	2	595	597
Khost	Khost	1401045	1	2	590	592
Khost	Khost	1401045	2	2	593	595

Khost	Khost	1401047	2	2	517	519
Khost	Khost	1401037	1	2	588	590
Khost	Khost	1401017	7	2	593	595
Khost	Khost	1401017	8	2	579	581
Khost	Khost	1401012	2	2	580	582
Khost	Manduza y	1402091	3	2	598	600
Khost	Manduza y	1402087	1	2	589	591
Khost	Manduza y	1402081	3	2	593	595
Khost	Manduza y	1402178	2	2	593	595
Khost	Manduza y	1402090	1	2	592	594
Khost	Manduza y	1402082	7	2	579	581
Khost	Manduza y	1402177	3	2	593	595
Khost	Gurbuz	1403153	2	2	594	596
Khost	Gurbuz	1403154	2	2	588	590
Khost	Tanay	1404133	4	2	587	589
Khost	Tanay	1404142	4	2	598	600
Khost	Tanay	1404141	4	2	597	599
Khost	Tanay	1404136	2	2	302	304
Khost	Musa khel	1405071	2	2	595	597
Khost	Nadirsha h ko	1406123	2	2	581	583
Khost	Nadirsha h ko	1406118	2	2	583	585
Khost	Nadirsha h ko	1406125	3	2	442	444
Khost	Nadirsha h ko	1406115	2	2	583	585
Khost	Nadirsha h ko	1406113	2	2	579	581
Khost	Sabari	1407065	5	2	437	439
Khost	Sabari	1407064	9	2	595	597
Khost	Sabari	1407066	6	2	112	114
Khost	Ali sher	1408049	3	2	592	594

Khost	Ali sher	1408050	2	2	232	234
Khost	Ali sher	1408050	1	2	257	259
Khost	Baak	1409061	3	2	573	575
Khost	Baak	1409057	7	2	598	600
Khost	Qalandar	1410111	1	2	597	599
Khost	Qalandar	1410106	1	2	592	594
Khost	Spera	1411129	3	2	545	547
Khost	Spera	1411127	3	2	596	598
Khost	Spera	1411128	4	2	594	596
Khost	Spera	1411128	2	2	592	594
Khost	Shamul	1412155	5	2	575	577
Khost	Shamul	1412160	2	2	130	132
Khost	Jaji maidan	1413098	4	2	598	600
Kunar	Sar kani	1505038	7	2	572	574
Takhar	Kalafgan	1807206	3	2	598	600
Kunduz	Kunduz	1901021	4	2	198	200
Kapisa	Nijrab	205039	2	2	102	104
Balkh	Sholgara	2107243	2	2	104	106
Balkh	Char bolak	2111198	3	2	146	148
Ghor	Duleena	2302238	2	2	535	537
Kandahar	Kandahar	2701063	4	2	582	584
Kandahar	Kandahar	2701007	3	2	229	231
Kandahar	Shah wali kot	2706095	2	2	595	597
Kandahar	Spin boldak	2711207	6	2	513	515
Na	Na	2717011	4	2	322	324
Faryab	Maimana	2901199	6	2	592	594
Faryab	Khwaja sabz posh	2903054	3	2	597	599
Faryab	Khwaja sabz posh	2903058	4	2	597	599
Faryab	Khwaja sabz posh	2903210	4	2	363	365
Faryab	Qaisar	2907090	3	2	552	554
Faryab	Qaisar	2907082	2	2	598	600

Faryab	Qaisar	2907203	2	2	598	600
Faryab	Andkhoy	2913189	5	2	543	545
Faryab	Andkhoy	2913185	4	2	452	454
Parwan	Shinwari	303073	4	2	116	118
Badghis	Muqur	3103024	2	2	590	592
Herat	Shindand	3214329	3	2	256	258
Wardak	Maydan shah	401005	4	2	121	123
Wardak	Maydan shah	401001	9	2	592	594
Wardak	Maydan shah	401008	5	2	598	600
Wardak	Jalrez	403014	1	2	155	157
Wardak	Jalrez	403017	1	2	198	200
Wardak	Chaki wardak	404092	3	2	598	600
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405115	1	2	598	600
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405131	2	2	590	592
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405120	1	2	593	595
Logar	Puli alam	501014	1	2	292	294
Logar	Puli alam	501019	5	2	594	596
Logar	Puli alam	501011	5	2	390	392
Logar	Puli alam	501004	5	2	582	584
Logar	Puli alam	501004	2	2	592	594
Logar	Puli alam	501009	3	2	590	592
Logar	Puli alam	501009	4	2	576	578
Logar	Mohamm ad a	505054	3	2	389	391
Logar	Mohamm ad a	505065	3	2	146	148
Logar	Mohamm ad a	505060	5	2	226	228
Logar	Mohamm ad a	505052	1	2	587	589
Logar	Mohamm ad a	505059	3	2	246	248
Logar	Mohamm ad a	505062	2	2	515	517

Logar	Mohammad a	505052	3	2	330	332
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601041	5	2	378	380
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601044	4	2	112	114
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601006	5	2	123	125
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601002	4	2	144	146
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601036	1	2	114	116
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601007	4	2	358	360
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601007	1	2	351	353
Nangarhar	Surkh rud	603093	7	2	114	116
Nangarhar	Surkh rud	603094	4	2	255	257
Nangarhar	Surkh rud	603089	2	2	199	201
Nangarhar	Rodat	607144	1	2	144	146
Nangarhar	Rodat	607142	2	2	185	187
Nangarhar	Khugyani	608285	1	2	598	600
Nangarhar	Khugyani	608276	2	2	598	600
Nangarhar	Khugyani	608286	1	2	598	600
Nangarhar	Pachirwaga	611315	1	2	225	227
Nangarhar	Shinwar	616436	1	2	195	197
Laghman	Mehtarlam	701004	6	2	550	552
Laghman	Qarghaye	702050	3	2	590	592
Laghman	Qarghaye	702049	5	2	593	595
Laghman	Qarghaye	702049	3	2	595	597
Kabul	Kabul	101448	7	3	597	600
Kabul	Kabul	101448	2	3	596	599
Kabul	Kabul	101449	5	3	594	597
Kabul	Kabul	101332	3	3	596	599
Kabul	Kabul	101510	3	3	589	592
Kabul	Kabul	101509	6	3	593	596
Kabul	Kabul	101176	6	3	115	118
Kabul	Kabul	101176	10	3	332	335
Kabul	Kabul	101160	2	3	187	190
Kabul	Chahar	103536	1	3	214	217

	asyab					
Kabul	Bagrami	104460	2	3	330	333
Kabul	Bagrami	104460	1	3	240	243
Ghazni	Andar	1107225	2	3	206	209
Ghazni	Andar	1107229	4	3	205	208
Ghazni	Andar	1107238	1	3	552	555
Ghazni	Andar	1107252	1	3	596	599
Ghazni	Qara bagh	1111195	1	3	595	598
Paktika	Sharan	1201022	2	3	195	198
Paktika	Sharan	1201004	1	3	351	354
Paktika	Sharan	1201003	2	3	576	579
Paktika	Sharan	1201026	3	3	97	100
Paktika	Sharan	1201008	2	3	522	525
Paktika	Sharan	1201008	3	3	525	528
Paktika	Mata khan	1202028	3	3	249	252
Paktika	Mata khan	1202027	2	3	554	557
Paktika	Mata khan	1202032	2	3	203	206
Paktika	Mata khan	1202029	1	3	99	102
Paktika	Mata khan	1202027	3	3	557	560
Paktika	Yosuf khel	1203046	1	3	399	402
Paktika	Yahya khel	1204052	1	3	597	600
Paktika	Yahya khel	1204062	1	3	597	600
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205081	2	3	513	516
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205077	1	3	190	193
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207085	1	3	593	596
Paktika	Gomal	1208291	1	3	594	597
Paktika	Gomal	1208132	2	3	102	105
Paktika	Gomal	1208137	2	3	592	595
Paktika	Jani khel	1209290	1	3	594	597
Paktika	Jani khel	1209109	4	3	592	595

Paktika	Barmal	1214264	1	3	597	600
Paktika	Barmal	1214259	2	3	596	599
Paktika	Wazakhwah	1217228	2	3	578	581
Paktika	Wazakhwah	1217230	4	3	597	600
Paktya	Gardez	1301017	2	3	98	101
Paktya	Gardez	1301006	5	3	282	285
Paktya	Gardez	1301006	6	3	146	149
Paktya	Gardez	1301005	5	3	585	588
Paktya	Gardez	1301202	1	3	477	480
Paktya	Gardez	1301202	2	3	515	518
Paktya	Ahmadaba	1302200	1	3	589	592
Paktya	Zurmat	1303078	3	3	563	566
Paktya	Zurmat	1303099	1	3	392	395
Paktya	Wuzazdran	1305131	3	3	597	600
Paktya	Wuzazdran	1305116	2	3	221	224
Paktya	Wuzazdran	1305117	1	3	597	600
Paktya	Sayyidkaram	1306035	1	3	112	115
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307076	5	3	595	598
Paktya	Lajaahmadk	1308138	2	3	597	600
Paktya	Samkani	1310168	3	3	596	599
Paktya	Samkani	1310166	2	3	595	598
Paktya	Samkani	1310163	4	3	596	599
Paktya	Dandpatan	1311183	2	3	593	596
Paktya	Dandpatan	1311187	2	3	595	598
Paktya	Dandpatan	1311185	2	3	595	598
Paktya	Dandpatan	1311189	2	3	596	599
Khost	Khost	1401014	3	3	587	590
Khost	Khost	1401021	4	3	558	561
Khost	Khost	1401027	2	3	591	594

Khost	Khost	1401030	1	3	590	593
Khost	Khost	1401030	2	3	592	595
Khost	Khost	1401043	4	3	596	599
Khost	Khost	1401162	2	3	573	576
Khost	Khost	1401161	1	3	592	595
Khost	Khost	1401161	2	3	589	592
Khost	Khost	1401161	4	3	592	595
Khost	Khost	1401046	2	3	538	541
Khost	Khost	1401034	3	3	589	592
Khost	Khost	1401017	2	3	577	580
Khost	Khost	1401017	3	3	591	594
Khost	Khost	1401023	4	3	596	599
Khost	Manduza y	1402094	2	3	588	591
Khost	Manduza y	1402079	5	3	584	587
Khost	Manduza y	1402088	2	3	583	586
Khost	Manduza y	1402087	2	3	583	586
Khost	Manduza y	1402083	1	3	585	588
Khost	Manduza y	1402083	3	3	510	513
Khost	Manduza y	1402095	1	3	285	288
Khost	Manduza y	1402093	2	3	596	599
Khost	Manduza y	1402090	2	3	589	592
Khost	Gurbuz	1403150	2	3	149	152
Khost	Gurbuz	1403147	5	3	593	596
Khost	Tanay	1404135	2	3	595	598
Khost	Tanay	1404137	5	3	596	599
Khost	Tanay	1404137	4	3	594	597
Khost	Musa khel	1405077	5	3	595	598
Khost	Musa khel	1405074	3	3	570	573
Khost	Musa khel	1405071	1	3	592	595

Khost	Nadirsha h ko	1406122	3	3	578	581
Khost	Nadirsha h ko	1406118	1	3	584	587
Khost	Sabari	1407064	3	3	581	584
Khost	Sabari	1407065	1	3	319	322
Khost	Sabari	1407065	2	3	350	353
Khost	Sabari	1407166	3	3	387	390
Khost	Sabari	1407167	4	3	595	598
Khost	Sabari	1407066	7	3	97	100
Khost	Ali sher	1408183	1	3	178	181
Khost	Qalandar	1410111	2	3	578	581
Khost	Spera	1411171	2	3	591	594
Khost	Spera	1411129	1	3	593	596
Khost	Spera	1411129	4	3	584	587
Khost	Spera	1411127	2	3	589	592
Khost	Spera	1411127	4	3	592	595
Khost	Spera	1411128	5	3	595	598
Khost	Spera	1411128	1	3	584	587
Khost	Shamul	1412155	4	3	555	558
Khost	Shamul	1412159	1	3	593	596
Kunar	Narang	1504036	2	3	590	593
Kunar	Ghazi abad	1511118	4	3	202	205
Kunar	Noor gal	1514088	3	3	504	507
Kunar	Noor gal	1514087	5	3	580	583
Kunduz	Char dara	1902127	5	3	177	180
Kunduz	Ali abad	1903134	3	3	288	291
Kunduz	Hazrat-e- imam	1905200	5	3	435	438
Kunduz	Hazrat-e- imam	1905200	6	3	100	103
Kapisa	Nijrab	205039	1	3	166	169
Kapisa	Tagab	206081	2	3	109	112
Kapisa	Tagab	206085	2	3	106	109
Kapisa	Tagab	206078	3	3	140	143
Ghor	Shahrak	2306079	1	3	597	600

Ghor	Shahrak	2306089	1	3	589	592
Zabul	Daichop an	2607022	4	3	216	219
Kandahar	Panjwaye	2704193	3	3	578	581
Kandahar	Shah wali kot	2706090	2	3	597	600
Kandahar	Spin boldak	2711226	1	3	566	569
Kandahar	Spin boldak	2711225	3	3	597	600
Kandahar	Spin boldak	2711225	4	3	583	586
Kandahar	Spin boldak	2711228	4	3	525	528
Na	Na	2717052	1	3	506	509
Jawzjan	Mardyan	2809060	4	3	435	438
Faryab	Maimana	2901002	10	3	166	169
Faryab	Khwaja sabz posh	2903210	3	3	595	598
Faryab	Almar	2904077	2	3	593	596
Faryab	Shirin tagab	2906153	4	3	592	595
Faryab	Qaisar	2907089	2	3	555	558
Faryab	Qaisar	2907081	7	3	572	575
Faryab	Qaisar	2907101	4	3	587	590
Faryab	Dawlat abad	2909159	3	3	105	108
Faryab	Qurghan	2912190	5	3	168	171
Faryab	Andkhoy	2913184	1	3	370	373
Faryab	Andkhoy	2913184	2	3	386	389
Faryab	Andkhoy	2913181	5	3	587	590
Herat	Gulran	3208224	1	3	597	600
Herat	Shindand	3214308	1	3	279	282
Farah	Bala buluk	3306162	3	3	588	591
Wardak	Maydan shah	401010	5	3	594	597
Wardak	Maydan shah	401008	2	3	597	600
Wardak	Chaki wardak	404083	3	3	597	600

Wardak	Sayyd abad	405130	1	3	597	600
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405111	4	3	597	600
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405142	4	3	597	600
Wardak	Jaghatu	408080	1	3	590	593
Logar	Puli alam	501009	1	3	511	514
Logar	Baraki barak	502036	1	3	516	519
Logar	Charkh	503044	1	3	570	573
Logar	Khushi	504047	3	3	253	256
Logar	Mohammad a	505063	5	3	596	599
Logar	Mohammad a	505067	1	3	588	591
Logar	Mohammad a	505062	3	3	545	548
Logar	Mohammad a	505057	4	3	442	445
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601009	3	3	333	336
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601018	6	3	140	143
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601007	2	3	349	352
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601032	4	3	335	338
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601015	4	3	437	440
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601011	6	3	153	156
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601015	2	3	375	378
Nangarhar	Behsud	602061	5	3	167	170
Nangarhar	Surkh rud	603094	5	3	202	205
Nangarhar	Surkh rud	603094	3	3	573	576
Nangarhar	Rodat	607143	2	3	248	251
Nangarhar	Shinwar	616421	3	3	101	104
Laghman	Mehtarlam	701025	4	3	111	114
Laghman	Qarghaye	702035	4	3	158	161
Laghman	Qarghaye	702040	4	3	257	260
Laghman	Qarghaye	702051	1	3	545	548
Laghman	Qarghaye	702038	3	3	190	193

	e					
Laghman	Alingar	704080	1	3	120	123
Baghlan	Pul-e-khumri	901016	2	3	589	592
Baghlan	Dahana-e-ghuri	902258	3	3	337	340
Kabul	Kabul	101511	2	4	571	575
Kabul	Kabul	101176	8	4	139	143
Kabul	Kabul	101151	4	4	132	136
Kabul	Paghman	102414	3	4	190	194
Kabul	Chahar asyab	103424	2	4	110	114
Kabul	Chahar asyab	103419	1	4	99	103
Kabul	Bagrami	104461	3	4	97	101
Kabul	Shakar dara	106543	3	4	108	112
Kabul	Surubi	115482	2	4	591	595
Paktika	Yosuf khel	1203041	1	4	263	267
Paktika	Yosuf khel	1203043	4	4	520	524
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205080	1	4	537	541
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205076	3	4	592	596
Paktika	Sar rawza	1205079	3	4	586	590
Paktika	Omna	1206066	1	4	594	598
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207098	1	4	109	113
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207085	2	4	594	598
Paktika	Gomal	1208141	2	4	585	589
Paktika	Gomal	1208126	2	4	594	598
Paktika	Gomal	1208131	2	4	100	104
Paktika	Jani khel	1209115	1	4	596	600
Paktika	Jani khel	1209115	2	4	592	596
Paktika	Turwo	1219231	5	4	594	598
Paktya	Gardez	1301015	1	4	110	114
Paktya	Ahmadab a	1302195	4	4	593	597
Paktya	Ahmadab	1302200	2	4	593	597

	a					
Paktya	Shwak	1304113	3	4	591	595
Paktya	Wuza zadran	1305128	2	4	596	600
Paktya	Wuza zadran	1305114	2	4	589	593
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306024	1	4	595	599
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306021	1	4	595	599
Paktya	Sayyid karam	1306024	2	4	595	599
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307076	2	4	596	600
Paktya	Samkani	1310160	4	4	590	594
Paktya	Samkani	1310165	1	4	585	589
Paktya	Dand patan	1311184	1	4	592	596
Paktya	Dand patan	1311189	4	4	596	600
Khost	Khost	1401044	4	4	595	599
Khost	Khost	1401004	1	4	594	598
Khost	Khost	1401004	2	4	593	597
Khost	Khost	1401004	3	4	397	401
Khost	Khost	1401025	2	4	573	577
Khost	Khost	1401025	4	4	472	476
Khost	Khost	1401035	3	4	594	598
Khost	Khost	1401162	7	4	596	600
Khost	Khost	1401161	7	4	591	595
Khost	Khost	1401023	2	4	591	595
Khost	Khost	1401023	3	4	594	598
Khost	Khost	1401029	4	4	594	598
Khost	Manduza y	1402088	1	4	585	589
Khost	Manduza y	1402091	2	4	582	586
Khost	Manduza y	1402178	3	4	584	588
Khost	Manduza y	1402094	1	4	591	595
Khost	Manduza y	1402096	1	4	590	594

Khost	Manduza y	1402177	1	4	592	596
Khost	Manduza y	1402082	2	4	592	596
Khost	Manduza y	1402082	3	4	586	590
Khost	Gurbuz	1403147	1	4	593	597
Khost	Gurbuz	1403147	4	4	592	596
Khost	Tanay	1404143	5	4	587	591
Khost	Tanay	1404135	4	4	595	599
Khost	Tanay	1404142	3	4	596	600
Khost	Tanay	1404145	1	4	595	599
Khost	Tanay	1404182	2	4	244	248
Khost	Tanay	1404137	3	4	595	599
Khost	Tanay	1404136	1	4	337	341
Khost	Musa khel	1405067	3	4	586	590
Khost	Musa khel	1405067	1	4	594	598
Khost	Musa khel	1405068	2	4	592	596
Khost	Nadirsha h ko	1406120	2	4	575	579
Khost	Nadirsha h ko	1406116	2	4	592	596
Khost	Sabari	1407064	7	4	506	510
Khost	Sabari	1407064	6	4	586	590
Khost	Ali sher	1408054	5	4	596	600
Khost	Ali sher	1408050	6	4	588	592
Khost	Ali sher	1408056	1	4	525	529
Khost	Baak	1409060	2	4	593	597
Khost	Spera	1411170	1	4	479	483
Khost	Spera	1411127	5	4	595	599
Khost	Spera	1411127	7	4	595	599
Khost	Spera	1411129	2	4	571	575
Khost	Shamul	1412160	1	4	172	176
Khost	Shamul	1412155	2	4	554	558
Kunar	Asad abad	1501004	7	4	586	590

Kunar	Sawkai	1509094	7	4	584	588
Kunar	Sawkai	1509094	5	4	593	597
Kunar	Chapadara	1513082	1	4	593	597
Takhar	Hazarsumuc	1802038	2	4	306	310
Takhar	Bangi	1804061	3	4	379	383
Kunduz	Kunduz	1901050	1	4	333	337
Kunduz	Dasht-e-archi	1906181	4	4	97	101
Zabul	Tarankwaja	2602027	1	4	514	518
Zabul	Shinkai	2603033	10	4	360	364
Zabul	Daichopani	2607022	3	4	490	494
Kandahar	Panjwaye	2704190	1	4	401	405
Kandahar	Zhire	2705153	4	4	495	499
Na	Na	2718241	2	4	240	244
Jawzjan	Sheberghan	2801031	1	4	187	191
Jawzjan	Sheberghan	2801031	3	4	210	214
Jawzjan	Sheberghan	2801021	1	4	177	181
Jawzjan	Khwajaduko	2802110	9	4	589	593
Jawzjan	Darzab	2811127	3	4	150	154
Faryab	Pashtunkot	2902023	3	4	164	168
Faryab	Khwajasabzposh	2903058	3	4	595	599
Faryab	Almar	2904073	1	4	594	598
Faryab	Qaramqul	2911216	3	4	504	508
Faryab	Andkhoy	2913184	3	4	386	390
Helmand	Lashkargah	3001021	2	4	228	232
Helmand	Lashkargah	3001021	3	4	225	229
Helmand	Nadali	3002070	4	4	116	120
Helmand	Nawa-e-barakzayi	3003090	2	4	170	174

Helmand	Nawa-e-barakzayi	3003092	2	4	413	417
Parwan	Kohi safi	308156	1	4	118	122
Herat	Guzara	3203438	2	4	96	100
Herat	Adraskan	3209293	2	4	550	554
Herat	Shindand	3214308	2	4	468	472
Farah	Khak-e-safed	3303051	1	4	570	574
Wardak	Maydan shah	401001	7	4	186	190
Wardak	Maydan shah	401005	1	4	170	174
Wardak	Maydan shah	401004	1	4	152	156
Wardak	Maydan shah	401012	4	4	128	132
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405110	5	4	591	595
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405114	8	4	596	600
Logar	Puli alam	501014	2	4	188	192
Logar	Puli alam	501008	4	4	140	144
Logar	Puli alam	501001	7	4	131	135
Logar	Puli alam	501007	2	4	587	591
Logar	Puli alam	501007	3	4	589	593
Logar	Puli alam	501007	13	4	580	584
Logar	Puli alam	501008	1	4	143	147
Logar	Baraki barak	502022	6	4	173	177
Logar	Mohamm ad a	505055	2	4	403	407
Logar	Mohamm ad a	505060	4	4	583	587
Logar	Mohamm ad a	505067	4	4	183	187
Logar	Mohamm ad a	505066	5	4	588	592
Logar	Azra	507081	5	4	596	600
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601004	3	4	541	545
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601004	7	4	144	148
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601009	1	4	266	270

Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601030	2	4	173	177
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601011	2	4	128	132
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601014	5	4	300	304
Nangarhar	Behsud	602045	6	4	406	410
Nangarhar	Surkh rud	603080	3	4	171	175
Nangarhar	Kama	605154	2	4	134	138
Nangarhar	Kama	605176	3	4	210	214
Nangarhar	Khugyani	608291	2	4	99	103
Nangarhar	Khugyani	608286	2	4	596	600
Nangarhar	Bati kot	609459	1	4	476	480
Nangarhar	Pachir waga	611306	2	4	135	139
Nangarhar	Kot	613344	1	4	136	140
Nangarhar	Achin	615362	2	4	104	108
Nangarhar	Shinwar	616430	3	4	150	154
Nangarhar	Muhman d dara	617477	2	4	298	302
Nangarhar	Dur baba	622412	4	4	596	600
Laghman	Mehtarlam	701024	1	4	531	535
Laghman	Mehtarlam	701017	3	4	592	596
Laghman	Mehtarlam	701016	2	4	402	406
Laghman	Mehtarlam	701005	9	4	141	145
Laghman	Qarghaye e	702035	5	4	149	153
Laghman	Qarghaye e	702051	2	4	524	528
Laghman	Qarghaye e	702045	6	4	125	129
Baghlan	Pul-e-khumri	901031	2	4	589	593
Baghlan	Dahana-e-ghuri	902258	2	4	311	315
Baghlan	Baglan-e-jade	905046	2	4	569	573
Baghlan	Baglan-e-jade	905268	3	4	485	489
Baghlan	Tala wa barf	911169	3	4	586	590

Kabul	Kabul	101532	3	5	590	595
Kabul	Kabul	101313	6	5	276	281
Kabul	Kabul	101313	7	5	241	246
Kabul	Kabul	101473	1	5	591	596
Kabul	Kabul	101473	9	5	592	597
Kabul	Kabul	101510	4	5	594	599
Kabul	Kabul	101449	1	5	585	590
Kabul	Kabul	101509	2	5	488	493
Kabul	Kabul	101176	1	5	586	591
Kabul	Chahar asyab	103429	5	5	465	470
Kabul	Chahar asyab	103422	2	5	435	440
Kabul	Chahar asyab	103537	2	5	218	223
Kabul	Bagrami	104461	4	5	583	588
Kabul	Dehsabz	105330	7	5	117	122
Kabul	Khak-e- jabar	109445	3	5	496	501
Ghazni	Andar	1107232	1	5	509	514
Ghazni	Andar	1107224	2	5	594	599
Ghazni	Qara bagh	1111152	2	5	227	232
Paktika	Sharan	1201017	1	5	548	553
Paktika	Sharan	1201021	3	5	317	322
Paktika	Sharan	1201018	1	5	545	550
Paktika	Sharan	1201018	2	5	553	558
Paktika	Sharan	1201007	3	5	572	577
Paktika	Sharan	1201011	1	5	543	548
Paktika	Mata khan	1202028	2	5	507	512
Paktika	Omna	1206284	3	5	582	587
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207105	2	5	593	598
Paktika	Zarghun shah	1207106	1	5	595	600
Paktika	Gomal	1208125	3	5	584	589
Paktika	Gomal	1208146	2	5	591	596
Paktika	Gomal	1208142	1	5	583	588

Paktika	Gomal	1208129	3	5	595	600
Paktika	Gomal	1208146	5	5	520	525
Paktika	Surubi	1210159	1	5	586	591
Paktika	Surubi	1210149	1	5	588	593
Paktika	Surubi	1210153	2	5	594	599
Paktika	Surubi	1210159	2	5	589	594
Paktika	Urgoon	1211186	1	5	595	600
Paktika	Urgoon	1211165	1	5	595	600
Paktika	Dila wa khush	1216208	3	5	586	591
Paktika	Wor mamy	1218241	1	5	595	600
Paktya	Gardez	1301006	1	5	302	307
Paktya	Gardez	1301005	4	5	562	567
Paktya	Gardez	1301005	1	5	583	588
Paktya	Ahmadaba	1302200	4	5	588	593
Paktya	Ahmadaba	1302191	5	5	580	585
Paktya	Ahmadaba	1302218	1	5	595	600
Paktya	Zurmat	1303093	1	5	556	561
Paktya	Zurmat	1303078	6	5	586	591
Paktya	Wuzadran	1305124	3	5	595	600
Paktya	Wuzadran	1305114	1	5	589	594
Paktya	Wuzadran	1305116	1	5	144	149
Paktya	Sayyidkaram	1306020	4	5	594	599
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307067	1	5	595	600
Paktya	Jaji aryob	1307067	3	5	595	600
Paktya	Samkani	1310166	3	5	591	596
Paktya	Samkani	1310158	2	5	589	594
Paktya	Dandpatan	1311210	1	5	595	600
Na	Na	1312222	3	5	595	600
Khost	Khost	1401015	1	5	572	577
Khost	Khost	1401009	4	5	571	576

Khost	Khost	1401021	3	5	595	600
Khost	Khost	1401021	6	5	563	568
Khost	Khost	1401030	5	5	578	583
Khost	Khost	1401036	1	5	590	595
Khost	Khost	1401028	2	5	595	600
Khost	Khost	1401038	2	5	209	214
Khost	Khost	1401038	3	5	145	150
Khost	Khost	1401176	2	5	595	600
Khost	Khost	1401046	4	5	548	553
Khost	Manduza y	1402081	1	5	580	585
Khost	Manduza y	1402095	3	5	589	594
Khost	Manduza y	1402095	2	5	289	294
Khost	Manduza y	1402093	1	5	588	593
Khost	Manduza y	1402092	1	5	573	578
Khost	Manduza y	1402086	2	5	561	566
Khost	Manduza y	1402179	2	5	454	459
Khost	Tanay	1404133	5	5	587	592
Khost	Tanay	1404144	2	5	593	598
Khost	Tanay	1404144	3	5	592	597
Khost	Tanay	1404135	3	5	593	598
Khost	Tanay	1404142	1	5	595	600
Khost	Tanay	1404142	2	5	592	597
Khost	Tanay	1404136	3	5	291	296
Khost	Musa khel	1405074	1	5	582	587
Khost	Musa khel	1405067	4	5	473	478
Khost	Nadirsha h ko	1406122	1	5	575	580
Khost	Nadirsha h ko	1406124	1	5	481	486
Khost	Nadirsha h ko	1406125	2	5	567	572
Khost	Nadirsha	1406126	2	5	591	596

	h ko					
Khost	Nadirsha h ko	1406116	1	5	584	589
Khost	Ali sher	1408051	5	5	580	585
Khost	Ali sher	1408051	3	5	589	594
Khost	Qalandar	1410112	1	5	590	595
Khost	Qalandar	1410109	2	5	595	600
Khost	Qalandar	1410110	3	5	594	599
Khost	Qalandar	1410110	4	5	592	597
Khost	Qalandar	1410107	3	5	593	598
Khost	Spera	1411168	1	5	583	588
Khost	Shamul	1412159	2	5	594	599
Khost	Jaji maidan	1413104	1	5	589	594
Kunar	Asad abad	1501001	7	5	575	580
Kunar	Chapa dara	1513082	3	5	313	318
Takhar	Kalafgan	1807094	3	5	314	319
Takhar	Rustaq	1810117	2	5	592	597
Kunduz	Kunduz	1901199	1	5	399	404
Kunduz	Kunduz	1901038	3	5	136	141
Kunduz	Ali abad	1903134	4	5	234	239
Kapisa	Tagab	206078	4	5	112	117
Balkh	Sholgara	2107268	2	5	195	200
Balkh	Chimtal	2108233	2	5	115	120
Sar-e-pul	Kohistana t	2203061	5	5	580	585
Urozgan	Shahid-e- hass	2504033	4	5	181	186
Zabul	Qalat	2601005	4	5	404	409
Zabul	Tarank wa ja	2602029	4	5	510	515
Zabul	Arghanda b	2605018	5	5	581	586
Zabul	Atghar	2608035	2	5	575	580
Kandahar	Daman	2703083	2	5	537	542
Kandahar	Panjwaye e	2704193	5	5	583	588

Kandahar	Panjwaye e	2704193	4	5	579	584
Kandahar	Spin boldak	2711228	5	5	501	506
Kandahar	Nish	2712266	2	5	567	572
Kandahar	Shorabak	2714199	5	5	250	255
Na	Na	2717052	7	5	325	330
Jawzjan	Sheberghan	2801020	4	5	327	332
Jawzjan	Sheberghan	2801006	4	5	250	255
Jawzjan	Faizabad	2808059	1	5	207	212
Faryab	Khwaja sabz posh	2903054	2	5	588	593
Faryab	Khwaja sabz posh	2903058	5	5	344	349
Faryab	Almar	2904077	1	5	592	597
Faryab	Almar	2904067	3	5	594	599
Faryab	Qaisar	2907082	3	5	592	597
Faryab	Dawlat abad	2909162	1	5	593	598
Faryab	Qaram qul	2911216	2	5	237	242
Faryab	Andkhoy	2913184	5	5	568	573
Faryab	Andkhoy	2913189	4	5	419	424
Faryab	Andkhoy	2913183	4	5	472	477
Faryab	Andkhoy	2913183	6	5	497	502
Faryab	Andkhoy	2913189	1	5	316	321
Faryab	Andkhoy	2913189	2	5	227	232
Faryab	Khani charba	2914176	4	5	204	209
Herat	Shindand	3214329	2	5	119	124
Farah	Farah	3301028	2	5	181	186
Farah	Bala buluk	3306128	1	5	105	110
Wardak	Maydan shah	401009	2	5	261	266
Wardak	Chaki wardak	404095	3	5	595	600
Wardak	Sayyd abad	405116	2	5	591	596

Wardak	Sayd abad	405108	1	5	594	599
Wardak	Sayd abad	405110	2	5	592	597
Wardak	Jaghatu	408079	2	5	595	600
Logar	Puli alam	501014	4	5	587	592
Logar	Puli alam	501004	4	5	592	597
Logar	Puli alam	501005	2	5	190	195
Logar	Mohamm ad a	505055	3	5	362	367
Logar	Mohamm ad a	505055	1	5	518	523
Logar	Mohamm ad a	505063	2	5	587	592
Logar	Mohamm ad a	505059	1	5	321	326
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601043	4	5	486	491
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601044	5	5	103	108
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601004	6	5	257	262
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601036	5	5	580	585
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601034	3	5	151	156
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	601009	2	5	172	177
Nangarhar	Kama	605511	3	5	107	112
Nangarhar	Khugyani	608285	3	5	595	600
Nangarhar	Pachir waga	611309	2	5	424	429
Laghman	Mehtarla m	701018	3	5	593	598
Laghman	Mehtarla m	701024	3	5	405	410
Laghman	Mehtarla m	701017	2	5	589	594
Laghman	Mehtarla m	701024	2	5	321	326
Laghman	Mehtarla m	701002	1	5	592	597
Laghman	Qarghaye e	702038	1	5	290	295
Laghman	Alishing	703097	4	5	586	591
Laghman	Alingar	704085	2	5	494	499
Laghman	Alingar	704064	3	5	153	158

Baghlan	Pul-e-khumri	901013	2	5	592	597
Baghlan	Pul-e-khumri	901017	2	5	579	584

Appendix B

Table 10: Abdullah Abdullah 35 Polling Place Votes of Extremely High Percentages (At Least 100 votes Cast)⁵⁸

<i>Province</i>	<i>District</i>	<i>PC number</i>	<i>PS number</i>	<i>Abdullah</i>	<i>Ghani</i>	<i>Total</i>
Paktika	Barmal	1214305	3	600	0	600
Paktika	Wor mamy	1218238	2	600	0	600
Na	Na	1312151	1	600	0	600
Na	Na	1312152	2	600	0	600
Nooristan	Wama	1603075	3	600	0	600
Badakhshan	Tashkan	1711180	2	600	0	600
Kapisa	Nijrab	205043	4	600	0	600
Ghor	Duleena	2302105	3	600	0	600
Ghor	Dawlatyar	2303058	2	600	0	600
Ghor	Char sada	2304067	1	600	0	600
Ghor	Char sada	2304067	3	600	0	600
Ghor	Shahrak	2306080	1	600	0	600
Ghor	Shahrak	2306080	2	600	0	600
Ghor	Taywara	2308216	2	600	0	600
Ghor	Tulak	2309184	2	600	0	600
Ghor	Saghar	2310202	3	600	0	600
Faryab	Pashtun kot	2902028	1	600	0	600
Badghis	Ghormach	3107125	3	600	0	600
Nooristan	Paroon	1601006	4	599	1	600
Badakhshan	Darayim	1707068	3	599	1	600
Badakhshan	Darayim	1707294	3	599	1	600
Ghor	Taywara	2308213	1	599	0	599

⁵⁸ Afghan Election Data, http://2014.afghanistanelectiondata.org/#runoff/results_runoff.

Faryab	Gurziwan	2908206	3	599	0	599
Baghlan	Khost wa firi	913255	2	599	0	599
Badakhshan	Yaftal-e-sufla	1704291	3	598	0	598
Badakhshan	Yaftal-e-sufla	1704029	3	598	1	599
Badakhshan	Yaftal-e-sufla	1704030	2	598	1	599
Samangan	Khuram wa sabagh	2003079	3	598	1	599
Kapisa	Nijrab	205053	3	598	1	599
Ghor	Dawlatyar	2303058	1	598	1	599
Ghor	Dawlatyar	2303058	3	598	2	600
Ghor	Char sada	2304070	1	598	1	599
Ghor	Tulak	2309194	3	598	2	600
Faryab	Pashtun kot	2902028	2	598	0	598
Faryab	Gurziwan	2908135	3	598	0	598
Nangarhar	Darah-e-noor	612235	1	598	0	598
Baghlan	Khost wa firi	913213	1	598	1	599
Baghlan	Gozargah-e-nur	914225	3	598	2	600
Paktika	Wor mamy	1218238	3	597	0	597
Nooristan	Wama	1603075	2	597	3	600
Badakhshan	Darwaz-e-pay	1722262	3	597	2	599
Ghor	Duleena	2302105	1	597	3	600
Herat	Kushk-e-kuhn	3210418	3	597	0	597
Baghlan	Deh salah	908185	3	597	3	600
Paktika	Jani khel	1209112	3	596	4	600
Badakhshan	Yaftal-e-sufla	1704033	4	596	4	600
Badakhshan	Darayim	1707066	2	596	4	600
Badakhshan	Darayim	1707068	2	596	4	600
Badakhshan	Darayim	1707071	3	596	2	598
Kapisa	Nijrab	205051	3	596	3	599

Ghor	Taywara	2308213	2	596	0	596
Baghlan	Khost wa firi	913256	2	596	3	599
Badakhshan	Darayim	1707062	4	595	3	598
Badakhshan	Darwaz-e-pay	1722263	3	595	2	597
Takhar	Farkhar	1808088	1	595	0	595
Takhar	Eshkamesh	1811073	2	595	3	598
Kapisa	Nijrab	205066	2	595	5	600
Balkh	Marmul	2105071	2	595	1	596
Ghor	Chighcheran	2301022	2	595	5	600
Ghor	Duleena	2302104	4	595	2	597
Herat	Kushk (rubat-e	3207479	3	595	3	598
Baghlan	Jalga	909277	3	595	1	596

Bibliography

- Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, UNAMA. "Afghanistan: AIHRC-UNAMA Joint Monitoring of Political Rights, Presidential and Provincial Council Elections, Third Report, 1 Aug - 21 Oct 2009." October 21, 2009. <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-aihrc-unama-joint-monitoring-political-rights-presidential-and-1>.
- Amani, Wahidulla. "The Making of an Election." October 7, 2004. https://web.archive.org/web/20041013205424/http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/arr/arr_200410_139_04_eng.txt.
- Atkinson, Darren. "Democracy as Theatre: The 2014 Presidential Elections in Afghanistan." *E-International Relations*. <https://www.e-ir.info/2014/08/12/democracy-as-theatre-the-2014-presidential-elections-in-afghanistan/>.
- Barfield, Thomas. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012.
- Coburn, Noah. "Afghanistan: The 2014 Vote and the Troubled Future of Elections," The Chatham House: Asia Programme, March 2015, Afghanistan: Opportunity in Crisis Series No. 8.
- Coburn, Noah and Anna Larson, *Derailing Democracy in Afghanistan: Elections in an Unstable Political Landscape*. Columbia University Press, 2014.
- Coll, Steve *Directorate S*. New York: Penguin Press, 2018.
- Gall, Carlotta. "In Afghan Election, Signs of Systemic Fraud Cast Doubt on Many Votes." *The New York Times*, August 23, 2014. <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/24/world/asia/in-afghan-election-signs-of-systemic-fraud-cast-doubt-on-many-votes.html>.
- Craig, Tim and Mohammad Sharif. "Abdullah Abdullah, the Front-Runner in the Afghan Presidential Race, Solidifies Support."

Washington Post, May 11, 2014, sec. World, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/abdullah-the-front-runner-in-afghan-election-picks-up-new-support-from-one-time-rival/2014/05/11/db84abd8-d939-11e3-8009-71de85b9c527_story.html.

Dupree, Louis, *Afghanistan*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973.

Gopal, Anand. "Afghan Voter Registration Marred," *The Christian Science Monitor*. December 24, 2008.

Harrison, Emma Graham. "Afghan Election Crisis: 'Stuffed Sheep' Recordings Suggest Large-Scale Election Fraud." *The Guardian-US Edition*. June 22, 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/22/afghan-election-crisis-stuffed-sheep-fraud>.

Horowitz, Donald, L. "Democracy in Divided Societies." *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 4, 1993, 18–38.

Huntington, Samuel. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Johnson, Thomas H., and Taliban Narratives. *The Use and Power of Stories in the Afghanistan Conflict*. London: Hurst Publisher and Oxford University Press, December 2017.

Johnson, Thomas H. "Afghanistan's post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building After War." *Central Asian Survey* 25, no. 1–2 (March–June 2006): 1–26.

Kennedy, Merrit. "U.S. Military Withholds Key Measures of Afghan War." *The Two-Way: Breaking News from NPR*. October 31, 2017. <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/10/31/561140868/u-s-military-withholds-key-measures-of-afghan-war>.

Kube, Courtney. "The Taliban is Gaining Strength and Territory in Afghanistan." NBC News. January 30, 2018. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/numbers-afghanistan-are-not-good-n842651>.

Latifi, Ali M. "Sixteen Afghan Election Hopefuls Disqualified." *Al Jazeera*. October 22, 2013. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2013/10/sixteen-afghan-election-hopefuls-disqualified-2013102213563537306.html>.

Mashal, Mujib. "Afghan President Under Fire as Critics Chafe at Overdue Vote," *The New York Times*. December 12, 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/world/asia/afghanistan-ashraf-ghani-elections.html>.

Mason, Chris. "Fraud and Folly In Afghanistan," *Foreign Policy*, September 23, 2014.

Miller, Paul D. "Democracy in Afghanistan: The 2014 Election and Beyond." *RAND Corporation*, 2014. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE120/RAND_PE120.pdf.

Noel, Sid. *From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies*. Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005.

Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). *Quarterly Report to Congress*. Washington, DC, July 30, 2018.

Pacheco, Fernando "The Role of External Development Actors in the Post-conflict Scenarios – The Case of Angola." in *The Role of External Actors in Post-Conflict Scenarios*, edited by Fernando Pacheco, Mamadu Jao, Teresa de Almeida Cravo, and Ulrich Schiefer. Coimbra: Oficina do CES, No. 258, September 2006.

Packer, George. "Afghanistan's Theorist-in-chief: President Ghani is an expert on failed states. Can He Save His Country from Collapse?" *The New Yorker*, July 4, 2016, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/07/04/ashraf-ghani-afghanistans-theorist-inchief>.

Rafi, Kambaiz. "Afghanistan's Institutional Credibility Crisis And Likelihood Of 'Sheepish Elections' – Analysis." *Eurasia Review*, June 21, 2018. <https://www.eurasiareview.com/21062018-afghanistans-institutional-credibility-crisis-and-likelihood-of-sheepish-elections-analysis/>.

Rubin, Barnett R. *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002.

Ruttig, Thomas. "Elections (31)." Afghanistan Analysts Network website: www.afghanistan-analysts.org.

Ruttig, Thomas. "Pluralistic within Limits, but Not Democratic." Afghanistan Analysts Network website: www.afghanistan-analysts.org.

Sharan, Timor and Srinjoy Bose. "Political Networks and the 2014 Afghan Presidential Election: Power Restructuring, Ethnicity and State Stability." *Conflict, Security & Development* 16, no. 6 November 1, 2016. 613–33. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2016.1248431>

van Bijlert, Martin. "Afghan Elections Dilemma." Afghanistan Analysts Network website: www.afghanistan-analysts.org.

van Bijlert, Martin. "Polling Day Fraud in the Afghan Elections." Afghanistan Analysts Network website: www.afghanistan-analysts.org.

van Bijlert, Martin. "Elections in Hibernation." Afghanistan Analysts Network website: www.afghanistan-analysts.org.

Worden, Scott. "Afghanistan Election Conundrum (12): New voter registry too good to be true." August 28, 2018. <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/afghanistan-election-conundrum-12-new-voter-registry-too-good-to-be-true/>.

About the Author

Professor Thomas H. Johnson is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies (AISS) and Director of the Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA where he is on the faculty in the Department of National Security Affairs. He has conducted research and written about Afghanistan, South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa for over three decades.

He has taught at the University of Southern California and the Foreign Service Institute, and frequently lectures at Service Academies. Before joining the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School, he served on the research faculty of George Mason University. He regularly conducts field research in Afghanistan and South Asia. He served as the counterinsurgency advisor to the Commander of Task Force Kandahar (General Jon Vance). His area of expertise include military history of insurgency and counter-insurgency, and Central and South Asia, particularly Afghanistan and Pakistan. He has published widely on Afghanistan and his latest book is *Taliban Narratives: The Use and Power of Stories in the Afghanistan Conflict*, co-published by Oxford University Press and Hurst Publishing (London).



انستیتوت مطالعات استراتژیک افغانستان


Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies


Constitutional & Political System
Reform Studies IV

 @AISS_Afg

 www.facebook.com/AISSAfghanistan

 https://t.me/AISS_Afg

 www.aiss.af

 contact@aiss.af

 +93 799840161

ISBN 978-9936-8070-8-2



9 789936 807082